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To assure coordination of emergency response across multiple areas of 
responsibility, clear methods of communication between public health agencies need to 
be defined before responding to foodborne outbreaks. Such capacity is essential to assure 
the United States can satisfy its goal of achieving an Integrated Food Safety System, as 
mandated under the 2011 Food Safety Modernization Act. With this in mind, a 
comparative analysis was conducted of 21 states’ general operating procedures to 
ascertain lines and modes of communication related to foodborne outbreaks, evaluate for 
procedural commonalities and best practices, identify potential barriers to effective 
communication, and make recommendations to enhance multi-directional coordinated 
information exchanges among health agencies.  
The analysis identified that while all states included recognize the value of a 
prompt response in disease identification, investigation and control, coordinated 
communication strategies within and between affected public health agencies is less 
robust. Many protocols are vague in establishing parameters for what information can be 
shared with other agencies, and under which circumstances. A multitude of electronic 
portals exist for collaborative purposes; however, these resources are not centralized.  
Recommendations for systemic improvement include expanding the current food 
protection rapid-response teams to all 50 states, assuring that formalized inter- and intra-
agency communication plans exist in every outbreak response protocol, assuring the 
Incident Command System is explicitly stipulated in every regulatory outbreak response 
plan, and establishing funding opportunities for county and local health agencies related 
to communication training and system enhancements for collaborations in the midst of an 
outbreak. 
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A. INTRODUCTION  
The United States public health system, including agencies at the federal, state, 
and local levels, is charged with protecting citizens from illness due to food. While 
working toward this protective oversight, public health professionals are challenged by an 
increasing frequency of multi-jurisdictional outbreaks. Effective communication and 
crucial information sharing between public health agencies is essential to assure unified 
and rapid identification and response to epidemics attributed to food.  
Local public health professionals rely on communications systems established by 
federal and state oversight agencies. Most commonly, if a verified or suspect foodborne 
contamination or outbreak has occurred, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), the U.S. Department of Agriculture, or the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) will ascertain the appropriateness of information release.1 If this information is 
deemed credible, notification is forwarded individually or en masse to state departments 
of health. The states, in turn, push this information down to local regulators.2 Each step in 
the process contains elements that may delay the rapid dissemination of outbreak 
information. The ability and willingness of all stakeholders to quickly and readily share 
incident particulars with fellow responding agencies can enhance investigation 
effectiveness and amplify response efforts.3 
Delays in the prompt notification between public health partners can result from 
the federal agencies desiring a certain level of correlation between a particular food 
source and the reported illnesses. Data sharing is difficult because federal agencies are 
legally prevented from sharing certain data. As a result, state and local public health 
officials may hear about foodborne disease issues first from other sources, such as the 
                                                 
1 “Investigating Foodborne Outbreaks,” last updated March 17, 2016, http://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/ 
outbreaks/index.html. http://www.cdc.gov/outbreaknet/investigations/. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) and Council of State and Territorial 
Epidemiologists, Guidelines for Foodborne Disease Outbreak Response (Atlanta, GA: Council to Improve 
Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) and Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, 2009), 152. 
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media, word of mouth, public complaints, or the food industry.4 In addition, the desire of 
some states to have their own logos and contact information on the notifications can 
cause further delays in information dissemination. Slow notification can inhibit timely 
response efforts, and increase the likelihood of additional illness.  
Although national recommendations for notifications do exist, some outbreak 
reporting depends on state and local requirements. Some public health departments lack 
the resources to provide rapid access to communications, or staff to consistently monitor 
the same. Anecdotal reports of current communication strategies and governmental 
efforts provide an extremely unbalanced approach to essential information sharing.  
With this in mind, this research examined states’ general operating procedures to 
ascertain lines and modes of communication related to foodborne outbreaks, determine 
procedural commonalities, identify potential barriers, and make recommendations to 
enhance multi-directional information exchanges between health agencies. The 
implications of this study for improving policy, inter-agency communications, and 
foodborne outbreak notification dissemination are significant. Creating a picture of the 
status of foodborne disease outbreak communications lays a foundation for gap analysis 
and performance comparison, and identifies areas for functional improvement. 
Addressing these issues can improve the two-way flow of information for food protection 
issues, and may be applicable to other areas where federal, state, and local agencies need 
interactive communication.  
Directions for foodborne outbreak response exist in collaborative proceedings, 
such as the Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) guidelines; 
however, exact assignments for managing outbreaks are state-specific. The variability 
observed in states’ approaches was conspicuous, especially in the areas of outreach and 
communication. References to the Incident Command System (ICS) is lacking in all but a 
few states’ documents. A well-designed communication plan with a focal spokesperson 
helps to prevent unnecessary duplication, mixed messages, and avoidable delays. This 
area should be formalized in written response plans, and have enough specificity to 
4 Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) and Council of State and Territorial 
Epidemiologists, Guidelines for Foodborne Disease Outbreak Response, 152. 
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assure appropriate and timely notifications to all who should be included in the outbreak 
response conversation.  
As foodborne outbreaks are often a rapidly evolving and sometimes confusing 
situation, all agencies should maintain a written, defined, specific, clear, and understood 
communication plan as part of their foodborne outbreak protocols to reduce the 
likelihood of two-way information transmission delays with public health. The interplay 
of people and agencies involved in a local or state response necessitates all public health 
response staff be trained on how information needs to be exchanged, how this exchange 
will occur, who is the person or agency responsible for the delivery of the message, and 
how to confirm the message has been received and understood. Designating key staff for 
inter- and intra-agency communication helps to assure work is not being done in 
isolation. As outbreak response teams may vary in different jurisdictions, roles and 
responsibilities may overlap. Communication guidelines should specify how to 
incorporate partners that could be involved, and outline when and how to share specific 
information.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
In responding to foodborne outbreaks, effective communication guidelines and 
strategies are essential for public health agencies to assure situational awareness and 
interoperability. Based on the content of the states’ foodborne outbreak protocols 
reviewed for this research, a summary of recommendations includes the following.  
1. Review and Update of Outbreak Communication Protocols  
It is strongly recommended that all jurisdictions review and update their 
procedures on an annual basis. It is especially imperative for those agencies with older 
documents to scrutinize urgently and update their procedures to assure the best possible 
response to an outbreak.  
2.  Communication Enhancements 
Coordinated response, especially in multi-jurisdictional foodborne outbreaks, can 
best be attained if all personnel are working with the same playbook. Just as the FDA 
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Food Code is a model document that states are strongly encouraged to adopt for synergy 
in protecting the food supply, the CIFOR guidelines should similarly be widely endorsed 
and adopted by all states for functional coaction in outbreak response. Communication is 
an essential element in outbreak investigations. In addition to including planning 
components from the CIFOR guidelines, states’ plans should also incorporate 
prescriptive, but flexible elements to optimize the use of operational resources and assure 
enhanced information transfer.  
3. Incident Command System  
Public health agencies throughout the United States, to maintain compliance with 
the National Incident Management System (NIMS), are required to utilize ICS principles 
to coordinate a public health emergency response. As ICS is a national standard for 
communication during emergencies, and provides the structure for management, 
reporting and response, use of this system should be stipulated in the text of every 
outbreak action protocol. Familiarity with ICS principles and widespread application 
during foodborne outbreaks can help prevent or solve a variety of communication 
concerns in multi-disciplinary and multi-agency responses.  
4. Regionalized Expertise  
Local health agencies are the first line of defense in foodborne outbreaks. 
Nevertheless, resources and multi-disciplinary personnel are often strapped at this level. 
A regionalized approach for food safety expertise is a prudent way of addressing this gap, 
and the federal government has appropriated funding for cooperative agreements in this 
area. Ideally, every state should have its own rapid response team (RRT) for more rapid 
response and coordination to outbreaks. Funding for additional centers of excellence 
(COEs) and RRTs to create a more robust regional approach would provide additional 
resources to assist with the burden of foodborne disease, and allow for greater integration 
with the thousands of local health agencies serving the nation.  
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5. Training  
As illustrated in this research, many professional disciplines and professional 
competencies are involved in the investigation and control of communicable diseases 
stemming from the food supply. Assuring the skills of the public health workforce in 
outbreak response is core to a rapid and integrated response to foodborne outbreaks.  
Health agencies should be encouraged to provide instruction and practice on 
interdisciplinary outbreak response, and reduce barriers to collaboration and 
communication. Such training should be offered not only to the primary outbreak 
response professionals (environmental health specialists, epidemiologists, and laboratory 
personnel), but also to specialized professionals (health educators, public health nurses) 
and administrative and support staff, so they can be prepared to act and assist when a 
large-scale outbreak occurs. Funding opportunities for training and enhancements are 
often targeted at state-level agencies or health departments of larger cities or states. Such 
opportunities should be more widely available to smaller health agencies to identify and 
create best practices from a bottom-up approach.  
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The United States public health system, including agencies at the federal, state, 
and local levels are charged with protecting citizens from illness due to food. While 
working toward this protective oversight, public health professionals are challenged by an 
increasing frequency of multi-jurisdictional outbreaks. Effective communication and 
crucial information sharing between public health agencies is essential to assure unified 
and rapid identification and response to epidemics attributed to food.  
To assure coordination of emergency response across multiple areas of 
responsibility, clear methods of communication between health agencies needs to be 
definitive before a foodborne crisis. Establishing outbreak response guidelines falls to the 
direction of state and local health agencies. This hierarchy can lead to variations in how 
inter- and intra-agency information exchange occurs. Incorporating communication 
expectations in standard operating procedures for foodborne outbreak investigations can 
prevent confusion and unintentional delays, and achieve enhanced efficiency and 
effectiveness in a collaborative response.  
This research examines states’ general operating procedures to ascertain lines and 
modes of communication related to foodborne outbreaks, determines procedural 
commonalities, identifies potential barriers, and makes recommendations to enhance 
multi-directional information exchanges between health agencies.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The sharing of information between public health and food-regulatory agencies is 
essential to assure appropriate and rapid response in foodborne outbreak investigations, 
and to prevent the spread of disease.1 Local public health professionals rely on 
communications systems established by federal and state oversight agencies. Most 
commonly, if a verified or suspect foodborne contamination or outbreak has occurred, the 
                                                 
1 Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) and Council of State and Territorial 
Epidemiologists, Guidelines for Foodborne Disease Outbreak Response (Atlanta, GA: Council to Improve 
Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) and Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, 2009), 152. 
 2 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
or the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) will ascertain the appropriateness of 
information release.2 If this information is deemed credible, notification is forwarded 
individually or en masse to state departments of health. The states, in turn, push this 
information down to local regulators.3 Each step in the process contains elements that 
may delay the rapid dissemination of outbreak information. The ability and willingness of 
all stakeholders to share incident particulars quickly and readily with fellow responding 
agencies can enhance investigation effectiveness and amplify response efforts.4 
Delays in the prompt notification between public health partners can result from 
the federal agencies desiring a certain level of correlation between a particular food 
source and the reported illnesses. Data sharing is difficult because federal agencies are 
legally prevented from sharing certain data. As a result, state and local public health 
officials may hear about foodborne disease issues first from other sources, such as the 
media, word of mouth, public complaints, or the food industry.5 In addition, the desire of 
some states to have their own logos and contact information on the notifications can 
cause further delays in information dissemination. Slow notification can inhibit timely 
response efforts, and increase the likelihood of additional illness.  
Although national recommendations for notifications do exist, some outbreak 
reporting depends on state and local requirements. Despite modern technology, some 
agencies rely on the U.S. mail and paper copies for official outbreak reports. In addition, 
some public health departments lack the resources to provide rapid access to 
communications, or staff to monitor the same consistently. Anecdotal reports of current 
communications strategies and governmental efforts provide an extremely unbalanced 
approach to essential information sharing.  
                                                 
2 “Investigating Foodborne Outbreaks,” last updated March 17, 2016, http://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/ 
outbreaks/index.html.  
3 Ibid. 
4 Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) and Council of State and Territorial 
Epidemiologists, Guidelines for Foodborne Disease Outbreak Response, 152. 
5 Ibid.  
 3 
Documenting the lines of communication for the flow of routine and emergent 
foodborne outbreak information between federal, state, and local public health officials, 
as well as identifying alternate information sources, can create a picture of established 
communication channels. Currently, no assessment is done of the format and process for 
how agencies receive their information. Gathering and analyzing this data can create a 
full picture of the status of foodborne disease outbreak communications, lay a foundation 
for gap analysis, performance comparison, and identify areas for functional improvement.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This study addresses the following two primary research questions: 
• How do the current foodborne outbreak information and communication 
systems function between federal, state, and local health agencies? 
• In what ways can the current foodborne outbreak communication system 
(strategy, policies, and processes) be improved? 
Through the data collection and analysis process, this research seeks to explore 
these areas: 
• How do public health professionals receive foodborne outbreak 
information? 
• What strategies and policies are currently in place for federal, state, and 
local foodborne outbreak information dissemination? 
• What processes and technologies are being used to support these 
communications? 
• Do delays or barriers exist in the communication process? Where? 
• Can the current strategy, policies, and processes be improved to allow for 
foodborne notifications to be disseminated in a more efficient fashion? 
This research seeks to create a blueprint of communication practices used in the 
investigation of foodborne disease by reviewing existing state-level policies and 
protocols. With this approach, the researcher hopes to discover insights regarding factors 
that enhance or impede foodborne outbreak communications. Information from the 
protocol review is analyzed and synthesized to develop a picture of the outbreak 
 4 
communication system, and to provide conclusions and recommendations applicable to 
the research questions.  
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH  
The implications of this study for improving policy, inter- and intra-agency 
communications, and foodborne outbreak notification dissemination are significant. In 
terms of research, understanding problems or gaps in communications between federal, 
state, and local regulators, creating a more complex picture of what elements contribute 
to it, and how it impacts public health is valuable. Gathering this data can create a full 
picture of the status of foodborne disease outbreak communications, and lay a foundation 
for gap analysis, performance comparison, and identify areas for functional improvement. 
Addressing these issues can improve the two-way flow of information for food protection 
issues, and may be applicable to other areas where federal, state, and local agencies need 
interactive communication.  
 5 
II. THE CRITICALITY OF FOOD SAFETY AND FOOD 
DEFENSE  
For the life of me, I cannot understand why the terrorists have not attacked 
our food supply because it is so easy to do.  
~ Tommy Thompson, former Secretary of the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Ensuring the safety of the U.S. food supply and prevention of foodborne diseases 
is a primary function of public health.6 In recent years, especially since 9/11, threats to 
food safety constitute a growing concern,7 and have broadened the scope of protective 
oversight by regulatory professionals working in this arena.8 Just as food can be grown in 
backyards or sourced far away, similarly, foodborne outbreaks can cover small 
geographical areas or be spread across a larger landscape.9 Regardless, the first indicator 
and usually the first response to an incident is a local one.10 The skills and abilities of this 
nation’s food safety regulatory workforce are essential to the rapid identification and 
response to a situation at hand.11 Further, timely communications with the appropriate 
agencies through previously established channels are essential for surveillance and 
                                                 
6 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Support Function #8—Public Health and 
Medical Services Annex (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008), 1; Institute of 
Medicine and National Research Council, Ensuring Safe Food: From Production to Consumption 
(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1998), 3. 
7 World Health Organization, Terrorist Threats to Food: Guidance for Establishing and Strengthening 
Prevention and Response Systems (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2008), 9; Emma Hartnett, Gregory 
M. Paoli, and David W. Schaffner. “Modeling the Public Health System Response to a Terrorist Event in 
the Food Supply,” Risk Analysis 29, no. 11 (2009): 1506. 
8 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Oversight of Food Safety FDA’s Food Protection 
Plan Proposes Positive First Steps, but Capacity to Carry Them Out Is Critical (GAO-08-435T) 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008), 2. 
9 Gerald Wojtala et al., “Global Food-Local Outbreaks,” Webcast GFLOA0407, Michigan Center for 
Public Health Preparedness, April 27, 2007. 
10 “Key Players in Foodborne Outbreak Response,” accessed May 23, 2015, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
foodsafety/outbreaks/investigating-outbreaks/key-players.html. 
11 World Health Organization, Terrorist Threats to Food: Guidance for Establishing and 
Strengthening Prevention and Response Systems, 9. 
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response.12 To be most effective in surveillance and response, public health professionals 
need to be intimately aware of partner agencies and be well trained in prevention 
essentials.13 The umbrella of food safety incorporates many components including 
laboratory, agriculture, manufacturing, and others.14 All are essential to assuring the 
safety of the food supply; however, this literature review concentrates on foodborne 
outbreak communications, including the area of food defense issues affecting the local 
public health workforce since 9/11.  
B. CONCERNS WITH FOOD SAFETY AND FOOD DEFENSE 
When it comes to the food supply, a number of terms appear repeatedly in the 
literature: “food safety” “food defense,”15 and “food protection.” As detailed by the 
Institute of Medicine, “food defense” is the science and practice of protecting the food 
supply from malicious or intentional contamination.16 Ostfield offers the explanation that 
food defense includes conducting vulnerability assessments in points along the food 
chain, such as production, transportation, and service, and finding ways to assure and 
enhance infrastructure protection, to decrease the ease of a planned attack.17 This 
explanation is separate from the concept of food safety, which is protection from 
                                                 
12 Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) and Council of State and Territorial 
Epidemiologists, Guidelines for Foodborne Disease Outbreak Response, 71. 
13 Ibid., 74. 
14 Ibid., 62. 
15 The notion of “food defense” was begun in the aftermath of 9/11 and was initiated by U.S. 
government agencies. The initial term adopted for this purpose was “food security.” This term was 
confusing to many because it was already in wide usage; in other words, the availability of food and 
someone’s access to it. The FDA still has food defense guidance documents available in print and online 
that refer to the previously used term “food security.” “Food Defense,” last updated December 22, 2015, 
http://www.fda.gov/food/fooddefense/default.htm.  
16 Institute of Medicine, Review of Food and Drug Administration’s Role in Ensuring Safe Food 
(Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2010), 404. 
17 Marc L. Ostfield, “Diplomacy to Advance Food Defense,” remarks to 6th Global Food Safety and 
Quality Conference, Chicago, IL, August 1, 2007, 1. 
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accidents or naturally occurring contamination.18 Whereas, Linton offers that “food 
protection” can be considered the amalgamation of both food defense and food safety.19  
Stakeholder confusion over the terminology has impeded the implementation of 
protective measures for the food supply. As Park points out, those involved in the food 
and agriculture sector viewed food safety and food defense as different, independent 
disciplines.20 He further explains that industry and regulators were compelled to separate 
the management of food safety activities from efforts to combat malicious 
contamination.21 Even the 2009 version of the FDA Food Code, the U.S. baseline for 
food safety, does not include regulatory specifications for food defense; rather, it 
provides links to guidance documents.22 Food defense may be a new concept, 
rationalizes Yoe et al., but it is still an integral element of food safety.23 Sobering concurs 
by clarifying, “food defense (in the context of food terrorism) must consider both the 
intentional use of exotic agents (such as anthrax or botulinum toxin) along with the 
intentional application of traditional foodborne pathogens (such as Salmonella and E. coli 
O157:H7). In the latter scenario, it could be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the 
contamination event as being of an intentional nature.”24 
In the time after the events of 9/11, it has been widely recognized that the U.S. 
food supply is susceptible to attack. In writing about this issue, Kumar acknowledged that 
the U.S. food and agriculture sector has many stops and potential for contamination along 
the way as food progresses from its point of origin, to the point of consumption by 
                                                 
18 Ostfield, “Diplomacy to Advance Food Defense,” 1. 
19 Richard H. Linton, A Guide to Useful Information about Food Protection and Defense (West 
Lafayette, IN: Purdue Agriculture Food Science, 2010), 1. 
20 David K. Park, “New Thinking On Food Protection: Unlocking Ways to Achieve Food Safety and 
Food Defense Goals,” Food Safety Magazine, December 2006/January 2007, 34.  
21 Ibid. 
22 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Supplement to the 2009 FDA Food Code 
(Washington, DC: Food and Drug Administration, 2009). 
23 Charles Yoe et al., “Risk Management: The Value of the Food Defense Plan,” Food Safety 
Magazine, April/May 2008, 16. 
24 Lisa A. Sobering, Food Defense Preparedness in Small and Very Small Meat and Poultry 
Establishments (Manhattan, KS: Kansas State University, 2008), http://krex.k-state.edu/dspace/bitstream/ 
2097/1137/1/L%20Sobering%20Field%20Experience.pdf. 
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consumers. Any of these points along the food continuum can be attractive to terrorist 
attack if not sufficiently protected.25 Kumar was not alone in this consideration. In May 
2002, the World Health Organization (WHO) also expressed concern about the potential 
for terrorists to use food as a platform to spread deadly biological agents, and adopted 
resolution WHA 55.16 stating so.26 
The WHO goes on to note that episodes of intentional contamination are not new 
or novel,27 and have occurred over history to cause death, as well as economic loss.28 
Examples noted in literature include the deliberate contamination of Israeli citrus in 
1978,29 of candy in Japan in 1984,30 poisoned fast food in China in 2001 and 2002,31 and 
the deliberate contamination of ground beef in a supermarket in Michigan in 2003.32 
Sobering,33 Dembek, Kortepeter, and Pavlin,34 and Day35 all discuss a 1996 incident in 
Texas where a disgruntled hospital worker made 12 victims sick by deliberately 
contaminating baked goods with Shigella dysenteriae. Smith reported one example of 
intentional contamination videotaped and posted on YouTube in April 2009, where 
                                                 
25 Amit Kumar, “An Examination of Policy and Organizational Issues Relating to the Role of Public-
Private Partnerships in Preparing for a Terrorist Attack on the Food and Agriculture Sector,” Center for 
Infrastructure Protection and Homeland Security 9, no. 5 (November 2010): 4. 
26 World Health Organization, Terrorist Threats to Food: Guidance for Establishing and 
Strengthening Prevention and Response Systems, 9.  
27 Ibid., 5. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ehud Sprinzak and Ely Karmon, “Why So Little? The Palestinian Terrorist Organizations and 
Unconventional Terrorism,” International Institute for Counter-terrorism, June 17, 2007, http://www.ict. 
org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/246/currentpage/5/Default.aspx. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ostfield, “Diplomacy to Advance Food Defense,” 2. 
32 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Nicotine Poisoning After Ingestion of 
Contaminated Ground Beef—Michigan, 2003,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 52, no. 18 (May 9, 
2003): 413–416. 
33 Sobering, Food Defense Preparedness in Small and Very Small Meat and Poultry Establishments, 
33. 
34 Z. F. Dembek, M. G. Kortepeter, and J. A. Pavlin, “Discernment between Deliberate and Natural 
Infectious Disease Outbreaks,” Epidemiol. Infect. 135, no. 3 (April 2007): 353–371. 
35 Bryan Day, “Is Food Bioterrorism the Next 9/11?” The CIP Report 3, no. 6 (January 2005): 8, 
http://cip.gmu.edu/archive/CIPHS_TheCIPReport_January2005_FoodAndAgricultureSector.pdf.  
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employees of one Domino’s restaurant were deliberating adulterating food items.36 One 
of the largest and most disconcerting instances of intentional contamination in the United 
States, as researched by Elad, was for political reasons, the Rajneeshee cult’s poisoning 
of salad bars in 1984 in which 751 people were affected.37 This act of bioterrorism was 
not recognized as such for over a year.  
These examples are only a few of deliberate attacks; although, Ostfield believes 
that other attacks with more limited impact may have gone undetected.38 
Federal emphasis on safeguarding the food supply has been renewed, but the 
system is disjointed. 
In the wake of 9/11, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness 
and Response Act (“Bioterrorism Act”), was passed by Congress to increase the FDA’s 
ability to prevent intentionally contaminated food from reaching consumers. It began a 
new wave of food protection oversight, and mainstreamed the concept of “food defense” 
into the vocabulary of those employed in any aspect of the food industry.  
Since the enactment of the Bioterrorism Act, the U.S. government has continued 
to address the challenges posed in protecting this nation’s food, and has created a number 
of policy interventions, such as Homeland Security Presidential Directives 7 (2003)39 and 
9 (2004),40 the FDA Food Protection Plan (2007),41 and the Food Safety Modernization 
Act (2010)42 to move this country towards safer consumables. The literature continues to 
refer to these documents and efforts when benchmarking progress (or not) towards an 
                                                 
36 Marijke Schwarz Smith, “Assessing the Risk of Intentional Contamination,” Food Safety News, 
December 28, 2010.  
37 D. Elad, “Risk Assessment of Malicious Biocontamination of Food,” Journal of Food Protection 
68, no. 6 (June 2005): 1302–5.  
38 Ostfield, “Diplomacy to Advance Food Defense,” 2. 
39 “Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7/HSPD-7,” December 17, 2003, www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2003/12/20031217-5.html.  
40 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food Protection Plan: An Integrated Strategy for 
Protecting the Nation’s Food Supply (Washington, DC: Food and Drug Administration, 2007).  
41 “Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9/HSPD-9,” February 3, 2004, www.whitehouse. 
gov/news/releases/2004/20040203-2.html.  
42 Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub L. No. 111-353 (January 4, 2011).  
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effective food protection continuum. The number and extent of the resources, some 
specific, some oblique, provides for a confusing picture of food defense responsibilities. 
An easily accessible listing of all the agencies, directives and policies encompassing 
protection of food is not available. A 2011 report released by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) identified a minimum of 15 agencies with watchful 
administration over various food safety laws.43 Additional reviews by the University of 
Maryland,44 David et al.,45 and Taylor and David concur,46 suggesting that the U.S. food 
supply is governed by at least 30 laws, with 12 or more federal agencies keeping it all in 
check. The GAO goes on to assert, “the disconnect between agencies is so wide that 
multiple agencies have separate enforcement capabilities on different aspects of the same 
food type, which results in government red tape and ample opportunities for obvious 
sources of food-borne illnesses to fall through the cracks.”47 
Response coordination in large-scale emergencies, including terrorist attacks on 
the food supply, is overseen by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in 
collaboration with federal, state, and local officials and private sector parties.48 
In 2004, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9) was issued, 
ordering a national policy to defend the U.S. food supply against natural or manmade 
threats.49 As part of its protective charge, the DHS leads HSPD-9’s efforts to, “ensure 
that the combined federal, state, and local response capabilities are adequate to respond 
                                                 
43 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Food Safety Working Group Is a Positive First Step but 
Governmentwide Planning Is Needed to Address Fragmentation (GAO-11-289) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2011), 1. 
44 “Listeria Outbreak Exposes Red Tape in U.S. Food Safety System,” October 5, 2011, http://www. 
mdchhs.com/blog/listeria-outbreak-exposes-red-tape-us-food-safety-system.  
45 Stephanie David et al., “The Essential Role of State and Local Agencies in Food Safety and Food 
Safety Reform,” The Food Safety Research Consortium, 2009, 3.  
46 Michael R. Taylor and Stephanie David, Stronger Partnerships for Safer Food: An Agenda for 
Strengthening State and Local Roles in the Nation’s Food Safety System (Washington, DC: George 
Washington University, 2009), 6. 
47 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Food Safety Working Group Is a Positive First Step but 
Governmentwide Planning Is Needed to Address Fragmentation, 1. 
48 “Ensuring Resiliance to Disasters,” accessed December 18, 2015, https://www.dhs.gov/ensuring-
resilience-disasters.  
49 Office of the Inspector General, DHS’ Role in Food Defense and Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(OIG-733) (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2007), 18. 
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quickly and effectively to a terrorist attack, major disease outbreak, or other disaster 
affecting the national agriculture or food infrastructure.”50 Information sharing and 
communications are vital to such federal, state, and local response activities, but assuring 
seamless and timely message transfer between an assortment of government agencies 
remains a point of difficulty. In September 2011, the GAO51 and the Office of the 
Inspector General52 released a report saying there is still no centralized coordination of 
the federal government’s food and agriculture defense policy, or adequate addressing of 
the food related sections of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.53 Similarly, in 
2011, the FDA conceded that the identification of a standard protocol and platform for 
disseminating and sharing information with the food and agriculture critical infrastructure 
sector remains a significant challenge.54 Further, as protocols and systems for 
communication and response are considered, as the FDA notes, system improvements 
should be created with ongoing participation from regulatory partners at all levels.55 In 
addition, funding and resources continue to be documented as deficiencies. For example, 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reports that from 2003 to 2007, 
the food and agriculture sectors received only about 1% of state homeland security grant 
funding.56 Improvements to the system are not progressing easily, as in 2009, the 
President’s Food Safety Working Group called the nation’s food safety system “anything 
                                                 
50 “Ensuring Resiliance to Disasters.” 
51 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Oversight of Food Safety FDA’s Food Protection 
Plan Proposes Positive First Steps, but Capacity to Carry Them Out Is Critical, 2. 
52 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Challenges for the Food and Agriculture Sector in 
Responding to Potential Terrorist Attacks and Natural Disasters (GAO-11-946T) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2011), 3. 
53 Ibid. 
54 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, and U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, 2011 Sector Critical Infrastructure Protection Annual Report for the Food and Agriculture 
Sector (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, and 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2011). 
55 Ibid.  
56 United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on 
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Agro-
defense: Responding to threats Against America’s Agriculture and Food System, 112th Cong., 1 (2011).  
 12 
but flexible and coordinated.”57 Although the literature can illustrate intent for 
improvement, this documentation of continued gaps persists.  
Nearly all the literature reviewed refers to federal documents and policies on food 
protection. These increasing federal governmental responsibilities regarding food 
protection oversight are extensive, and not without repercussions. In its 2010 publication, 
Ensuring Safe Food, the Institute of Medicine reported the FDA’s food safety 
responsibilities created a perfect foundation for food defense coordination; however, food 
defense can suffer when the agency becomes involved with day-to-day outbreak and 
recall activities.58 Indeed, when food safety funding was diminishing to the extent that 
federal food safety experts were being lost, the agency compensated by requiring more of 
the state and local regulators.59 
Throughout the literature about this nation’s food safety and food defense system, 
frequent reference is made to the necessity of collaborative efforts from federal, state, 
local, and territorial (FSLT) levels. David et al. elucidate that while policy begins on the 
federal level, the federal food safety programs represent only a fraction of the state and 
local health agencies also involved in food safety oversight. While David et al. emphasize 
that although many federal agencies are involved in protecting the food supply, the local 
regulatory agency shoulders the burden for day-to-day surveillance, oversight, and 
response.60  
David et al. detail that over 3,000 local health departments are working to assure 
the safety of the food supply in the United States, and that number does not include 
health and agriculture agencies at the state level or public health laboratories. The 
National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) concurs such that 
food defense has become another major responsibility and challenge to a burdened local 
                                                 
57 Tom Karst, “Food Safety Working Group—Key Findings,” The Packer, July 8, 2009, http://www. 
thepacker.com/opinion/fresh-talk-blog/food_safety_working_group_-_key_findings_122016289.html. 
58 Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, Ensuring Safe Food: From Production to 
Consumption, 75. 
59 Ibid., 44. 
60 David et al., “The Essential Role of State and Local Agencies in Food Safety and Food Safety 
Reform.” 
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system. The NACCHO goes on to blueprint since 2008, staffing reductions at health 
departments on the local level account for 34,400 fewer public health workers across the 
United States. These losses mean fewer trained professionals at the community level 
ready to protect public health and respond to health threats, foodborne outbreaks, and 
other local emergencies. Further, the NACCHO reports in 2011, the capacity to provide 
services or respond to public health emergencies has been reduced in 40 percent of local 
health departments, likely as a result of reduced funding.61 DeWaal establishes that 
despite this nation’s awareness of naturally occurring agents of foodborne illness, 
pathogens, such as Salmonella, Shigella and E. coli O157:H7, still cause major outbreaks 
in the United States.62 Whittenberger and Dohlman document that foodborne illnesses 
affect a wide range of food products, which contributes to the difficulty of attributing 
illnesses to a singular food source.63 Whereas literature by Powell and Chapman, 
Hargrove, Kim and Hooker repeatedly illustrate incidents where the U.S. food protection 
system fails in executing a rapid, coordinated response to reduce disease, and in 
communicating situational awareness to stakeholders in a timely fashion.64 
Recent food safety breakdowns have been covered extensively by researchers and 
the media, and lays out a sobering picture of system inadequacies for food protection. 
Repeated references are made by Ostfield, Falkenstein, and Maki to the 2006 E. coli 
O157:H7 outbreak from contaminated spinach, which affected 26 states, caused three 
deaths, and resulted in more than 200 ill,65 the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak in 2008 
that caused over 1,400 illnesses and an estimated monetary loss of $100 million damage 
                                                 
61 National Association of County and City Health Officials, NACCHO Issue Brief: FY 2012 Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention Public Health Prevention and Workforce Funding (Washington, DC: 
National Association of County and City Health Officials, 2011), 1–2. 
62 Caroline Smith Dewaal, 2009 Outbreak Alert (Washington, DC: Center for Science in the Public 
Interest, 2009), 5–6. 
63 Kelsey Wittenberger and Erik Dohlman, Impacts of the 2009–09 Foodborne Illness Outbreak 
Linked to Salmonella in Peanuts (Washington, DC: USDA, Economic Research Service, 2010).  
64 Doug Powell and Benjamin Chapman, “Two Norovirus Outbreaks: Same Food Safety Failure,” 
Food Safety Network Infosheet, November 30, 2006; Thomas Hargrove, “Many States Fail to Identify 
Food-borne Illnesses,” Scripps Howard News Service, December 21, 2006; Meebok Kim and Neal Hooker, 
“A Regional-level Comparison of the Cost of Food Safety Failures,” The Ohio State University, 2006, 
https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1811/6156/OARDC_kmb.nhh.pdf?sequence=1. 
65 Ostfield, “Diplomacy to Advance Food Defense,” 52. 
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to the tomato industry,66 and the Salmonella Typhimurium outbreak in peanut butter and 
peanut products in 2008–2009, where 22,500 became ill.67 In addition, at the time of this 
literature review, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention CDC reports 
investigating 133 persons in 26 states exhibiting symptoms of  outbreak-associated 
strains of Listeria monocytogenes, plus 28 related deaths and one miscarriage. This 
illness toll is now considered the third worst in U.S. history.68 
As sobering as these reports are, it is even more eye-opening when the FDA Food 
Protection Plan (2007) concedes that not all outbreaks or illnesses are noticed or 
documented. The repeated logic is that if unintentional illnesses related to the food 
encounter difficulties in being identified and addressed, how can the U.S. food safety 
system stop a determined individual or individuals from exploiting this vulnerability?69 
As Tommy Thompson pondered, why have terrorists not attacked this nation’s food 
supply? In terms of food defense, what it not known may be this country’s Achilles’ heel 
in adequately protecting the U.S. food supply. The major unknowns through this 
literature review illustrate how far it is necessary to progress in this area. 
Although subject matter experts have a concept of the type of agents likely to be 
utilized in an attack on the food supply, the biggest unknowns are likely to remain so 
until after an incident:  
 
 
                                                 
66 Drew Falkenstein, “2006 Spinach E. coli Oubreak Revisited,” Food Poison Journal, September 13, 
2009, www.foodpoisonjournal.com/food-poisoning-information/2006-spinach-c-coli-outbreak-revisted; 
Dennis G. Maki, “Don’t Eat the Spinach—Controlling Foodborne Infectious Disease,” New England 
Journal of Medicine 355 (2006): 1952–1955. 
67 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Outbreak of Salmonella Serotype Saintpaul Infections 
Associated with Multiple Raw Produce items—United States, 2008,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly 
Report (MMWR), August 29, 2008; The response to the Salmonella Typhimurium outbreak marked the 
first time that the CDC utilized social media as a means of communication; Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2008–2009 Salmonella Typhimurium Outbreak Response November 2008–March 2009 After 
Action Report (Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009). 
68 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Multistate Outbreak of Listeriosis Linked to Whole 
Cantaloupes from Jensen Farms, Colorado (Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2011).  
69 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, Food Protection 
Plan: An Integrated Strategy for Protecting the Nation’s Food Supply. 
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• When is an attack on this nation’s food supply going to occur?  
• What will be the contaminant, and where and how will it be distributed?  
• How long will it take for the U.S. system to identify the situation?  
• How many people will be affected by disease or death?70 
Despite these unknowns, the WHO believes there is “a real and widespread threat 
to public health from the intentional and malicious contamination of food above naturally 
occurring threats.”71 What is the best way to balance protection of the public with 
available resources? It is an ongoing conundrum.  
From a homeland security perspective, additional areas of knowledge, policy, and 
initiative exploration can help assure a more robust food defense system. Food defense 
should be seamlessly integrated into food safety. The public health system and its 
stakeholders need to collaborate, conceptualize, and develop a new and enhanced 
aptitude for addressing the threat of food terrorism and integrate it into a compatible food 
defense and food safety framework. As long as food defense is kept separate from food 
safety, resources will continue to be divided, and priorities will keep shifting. Unless and 
until a coordinated systems approach is created to include food defense, preventive 
efforts will continue to have areas of impotency. 
C. FOODBORNE OUTBREAK REPORTING TRENDS  
Whether an outbreak originates from malicious intent, or is accidental or naturally 
occurring, the avenues for communications among government stakeholders remain the 
same.  
Foodborne illness is common. National estimates from the CDC declare one in six 
persons (48 million people) annually become ill from something they ate,72 and 
widespread outbreaks related to food have increased three-fold over the last 20 years. In 
                                                 
70 “Bioterrorist Attack on Food: A Tabletop Exercise,” March 2004, http://www.nwcphp.org/training/ 
opportunities/drills-exercises/bioterrorist-attack-on-food.  
71 World Health Organization, Terrorist Threats to Food: Guidance for Establishing and 
Strengthening Prevention and Response Systems, 9. 
72 “Foodborne Germs and Illnesses,” assessed December 22, 2015, http://www.cdc.gov/food 
safety/foodborne-germs.html.  
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addition, data analysis from foodborne outbreaks in the years between 2010 and 2014 
points to a disturbing uptick in mortality due to foodborne outbreaks. See Figure 1.  
Figure 1.  Foodborne Illness on the Rise 
 
Source: Lena H. Sun, “Big and Deadly: Major Foodborne Outbreaks Spike Sharply,” 
Washington Post, November 3, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-
health/wp/2015/11/03/major-foodborne-outbreaks-in-u-s-have-tripled-in-last-20-years/. 
These statistics illustrate the magnitude of the problem in the United States. 
However, many foodborne illness cases are not categorized under the umbrella of 
“outbreak” due to reasons, such as under-reporting or insufficient epidemiologic 
evidence. As former FDA Senior Advisor, Jack Guzewich, articulated in Food Safety 
News, foodborne illness victims “self-identify and report most foodborne disease 
outbreaks to state or local agencies. These outbreaks are often linked to local restaurants, 
investigated locally and often not reported in the media. Such outbreaks are not always 
reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s foodborne illness 
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surveillance system, as reporting is voluntary.”73 The International Association of Food 
Protection (IAFP) also describes some of the difficulties. Foodborne outbreaks can be 
identified by the number of persons presenting with similar illness symptoms in a short 
period of time. The challenge is that often only a few persons become ill and even fewer 
may report it to health authorities. Discerning if reported illnesses are related or 
coincidental is a challenge. In addition, some highly contagious diseases may be passed 
on to others, or to food and water, which adds to confusion in investigations.74  
To understand best how food-related illness impacts the public health system in 
the United States, and how health professionals work to plan, prepare, investigate, and 
respond to intentional and unintentional contamination of food, it is necessary to briefly 
review how an outbreak typically unfolds.  
D. ANATOMY OF A FOODBORNE ILLNESS OUTBREAK  
A foodborne disease outbreak is defined, in simple terms, as “an incident in which 
two or more persons experience a similar illness resulting from the ingestion of a 
common food.”75  
For an outbreak to be identified, it is necessary for public health officials to 
observe or document unusual rates of illness in a population. An example, set forth by the 
Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR), might be if a jurisdiction 
identifies more ill persons than is typically expected in the community. When illness rates 
increase, public health needs to determine the cause.  
A health department may also suspect a possible foodborne outbreak when it 
receives phone calls from sick individuals experiencing gastrointestinal symptoms, such 
as vomiting or diarrhea. A public health professional, typically a nurse or sanitarian, will 
                                                 
73 John J. Guzewich, “No Quick Fixes for Outbreak Surveillance and Response,” Food Safety News, 
March 22, 2012, http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/03/challenges-to-foodborne-disease-outbreak-
surveillance-response/#.VqKbA5orKM8. 
74 International Association for Food Protection (IAFP), Procedures to Investigate Foodborne Illness, 
6th ed. (New York: Springer, 2011), 20. 
75 “Guide to Confirming an Etiology in Foodborne Disease Outbreak,” accessed November 18, 2015, 
http://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/outbreaks/investigating-outbreaks/confirming_diagnosis.html.  
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review relevant personal activities with the victims, such as what they did, where they 
went, what they ate, if they are aware if others are ill, and if they visited a healthcare 
provider in the previous days and weeks. This review is conducted to identify a 
connection to a possible food source. 
Healthcare providers are important to outbreak identification as they decide 
whether specimens from their patient(s) will be forwarded to a clinical laboratory for 
analysis. Findings from the laboratory can provide the verification or essential clues to a 
likely cause of infection.  
If illness is suspected to have originated from a food facility, the health 
department will send a member of the inspection staff to the site to conduct an 
environmental assessment to review related hygiene protocols and discern the 
environment and processes that suspect foods may have experienced.  
Environmental and food samples may be taken for testing. Food can become 
contaminated from a wide variety of circumstances, such as the improper handling or 
temperature control, poor hygiene or ill workers, accidental situations, naturally 
occurring microorganisms, malicious tampering, or intentional adulteration. Thus, a 
thorough assessment and sampling protocols are essential to diagnose the situation. With 
this information, a health department can recommend control actions if strong evidence 
presents that the food facility contributed to illness.  
As information on the possible disease source is uncovered, epidemiologists will 
create a hypothesis and accompanying case definition, regarding where the outbreak 
occurred,76 and defining if an individual is affected by the outbreak under investigation.  
The coordinating agency in an outbreak may be federal, state, or local, depending 
on the geographic spread of disease. Just as deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) can be 
important evidence in criminal investigations, working with laboratories to identify the 
fingerprint of disease causing bacteria, viruses, or parasites can help finger the culprits in 
an illness investigation. An outbreak limited to a small geographic area might be handled 
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by local health officials, while an outbreak with cases in multiple jurisdictions will likely 
be led by state officials. The CDC takes a lead role when outbreaks stretch across 
multiple states.77 If the implicated food source is a commodity regulated by the FDA or 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service (USDA-FSIS), 
these agencies need to be contacted to assure the recall and removal of the suspect 
foodstuffs from sale or use.78  
Throughout the course of an investigation, additional public health agencies—
state, local, and federal—may be advised or asked to assist in surveillance and response, 
based on the severity, geography, and people affected and/or if the originating health 
agency has insufficient resources. Such correspondence can be face-to-face, through 
phone calls, emails, electronic databases, or other means. Additionally, public health 
officials have a role in providing information and education to the public so that residents 
can be aware if they are at risk and be advised of any protective measures they can take.  
The Public Health Agency of Canada described the outbreak investigation process 
well:  
Solving an outbreak is like having to piece together a picture puzzle, 
except in most cases officials do not start with all the pieces, and do not 
know what the picture looks like, how many pieces it has, or where those 
pieces are. Outbreak investigations are non-linear, and often many of these 
steps occur concurrently. It may take a number of weeks from the time an 
individual becomes ill to the time a food source is identified and action is 
taken. In some cases, the source of the outbreak is never found.79  
If affected individuals do not report the incident to the health department, the 
outbreak may go undetected. If a health department does not voluntarily provide 
notification of the outbreak to the CDC for inclusion in morbidity assessments and the 
development of national disease statistics, it is not added to its national recordkeeping of 
disease trends. Lastly, once the outbreak is over, involved agencies conduct after-action 
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reviews for best practices and lessons learned, to identify gaps and boost system 
effectiveness.  
A flow diagram depicting the steps in an outbreak investigation can be viewed in 
Figure 2.  
Figure 2.  Outbreak Investigation Diagram 
 
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Steps in an Outbreak Investigation, 
last reviewed March 24, 2015, http://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/outbreaks/investigating-
outbreaks/investigations/. 
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Local-level foodborne outbreak reporting is essential to identify who in the public 
is affected, what agent is causing the illness, and assure care and follow up. Public health 
workers are responsible to conduct this follow up, which includes assuring sick 
individuals seek treatment and identifying contacts who may also be affected. Treatment 
may include interventions, such as vaccination, quarantine, or health education. In 
addition, public health professionals are responsible for environmental assessments to 
identify and mitigate health hazards, and may close premises implicated in the outbreak, 
if necessary, to disrupt the spread of disease.80 As the CDC advocates, surveillance of 
notifiable conditions assists public health in disease tracking and determining which 
interventions are most effective in abetting the spread of disease, and may also lay the 
foundation for policy development related to outbreak identification and response.81 
E. RECENT HISTORY OF FOODBORNE OUTBREAKS 
Over time, the United States has experienced a plenitude of deadly outbreaks 
attributed to food. Some of the most lethal foodborne epidemics were recorded in the 
early 1900s; streptococcus in unpasteurized milk in 1911 and 1922 resulted in more than 
2,400 illnesses and 70 deaths.82 A botulism outbreak in 1919, attributed to canned olives, 
resulted in canning process changes to protect public health.83 Oysters were the source of 
Typhi bacteria during an outbreak spanning the years of 1924–1925, which sickened 
1,500, and killed 10% of the victims.84  
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Incidence and severity of foodborne infection seem to have increased over the 
past two decades, as additional outbreaks added to the morbidity and mortality toll 
attributed to food consumption. Although many causes of foodborne illness are diagnosed 
through ever-growing scientific knowledge and public health surveillance, - efforts to 
identify and address foodborne outbreaks continues to be a public health challenge, as 
illustrated by this sample of widespread outbreaks from the past decade:  
• The 2006 E. coli contamination in fresh spinach, which caused over 200 
infections spread throughout 26 states and resulted in 102 hospitalizations 
and five deaths.85  
• A 43-state outbreak (plus District of Columbia and Canada) attributed to 
Salmonella Saintpaul affected 1,442 people between April and August 
2008.86 The CDC determined Serrano and Jalapeño peppers were the 
culprits, but also believe tomatoes may have also been a source of the 
bacteria.  
• Salmonella Typhimurium in peanut butter and peanut paste from the 
Peanut Corporation of America in 2008–2009 caused disease in at least 
174 people, killed nine, and reached across 46 states.87 
• Listeria in Jensen Farms cantaloupe in 2011 infected at least 146 people, 
killed 30 and resulted in more than 1.5 million cantaloupes being recalled 
in 24 states.88  
• From September 2015 to the time of this report, Salmonella Poona from 
imported Mexican cucumbers made 888 persons ill, and was responsible 
for 191 hospitalizations and six deaths. Investigation and response for this 
outbreak is ongoing.89 
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The FDA suggests that illness due to the consumption of food appears to be on 
the rise, potentially a consequence of increased surveillance and enhanced public health 
procedures for disease recognition. In 2009, the agency reported that federal, state, and 
local public health agencies are identifying more multistate outbreaks and are linking 
sporadic cases caused by the same disease agent in different states or regions. Further, 
they assert despite public health’s enhanced ability to diagnose the existence of 
foodborne outbreaks, the challenge of emerging and reemerging diseases across the globe 
can quickly overwhelm oversight agencies. Modern ways of processing and transporting 
foods can lead to larger-scale outbreaks due to the economics of scale. This geographic 
spread can lead to outbreaks spanning over longer periods of time, which adds to the 
difficulties of identification and response.90  
Despite challenges, it is important to note historically speaking, many instances 
have occurred, including some the aforementioned cases, in which different levels of 
government have cooperated or collaborated to identify and stem the spread of disease. 
Despite the collaborative response efforts of federal, state, and local public health 
agencies, these complexities of the U.S. food system can amplify the impact of outbreaks. 
Recognizing the potential negative consequences of outbreak response gaps, in 2008, the 
PEW trust conducted post-mortems of recent outbreaks, and identified three areas of 
concern: policy, communications with the media and consumers, and the public health 
system’s organization and outbreak response.91  
Numerous naturally occurring, or “unintentional,” foodborne outbreaks over the 
past few years showcase how susceptible the food supply can be. Outbreaks spanning 
multiple states are rising exponentially, increasing from an average of 2.5 per year from 
1973–1980 to 13.5 per year from 2001–2010.92 Similarly, the United States experienced 
an upsurge in the number of persons who became ill, were hospitalized, or died from 
                                                 
90 “What You Should Know about Government Response to Foodborne Illness Outbreaks,” accessed 
August 18, 2015, http://www.fda.gov/Food/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm180323.htm.  
91 The Pew Charitable Trusts, Breakdown: Lessons to Be Learned from the 2008 Salmonella Saintpaul 
Outbreak (Washington, DC: The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2008). 
92 V. D. Nguyen et al., “Increase in Multistate Foodborne Disease Outbreaks-United States, 1973–
2010,” Foodborne Pathog Dis. 12, no. 11 (November 2015): 867–72, doi:10.1089/fpd.2014.1908. 
 24 
multi-state associated epidemics related to food. The increase in these types of outbreaks 
highlights the necessity for a coordinated cross-jurisdictional response, as foodborne 
disease outbreaks that span across states lead to nearly twice the number of 
hospitalizations and deaths than outbreaks within states.93  
In addition to the cost to the health of the public, foodborne outbreaks take a fiscal 
toll. The economic impact of foodborne illness is staggering, costing the U.S. economy 
more than $15.6 billion. This price tag does not include the expense of federal, state, and 
local response, recall expenses, or economic losses due to decreased consumer 
confidence.94  
F. IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATION IN ADDRESSING FOODBORNE 
OUTBREAKS 
Foodborne outbreaks, depending on their size and severity, may necessitate the 
use of crisis and disaster management principles. During the course of an outbreak, 
people in the community are becoming sick or dying, and it may take a number of 
professionals and agencies working together to coordinate a response.  
Given the day-to-day charge to public health departments of reducing morbidity 
and mortality, is foodborne outbreak monitoring and response an emergency, or arguably, 
business as usual? Often it depends on the size, severity, origin, and geography of the 
outbreak, as well as the resources and competencies of the responding agency. Response, 
in the context of foodborne illness outbreaks, covers a broad range of activities related to 
the investigation, response, and control.95  
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When faced with everyday job responsibilities, utilizing established and 
standardized procedures in the workplace is usually viewed as a normal business 
function. However, the stress of emergencies or unexpected events can put public health 
agencies in a state of crisis.96 As expressed by Guzewich:  
When it comes to foodborne disease surveillance, detection, investigation 
and response, there often is a lack of clarity over roles and responsibilities 
and decision-making authority, especially since staff qualifications and 
training levels in public health professionals vary and local health agencies 
may have limited experience participating in multi-agency outbreak 
response.97  
Outbreaks are disease disasters, and as described by Quarantelli and Dynes, can “produce 
conditions of greater uncertainty, greater diversity, decreased formalizations and 
decreased centralization, unless all responders follow pre-established protocols.”98  
In addition, the lack of familiarity with crisis management can prompt health 
agencies to coordinate response by feedback, which is why pre-established, bi-directional 
communication planning is essential.99  
The 9/11 Commission Report recommended that first responder agencies 
intensely engage in the provision of purposeful training in accordance with Incident 
Command System (ICS) and unified command procedures.100 When responding to public 
health emergencies, such as outbreaks, agencies are obliged to institutionalize and 
coordinate communications using the National Incident Management System (NIMS), as 
required under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5).101 According to 
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FEMA, “all federal, state, territorial, tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental 
personnel with a direct role in emergency preparedness, incident management, or 
response”102 must complete NIMS training.103 As of 2008, the NACCHO reports 85% of 
local health departments complied with NIMS requirements related to emergency 
preparedness. Despite this assurance of training, currently, no formal assessment is 
available of the number of NIMS certified public health professionals in the United 
States.104  
In addition, to assure a workforce well-versed in coordinated response, NIMS 
certification should ideally be partnered with additional emergency response training, 
drills, simulations, and field experience.105  
Part of the practice of inter-and intra-agency communication is not only following 
a specified reporting structure, but knowing what to say, how to say it, which 
communication tool(s) to use, and instruction and drills on how to do it effectively. The 
continual modernization of computers, smartphones, and information technologies has 
reshaped the ways communication occurs. Government at all levels needs to assure the 
public health system is not practicing 21st century public health with 20th century 
communications technology. In addition, public health funders and policymakers need to 
understand that modern technology, databases, secure portals, smartphones, and other 
innovations need accompanying training, policies, and protocols for both senders and 
recipients to be most effective. Enhancements in modern technology present a great 
opportunity to enhance routine and emergency communication and information exchange 
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between all levels of public health agencies. If properly funded, used, and maintained, 
such enhancements can accelerate coordination in foodborne outbreak response 
operations. Currently, communication between federal, state, and local health agencies is 
a composite overlay of existing systems, databases, etc. This communication is addressed 
in further detail later in this chapter.  
G. THE RISK FROM INFORMATION DELAYS 
Although referring to law enforcement, The Armed Forces Communications and 
Electronics Association’s (AFCEA) perspective can easily be representative of public 
health. The AFCEA contends that “the goal of sharing information has a long, murky, 
and complex history. Part of the problem has been an inconsistent implementation of 
policies stemming from different interpretations of what is legally allowed.”106 
Understandably, public health needs to protect the privacy of citizens when sharing 
information.  
Of particular concern in the public health community is assuring the privacy 
protection afforded individuals by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA). As CDC explains:  
The Privacy Rule allows covered entities to disclose protected health 
information to public health authorities when required by federal, tribal, 
state, or local laws [45 CFR 164.512(a)]. This includes state laws (or state 
procedures established under such law) that provide for receiving 
reporting of disease or injury, child abuse, birth, or death, or conducting 
public health surveillance, investigation, or intervention.107 
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The liability of sharing information needs to be weighed against the risk of not 
“connecting the dots.” As AFCEA asks, “What is the true value of having important 
information—even if it comes from a tenuous source in some cases—if the information is 
never shared with others who may need it and who may add value to the information?”108 
In the instance of foodborne outbreaks, delays in communication can lead to unwanted 
consequences, such as an increase in cases, in morbidity, and in extreme cases, mortality. 
To this end, the CDC further explains: 
Balancing the protection of individual health information with the need to 
protect public health, the Privacy Rule expressly permits disclosures 
without individual authorization to public health authorities authorized by 
law to collect or receive the information for the purpose of preventing or 
controlling disease, injury, or disability, including but not limited to public 
health surveillance, investigation, and intervention.109  
In the CDC’s foodborne illness timeline graphic, it may take 2–4 weeks from the date of 
exposure for a health department to be notified of a foodborne illness (see Figure 3). Any 
unnecessary lag in the system can add to this time interval, and hinder public health steps 
to interrupt further disease transmission. To prevent delays, it is beneficial for health 
departments to know and understand what outbreak information they can share with their 
public health partners, in advance of a situation.  
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Figure 3.  CDC Foodborne Illness Timeline, Salmonella 
 
Source: “Timeline for Reporting Cases of Salmonella Infection,” accessed May 16, 2015, 
http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/resources/timeline-for-reporting-of-cases.pdf. 
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H. THE NEED FOR RAPID AND COORDINATED OUTBREAK RESPONSE 
Outbreaks do not always fit neatly into the boundaries of one jurisdiction or 
regulatory body. Having pre-existing affiliations with neighboring or oversight agencies 
can be beneficial in streamlining responses. In studying interagency communication 
networks during emergencies, Naim Kapucu suggests that more networking in the 
preparation for disasters is essential. He quotes a New York official contending that 
issues with communication are not due to technology or policy; rather, they are a result of 
not taking the time to know the staff at key organizations.110 It could be argued that a 
personal network of contacts often makes it possible to obtain information or responses 
quicker than formal channels that can be the cause of bureaucratic delays. This method is 
not the optimal way the system should function. Considering outbreak response, such 
pre-event interactions may be difficult to attain, given the wide variety of agencies and 
personnel that can be involved in resolving a food-related epidemic. A 2014 report by the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes that, in addition to state and local 
governments, food safety is regulated by up to 15 federal agencies.111 The lack of 
guidance or plans for communication can foster the siloing of response efforts. The CRS 
report agrees, and notes that the mosaic of federal agencies involved in food safety often 
results in the unnecessary duplication of regulatory endeavors.112 
I. THE COMPLEXITY OF THE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE FOR 
FOOD PROTECTION 
No one department or agency within U.S. government has exclusive responsibility 
for food safety and foodborne outbreak prevention and response; rather, the safety of this 
nation’s food supply is a partnership effort. Establishing and sustaining partnerships and 
integrating communication among all levels of government is the only way to assure 
significant progress in reducing and preventing foodborne outbreaks.  
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J. ROLE OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 
The federal government has established authorities to oversee the response for 
outbreaks, and the HHS is the principal national agency overseeing the health of the 
American people. Included in its many obligations, the HHS has the fundamental 
oversight of a federal public health response if a bioterrorist incident occurs in food, due 
to the essential response expertise of public health and medical emergency responders. 
The HHS operates under the National Response Framework (NRF) in all situations 
involving an “incident of national significance.” This type of incident is defined in the 
NRF as “an actual or potential high-impact event that requires a coordinated and effective 
response by an appropriate combination of federal, state, local, tribal, and 
nongovernmental and/or private sector entities in order to save lives and minimize 
damage and provide the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation 
activities.”113  
Emergency support function (ESF) #8 of the NRF is the document providing 
guidance for public health and medical relief in instances of emergencies declared by the 
federal government. This area is the designated responsibility of the HHS in support of 
state, local, and tribal jurisdictions. The HHS undertakes this obligation with the DHS, 
which has the all-embracing authority for managing domestic incidents.114 During a 
federal emergency, the HHS is also responsible for health-related situational awareness, 
such as public health disease surveillance, and communications to best utilize public 
health and medical assets.115 
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More routinely, the HHS is also responsible for safeguarding the food system, 
including animals that produce food, and the feed they eat through the efforts of the 
following key agencies: 
• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: The CDC works with state 
health agencies to conduct disease surveillance and monitor data on 
morbidity and mortality. 
• Food and Drug Administration: The FDA is the regulatory body for 
domestic and imported food and animal feed, except for commodities 
under the jurisdiction of the USDA/FSIS.116 
• Department of Agriculture: The USDA has authority over processed meat, 
poultry, and egg products through the FSIS. In addition, the USDA 
monitors animal and plant disease through the Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS), and administers recommendations on 
nutrition through the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS).117 
These three agencies—CDC, FDA and USDA—are the main federal players in 
foodborne outbreak prevention and control. On a daily basis, they are involved in a 
variety of functions to assure a safe food supply, and may be actively engaged in 
outbreak response. Not to say they are in this alone; the works of state, tribal, local, and 
territorial (STLT) public health agencies accompany their efforts. The complexity and 
logistics of communication between so many entities can lead to a variety of coordination 
difficulties.  
A brief description of these agencies’ roles during outbreak response is outlined 
as follows.  
1. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
The CDC is a non-regulatory agency, charged with—as its name implies—
developing and applying disease control and prevention strategies. It works to determine 
the parameters of an outbreak by linking together reports of cases or clusters of ill 
persons. It is the lead federal agency that gathers data and compiles statistics on all 
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aspects of foodborne illnesses and outbreaks, including ascertaining the efficacy of 
disease control methods.118 It also administers a number of electronic systems, such as 
FoodNet and PulseNet, to collect and analyze outbreak data. These systems, and others, 
are discussed at length later in this chapter.119  
In the case of widespread foodborne illness, it routinely collaborates on a federal 
level with the FDA and USDA-FSIS, and links federal agencies, state and local public 
health professionals, and other public health partners, in efforts to detect and define 
outbreaks, and determine the cause. In addition, it endeavors to bolster the capabilities of 
disease detection, public health labs, and environmental health (EH) at state and local 
levels.120 
2. Food and Drug Administration 
Eighty percent of food ingested in the United States is entrusted to the care of the 
FDA.121 As described previously, the FDA is the regulatory body for domestic and 
imported food and animal feed, except for commodities under the jurisdiction of the 
USDA/FSIS. It regulates the food industry through inspection, education, and 
enforcement, and also assists in outbreak investigation and response when one of the 
products it oversees may be implicated. As part of the outbreak response, the FDA may 
test, traceback, or recall food products.122 
It may also inspect and access food production systems in farms, processing/
packaging facilities, or retail establishments. In addition, it evaluates all outbreak 
information to prevent future problems through policy change or guidance updates. 
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Often, its food protection and outbreak response is augmented by state and local health 
departments.123  
3. United States Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection 
Service  
The USDA-FSIS oversees domestic and imported meat, and poultry and egg 
products, and assures these products have proper labels and packaging, and are handled 
in ways that guarantees safety and wholesomeness.124 During outbreaks, like the FDA, 
the USDA-FSIS may test products, conduct tracebacks, announce recalls, and access food 
safety measures in facilities where regulated food is processed. The FSIS may collaborate 
with health agencies at the federal, state, and local level. It also looks to collect, 
consolidate, and analyze data to assure the food supply remains safe.125  
K. THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL HEALTH AGENCIES 
Although federal agencies have an oversight role, the state, local, and tribal 
governments have the primary responsibility to assure food safety in their jurisdictions, 
including prompt responses to food emergencies.126 Depending on the structure of the 
state, and the jurisdiction(s) where an outbreak is active, response and responsibility may 
be in the purview of the state departments of health, agriculture, environment, or a 
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1. State Agencies 
Given their number and authorities, state agencies are sizeable players in 
foodborne outbreak detection and response. At the state level, agencies conduct and 
coordinate routine disease surveillance, and oversee outbreak response within their state’s 
geography. States assure responses to outbreaks that span multiple jurisdictions, and 
report data and findings to the CDC.127 During widespread outbreaks, or outbreaks of 
significance, they work closely with the federal agencies, and are often the state points-
of-contact for outbreak-related communications.  
2. Local Agencies 
During an outbreak, local health agencies are often the boots-on-the-ground for 
investigation. Their responsibilities include inspection and oversight of a variety of food 
facilities, and often sleuthing for environmental factors that may contribute to illness. 
These agencies are local points of contact for health care providers, clinical laboratories, 
and concerned or ill members of the public for surveillance and reporting.  
The lead agency, and the interplay and coordination of outbreak activities within a 
state, is often dependent upon a state’s organizational structure. The architecture of a 
state’s governance system lays out which agency, or agencies, hold primary oversight and 
responsibility. Highly centralized states may have more direct control over local 
activities, whereas decentralized states may need to request the cooperation of local 
health authorities in outbreak activities. See Figure 4 and Table 1.  
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Figure 4.  Architecture of Local Public Health Departments 
 
Source: David Bergmire-Sweat, “Experiences and Challenges with Outbreak Response 
and Investigation: A State Health Agency Perspective,” presented at The Better 













Local health units are primarily led by employees of the state and the state 
retains authority over most fiscal decisions 
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Largely Centralized states:  
AL, LA, NH, SD, VA 
Shared Local health units may be led by employees of the state or of local 
government. If they are led by state employees, then local government has 
authority to make fiscal decisions and/or issue public health orders. 
 
Shared states: 
FL, GA, KY 
Largely Shared states: 
MD 
Mixed Some local health units are led by employees of the state and some are led 
by employees of local government. No one arrangement predominates in the 
state. 




Local health units are primarily led by employees of local governments and 
the local governments retain authority over most fiscal decisions.  
Decentralized states: 
AZ, CA, CO, CT, ID, IL, IN, IA, 
KS, MA, MI, MN, MO, MT, NE, 
NJ, NY, NC, ND, OH, OR, UT, 
WA, WV, WI 
Largely decentralized states: 
NV, TX 
Source: Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, State and Local Health Department 
Governance Classification System (Washington, DC: Association of State and Territorial Health  
Officials, 2012), http://www.astho.org/Research/Data-and-Analysis/State-and-Local-Governance-
Classification-Tree/. 
Noting the variations in state structures, it is easy to see how inter- and intra-
agency and multi-agency coordination, and the flow of necessary communications can be 
discontinuous. Each jurisdiction has its own procedures, and some have more funding 
and resources than others. Similarly, the manner in which states approach disease 
surveillance varies. Oversight responsibilities can be granted to local agencies, a central 
state office, or regional health offices.128 Overall, the responsible public health agencies 
for oversight and investigation of foodborne illnesses may vary throughout an outbreak 
investigation. As the CDC describes, whether one or more health agencies contribute to 
the investigation will be dependent upon the outbreak size and scope. One agency may 
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initiate a response, and include other partner agencies if the investigation expands in size 
or across jurisdictional boundaries.129 
Again, collaboration and communication are key to assuring an outbreak is 
appropriately and rapidly identified and addressed by the responding health agencies.  
Regardless of the structure of the health authorities within a state, response 
activities for foodborne outbreaks are comparable across the United States. Several key 
professional disciplines and their corresponding competencies are generally recognized 
as the cornerstones of outbreak response:  
• Sanitarians (also known as environmental health specialists), perform 
investigations, identify food safety hazards, conduct sampling, and set 
interventions in place to reduce or eliminate hazards that contribute to 
foodborne illness. 
• Epidemiologists study the occurrence of disease, conduct surveillance for 
illness, create hypotheses for the cause/source, and perform analytic 
diagnostics to ascertain the progression of outbreaks in a population.  
• Laboratory personnel analyze samples (environmental, food, clinical) for 
chemical or microbiological presence, interpret results, and advise on 
collection, handling, storage, and transport of specimens related to an 
outbreak.  
As these three disciplines are reliant on information from each other for the rapid 
detection of outbreaks, the identification of the disease and its source, and setting controls 
in place to stem the chain of illness, coordination, communication and teamwork is 
essential. This shared responsibility for outbreak prevention and response is often 
pictured as a four-legged stool, one leg for each of the sanitarians, epidemiologists and 
laboratory personnel. The fourth leg is representative of other essential stakeholders in 
outbreak response: health educators, public information officers, health care professionals 
and others. A visual of this collaboration model can be seen in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5.  The Four-Legged Stool of Foodborne Outbreak Response  
 




Outbreak investigations are not without their challenges, given the necessity for 
teamwork and rapid, continued bi-directional interagency communication to assure 
timely and appropriate response. The FDA recognized as much in a 2013 report to 
Congress, in which it identified coordination and communication among state, local, 
tribal, and federal officials as an area to strengthen.  
Information sharing, as elemental as it may seem, is not that simple. The FDA, for 
instance, is limited by statute in its ability to share certain types of information with state 
and local partners. Some mechanisms exist to share certain types of information with 
states; however, many states have not taken this opportunity or maintained agreements to 
do so.130 
In 2007, the GAO considered federal oversight of food safety to be an area of 
concern and high-risk. In the GAO’s assessment, the current approach to protecting the 
U.S. food supply was in need of widespread transformation to work efficiently, assure 
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accountability, and to certify long-term and continuous effectiveness.131 The GAO also 
noted the fragmentation of this nation’s food safety system, and asserted integration of 
this system as a primary challenge to be addressed.132  
Many of the high-level talks about improving the food safety system are directed 
towards the integration at federal level agencies, with only limited attention paid to an 
integrated vertical system that incorporates federal, state, and local public agencies with 
food safety responsibilities. This issue is significant, as inter-agency collaborations and 
cooperation are necessary given that local agencies may be less equipped or prepared to 
respond to foodborne epidemics, encounter personnel and staffing shortages, and are 
dependent upon backing from state and federal partners to respond to large outbreaks.133  
In the wake of an outbreak, some public health agencies that normally are not 
involved in foodborne outbreak investigations suddenly are responsible for overseeing a 
course of action for which they may be inadequately staffed or prepared. Outbreaks occur 
unexpectedly, and agencies may have capacity issues with handling the additional work, 
as described by the National Environmental Health Association (NEHA): 
Staff who conduct these investigations usually have many responsibilities 
in addition to foodborne disease. Many local health agencies do not have 
robust or updated protocols to guide investigation and response. In fact, 
agencies with responsibility for foodborne illness response, control, and 
prevention should have a variety of available resources, which are often 
lacking. These include personnel experience, training, and a system to 
share expertise and data with partner agencies.134  
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Some state and local public health professionals have obtained insufficient training in 
how to conduct foodborne disease investigations, and may have limited experience in this 
area.135 
In 2014, the NEHA released the results of a local and state agency capacity 
assessment concentrating on the area of foodborne outbreak response.  
The findings expressed concern over “the potential impacts of ongoing budget 
reductions on staffing, training, outbreak response, control and prevention activities, as 
well as the current status of interagency cooperation to share resources.”136 
All levels of governmental food safety oversight, and their respective outbreak 
teams, need to have sufficient resources to be in direct and frequent communication with 
their respective counterparts about laboratory results, investigation particulars, and policy 
decisions to assure decisive and coordinated responses.  
M. COMMUNICATION VS. INFORMATION VS. COLLABORATION VS. 
COORDINATION  
The single biggest problem in communication is the illusion that it has 
taken place. 
~ George Bernard Shaw137 
Communication, at its most elemental, is the transfer of a message from one 
person to another. A common vocabulary is essential to assure understanding and 
situational awareness during an event, such as a foodborne outbreak. The varying 
agencies and audiences involved need to be assured they clearly comprehend the matter 
at hand, and what is expected of all response participants.  
Communication is most effective when it is bi-directional, so that senders have 
verification that their transmission was delivered to—and understood by—the intended 
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audience. Assuring information is exchanged via a multi-directional and multi-agency 
process is an essential component in satisfying the public health system’s responsibility 
to conduct emergency responses effectively. If public health professionals cannot 
communicate effectively, and if essential information transfer is not guaranteed, the 
successful management of a situation is not likely.138  
In business, when speaking of correspondence between people or agencies, 
communication denotes a two-way exchange; the exchange of information, facts or 
knowledge tends to be unidirectional. Information can be imparted passively or actively, 
depending on whether it is pushed (sent out to others) or pulled (is industriously sought). 
Collaboration is usually understood to be analogous to teamwork. It is defined as working 
jointly on an activity, especially to produce or create something. However, as NACCHO 
points out in its “Pulling Together” resource for local health departments, a standard 
definition or application of collaboration does not exist, and public health professionals 
may have their own unique definitions. NACCHO goes on to note that “common to most 
definitions of collaboration are the concepts of shared labor, a shared purpose or goal, 
and joint ownership of the work, risks, results, and rewards.”139 
As multiple partners or agencies may be necessary for a robust outbreak response, 
their collective efforts should optimally be coordinated or combined harmoniously. Such 
coordination, as described by Kapucu, can be understood, “as the degree to which there 
are adequate networks among the organizational parts for intra-organizational 
communication or among the organizations for inter-organizational communication to 
accomplish goals.”140 Mishra and Mishra define this organizational communication 
further, as using speech, signs, script, or other methods to transfer information, thoughts, 
or opinions. Additionally, they discuss organizational collaboration as a synthesis of 
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individual and group interaction comprised of deeds and communication methods to 
solve complex issues.141  
In its assessment of foodborne outbreak response, NEHA describes interagency 
coordination between public health partners. The association points out that the 
complexity of information and coordination required for effective investigations can be a 
barrier to harmonious multi-agency interactions. When more than one agency is involved 
in a response, the duplication or omission of essential investigative steps is entirely 
possible, which can potentially lead to delays in the identification of the outbreak source. 
The misdirection of incident management can also lead to increased public risk, further 
cases of disease, and unnecessary economic impact to the food industry.142 
In business vernacular, is not unusual for the terms communication, information, 
coordination, and collaboration to be used interchangeably. In practice, information 
delivery may be the simplest to achieve, as response or dialogue may not be necessary to 
the transfer. Communicating, or creating a dialogue, is more exacting because an 
interface between two or more entities is involved. Most challenging of all is fostering 
collaboration, as understanding, idea exchange, and collective engagement are essential 
ingredients to its success.  
In government interactions, both internal and between agencies, defining these 
terms can prevent misunderstandings and help with moving all parties toward a common 
goal; especially, in consideration of public health emergencies, such as foodborne 
outbreak response. Sadly, barriers to efficient communication and collaboration do exist. 
Health agencies, while ultimately focused on reducing disease and death, each have 
unique missions, goals, and authority. As NACCHO explains, although the overarching 
purpose of public health agencies should be interconnected, variations in procedures, 
protocols, and visions between agencies can cause conflict or confusion during joint 
response situations. Systemic hurdles to interagency collaboration exist, as no two health 
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agencies are alike. Resources can vary widely, and the entire system is fragmented across 
federal, state, and local levels.143 
Further, NACCHO notes interagency efforts can sometimes become an obstacle 
to effective response. Issues that can hamper information, communication and/or 
collaboration include: 
• Ideology—Potential collaborators have substantially differing ideologies, 
values, and/or beliefs. 
• Leadership—Either no one has enough power to bring the key players 
together or the “wrong person” leads the meetings. 
• Power—Power must be shared even if it is not equal among members. 
• History—Potential collaborators have a history of past conflict or failure. 
• Competition—Potential collaborators maintain existing competition. 
• Resources—Lack of necessary personnel, time, and skills to contribute to 
the effort.144  
Recognizing and understanding the nuances of information, communication and 
collaboration is essential when considering outbreak response documents, in that the lack 
of common understanding can prevent situational awareness and an expeditious response 
of stakeholders. Kapucu mused that fractured communication continuity is a barrier to 
coordination among multiple organizations.145 Indeed, numerous federal reports address 
the need for improvement in food safety coordination in this nation. For instance, the 
GAO, in studying safety issues that afflict the U.S. food supply, observed that planning 
and coordination can address problematic issues of complementary outbreak management 
by multiple federal agencies. The USDA-FSIS addresses collaboration among internal 
and external stakeholders to prevent foodborne illness as a priority in its 2011–2016 
strategic plan. The CDC observes that state and local outbreak information sharing with 
its agency is voluntary.  
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Foodborne outbreak investigations may be hampered by communication issues 
and confusion over response roles and responsibilities. These challenges are obstacles for 
response at all levels of government. The failure to share information on outbreaks can 
inhibit a complete picture of outbreak burden in the United States, and inhibit not only 
outbreak interruption, but also the understanding of the pathogens, foods, settings, 
contributing factors and human health impact of outbreaks. The public health system 
needs a systematic, coordinated and comprehensive strategy to assure and improve 
routine and emergency foodborne outbreak communications.  
N. EXISTING SURVEILLANCE AND RESPONSE NETWORKS 
Modern technology is dynamic and new electronic applications are aggressively 
brought to the consumer market on a regular basis. Similarly, dynamic and effective 
applications to exchange food safety data should be made available to the public health 
sector to assure communications and response initiatives are modern and appropriate to 
emerging needs. Although electronic portal and exchanges do exist at the federal level, 
many were purpose built for defined purposes, and have not kept pace with contemporary 
needs. In addition, multiple data exchange initiatives from a variety of federal, academic, 
and non-governmental organizations require health officials to check into a number of 
disparate systems for food protection or outbreak information and updates. As the 
Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL) promulgates, “In order to ensure an 
integrated food safety system, these data initiatives will have to work in concert with 
each other to allow for seamless and interoperable data exchange.”146 
In addressing the issues surrounding multi-jurisdictional outbreak 
communications, the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) observes 
that “through the introduction of electronic disease surveillance systems, states and 
localities have worked to migrate disparate and siloed legacy surveillance systems into 
more integrated surveillance platforms. The goals for surveillance system integration are 
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to utilize national standards, reduce redundancy, streamline reporting, understand disease 
and risk factor interactions, and increase data sharing.”147 
Over the past two decades, the launch and use of electronic platforms for 
professional notification or exchange of information related to foodborne disease 
incidents between local health departments, states, and federal agencies have increased. 
Some of these platforms are discipline specific, aimed at epidemiological information or 
laboratory data, such as food and feed testing information. Others are more holistic and 
used by a variety of professional positions within public health agencies. All contain 
essential information to help direct decision making in outbreak response. The following 
sections discuss the most common network initiatives used for interagency outbreak 
communication in the United States.  
1. National Electronic Norovirus Outbreak Network 
Named after caliciviruses, the National Norovirus Outbreak Network, or 
CaliciNet (http://www.cdc.gov/norovirus/reporting/calicinet), connects 25 subscribed 
states working collectively and rapidly to identify emerging norovirus strains and their 
implicated food sources. CaliciNet is linked to the National Outbreak Reporting System 
(NORS).148  
2. Common Organizational Registry Environment SHIELD  
The Common Organizational Registry Environment SHIELD, or CoreSHIELD, is 
a secure online hub providing federal, state, and local public health agencies and industry 
partners with a platform for a variety of food and agriculture critical infrastructure 
networks, including FoodSHIELD, and the Food Emergency Response Network (FERN), 
among others. Created by the Food Protection and Defense Institute (FPDI) (formerly the 
National Center for Food Protection and Defense) at the University of Minnesota, 
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CoreSHIELD also provides for education and training in the areas of food protection and 
defense.  
Funding for CoreSHIELD includes the following agencies: the FDA, DHS, 
USDA, and others.149 
3. Electronic Laboratory Exchange Network 
The Electronic Laboratory Exchange Network (https://www.elexnet.com), or 
eLEXNET, is an integrated, secure network created to help align the collective efforts of 
public health laboratories in the United States. Through this exchange network, 
professionals can review and analyze lab data, and discuss and coordinate findings. 
eLEXNET is the official repository for several tracking systems, including FERN.  
Funding for eLEXNET comes from the FDA, USDA, and the Department of 
Defense (DOD).150 
4. The Epidemic Information Exchange 
The CDC oversees the rapid communication portal, Epi-X (Epidemic Information 
Exchange), exclusively for those in public health responsible for identifying, 
investigating, and responding to health threats. The Epi-X website (http://www.cdc.gov/
epix) provides a secure platform for the sharing of disease reports and related 
surveillance data. In addition, Epi-X can push out information to its subscribers via email, 
pagers, or telephone connections.151  
5. Electronic State Access to FACTS  
The FDA maintains an electronic platform for its contractual regulatory partners. 
Electronic State Access to FACTS, or eSAF, is an external electronic web portal 
maintained by FDA’s Office on Partnerships to track and exchange inspection 
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information with contractual regulatory partners via the automated Field 
Accomplishments and Compliance Tracking System (FACTS) electronic system. eSAF 
was scheduled to be retired as of March 2014.152 
6. Field Accomplishments and Compliance Tracking Systems 
The FDA automated tracking system FACTS is used by the Office of Regulatory 
Affairs (ORA) to oversee aspects of field assignments and centralize data related to this 
work. A portion of the information from FACTS is transferred daily to the Electronic 
Laboratory Exchange Network (eLEXNET), which accounts for approximately 65% of 
the data contained.153 
7. FDA Office of Partnerships Mailing List 
For federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and industry partners working under an 
FDA agreement, the FDA Office on Partnerships maintains a mailing list to distribute 
essential technical information based on areas of responsibility. The Office of 
Partnerships also provides resources, such as policy guides and rapid response team 
(RRT) manuals.154 
8. Food Emergency Response Network 
FERN is a collaborative USDA-FDA design that connects and integrates the 
nation’s public health food testing laboratories through a secure online portal. This web 
platform (http://fernlab.org) encourages state inter-agency participation, as it gathers 
information related to biological, chemical, or radiological contamination of food.155  
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9. Foodborne Diseases Centers for Outbreak Response Enhancement  
Ten state and local public health agencies, representing about 18% of the nation’s 
population, receive funding from the CDC under the Foodborne Diseases Centers for 
Outbreak Response Enhancement (FoodCORE) project (http://www.cdc.gov/foodcore). 
FoodCORE fosters collaboration among the funded partners in areas related to 
identification of, and response to, foodborne outbreaks. The project also aims to create 
and establish enhanced methods of detecting and responding foodborne disease. 
Participating agencies include Colorado, Connecticut, New York City, Minnesota, Ohio, 
Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin.156 
10. Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network  
FoodNet (www.cdc.gov/FoodNet) tracks trends in foodborne illnesses through 
active surveillance, and is an endeavor funded collaboratively by the CDC, FDA and 
USDA. A joint project with 10 funded states, the area under surveillance encompasses 
approximately 15% of the U.S. population. The participating agencies for FoodNet are 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, New 
York, Oregon, and Tennessee.157 
11. FoodSHIELD 
A comprehensive web-based system for agencies, laboratories, and professionals 
working at all levels of government in food and agriculture systems, FoodSHIELD 
(https://www.FoodSHIELD.org) facilitates interaction and communication among its 
participants. A project developed and sponsored by the FPDI, its focus is on 
collaboration, information sharing, and education/training.158 
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12. Health Alert Network 
A service of the CDC, the Health Alert Network (HAN) (http://emergency.cdc. 
gov/han/) is an electronic emergency notification system designed to push emergent 
public health notices and non-emergency information rapidly to federal, state, and local 
agencies, as well as relevant partners, such as clinicians and public health laboratories. 
This service is further augmented by many states that act as conduits to redistribute the 
messages to their own public health subscribers, often under distribution systems 
rebranded by the state health agency. It is estimated that this HAN pass-thru system 
reaches 90% of the states’ populations.159 
13. Homeland Security Information Network 
A secure online information portal, the Homeland Security Information Network 
(HSIN) (http://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-information-network-hsin) is designed 
for governmental, international, and private sector homeland security partners to 
exchange sensitive but unclassified information necessary for the execution of their 
official duties. This system allows users a wide range of functions, including data 
analysis and sending messages including notifications and alerts. The Food and 
Agriculture Sector of the DHS has designated HSIN-FA and FoodSHIELD as its two 
principle collaboration portals to support its public and private sector partners.160 
14. National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System  
As states are requested to share information voluntarily with the CDC regarding 
nationally notifiable diseases, the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System 
(NNDSS) (http://wwwn.cdc.gov/nndss/) was created to provide for streamlined reporting 
and data gathering. Currently, 57 different public health jurisdictions participate in this 
voluntary system, but some designated diseases may not be considered as reportable in 
each state. This aggregation of information allows public health professionals to gauge 
morbidity rates and ascertain appropriate disease control measures. Based on current 
                                                 
159 “Health Alert Network,” accessed February 2, 2015, http://emergency.cdc.gov/han/.  
160 “Homeland Security Information Network,” accessed February 2, 2015, https://www.dhs.gov/ 
homeland-security-information-network-hsin.  
 51 
trends, the listing of reportable diseases can vary over time, and is reviewed and updated 
annually by the CSTE, in collaboration with the CDC. Foodborne diseases designated as 
notifiable include botulism, cholera, hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS), listeriosis 
(Listeria), salmonellosis (Salmonella), Shiga Toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) 
infections, shigellosis (Shigella), and vibriosis.161 
15. National Outbreak Reporting System 
NORS, administered by the CDC, provides a web-based system 
(http://www.cdc.gov/nors/) for health partners at the state, local, and territorial levels to 
provide information voluntarily on enteric diseases. Information on foodborne epidemics 
caused by “bacterial, viral, parasitic, chemical, toxin and unknown agents”162 can be 
entered for review. In addition, this system accepts data on diseases spread from person-
to-person, including those spread by water or animal contact. Electronic Foodborne 
Outbreak Reporting System (eFORS) preceded NORS as the CDC’s data transmission 
tool from 1998–2008.163 
16. OutbreakNet Enhanced 
OutbreakNet Enhanced is an online collaborative (http://www.cdc.gov/food 
safety/outbreaknetenhanced/index.html), which includes membership from all 50 states in 
a network of epidemiologists and other public health professionals involved in aspects of 
enteric outbreaks from food, water, and other sources. Considered a capacity building 
program, this connection allows the CDC, FDA, and USDA to network and share insights 
on best practices in foodborne outbreak response.164  
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PulseNet is a collaborative computer-based communication hub 
(http://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/) that allows participants from laboratories, and federal, 
state, and local health agencies to share real-time information on identification, or 
fingerprinting, of bacteria, to help confirm and track foodborne outbreaks.165 
18. Public Health Information System 
USDA/FSIS launched its Public Health Information System (PHIS) 
(http://www.fsis.usda.gov/phis) to replace a number of older online systems to provide a 
platform from which it can interact electronically with its partners. Created to streamline 
and enhance operations, this secure system allows the agency to collect and analyze data 
to assure safer food.166  
19. State Advisory Fax and Email System 
To facilitate rapid communication with defined public health partners, the FDA 
Office of Partnerships oversees a broadcast system for the dissemination of alerts and 
emergency messages known as SAFES, the State Advisory Fax and Email System 
(http://www.fda.gov/ForFederalStateandLocalOfficials/ucm373618.htm). The mailing 
list for SAFES is restricted to state and local regulatory officials performing an FDA-
related function.167 
20. STLT Collaboration Space  
To enhance communications with public health partners on the STLT level, the 
CDC created an online sharing space for the ease of connectivity. This web portal 
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FederalStateandLocalOfficials/CommunicationbetweenFDAStateLocalandTribalOfficials/default.htm.  
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(http://www.cdc.gov/stltpublichealth/collab-space) provides all registered users with 
access to tools and assets, such as a communications resource center.168 
In 2013, the APHL issued a discovery document, which was a review of the 
myriad databases used to track laboratory testing and data for foodborne outbreaks. A 
number of these databases were defined previously. While valuable, APHL’s document, 
focused on the laboratory aspects of outbreaks, illustrates only some of the major 
communication systems and electronic portals used for information and situational 
awareness in outbreak response; many others exist. A chart of APHL’s findings from this 
document can be found in Table 2. Such an extensive listing begs the question, “how 
does a professional navigate so many existing information/communication avenues when 
responding to an outbreak?” The author proposed this question to several current 
employees of the CDC, with the assurance of confidentiality. In reply, the CDC staffers 
expressed frustration on the myriad portals used for interagency notification with 
comments, such as, “its numbing, it’s just so much,”169 “it’s hard to crawl out of the 
weeds,”170 “it’s even confusing to us,”171 and “everyone has their own go-to 
communication portal.”172 A realistic and very telling synopsis can be found in this 
response, “everyone realizes and gives lip service to coordination, but in reality, it’s 
difficult to do because you have your own stuff to do.”173  
                                                 
168 “State, Tribal, Local & Territorial Public Health Professionals Gateway,” accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://www.cdc.gov/stltpublichealth/.  




































Table 2.  APHL Data Exchange Initiatives (Continued) 
 
 
Source: Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL), Discovery Document: Data Exchange among 
Food and Feed-Testing Laboratories and FDA’s eLEXNET (Silver Spring, MD: Association of Public 
Health Laboratories (APHL), 2013), 50–53. 
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Considering the best system or systems to use for rapid communication between 
agencies would need a thorough evaluation of need, cost, and applicability to all the 
public health agencies and professionals involved. Perhaps the situation is best conveyed 
in a 2013 Discovery Document from APHL, “Beyond these challenges, there are 
significant policy obstacles to address before any of these systems can be established as 
the primary communication portal for integrated federal-state-local outbreak 
communications. Any effort to improve outbreak communications and data exchange 
must address both the technical and policy issues.”174 Overall, the intent of systemic 
assessment is to clarify and improve the entire process to assure clear communications 
and timely diffusion of the right information to the right people to prevent and respond to 
an actual or potential foodborne outbreak.  
The need for improvement has not gone unnoticed, as illustrated by the recent 
history of federal attention to enhancing food safety in the United States.  
O. FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY WORKING GROUP 
In 2009, President Obama recognized the need for enhancements to the U.S. food 
safety system by establishing a multiagency Food Safety Working Group (FSWG) to 
align federal efforts in this area. The FSWG established priorities on three primary 
objectives: “prioritizing prevention, strengthening surveillance and enforcement, and 
improving response and recovery.”175 Recommendations from the FSWG included 
strengthening public health epidemiology programs, improving state capacity, and 
requesting that state and local health partners review and amend their agency protocols 
for emergency situations to be consistent with the CIFOR Guidelines for Foodborne 
Disease Outbreak Response.176 However, as reported by the GAO, the group has not met 
for at least three years.177 The last item listed as a recent action on the FSWG’s website is 
                                                 
174 Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL), Discovery Document: Data Exchange among 
Food and Feed-Testing Laboratories and FDA’s eLEXNET, 2. 





its December 2011 progress report.178 As of December 2015, no additional updates have 
been posted to the FSWG website.  
1. Food Safety Modernization Act/Integrated Food Safety System  
The long list of foodborne outbreaks that have occurred over the past decade179 
raised concerns among all levels of government as to areas in which the system could be 
improved. These concerns eventually prompted action in Washington to assure system-
wide enhancements, which culminated in President Obama signing the Food Safety 
Modernization Act (FSMA) on January 4, 2011. FSMA calls for a national integrated 
food safety system (IFSS) focused on the prevention of foodborne illness outbreaks. It also 
recognizes the importance of improving outbreak detection and response180 that includes 
enhanced partnerships at the local, state, and federal level.181  
FSMA’s primary goal is to assure all agencies with food safety responsibilities 
carry out their duties in an integrated fashion that unites local, state, and national agencies 
in efforts to prevent food safety outbreaks from happening, rather than just cleaning up 
the aftermath.182 Communication is integral to such enhanced partnerships, and reliable, 
efficient data exchange is essential to a coordinated response to foodborne disease 
outbreaks. This aim requires new approaches to food safety, including increased data-
sharing capabilities.183 
The FSMA includes numerous provisions requiring interagency collaboration, 
but, as the GAO observed, such provisions are aimed at individual issues and do not 
                                                 
178 U.S. Government Accountability Office, High Risk: Revamping Federal Oversight of Food Safety 
(GAO-15-290) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2015, http://www.gao.gov/ 
highrisk/risks/safety-security/food_safety.php. 
179 “List of Selected Multistate Foodborne Outbreak Investigations,” accessed December 17, 2015, 
http://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/outbreaks/multistate-outbreaks/outbreaks-list.html. 
180 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Ensuring a Safe Food Supply, 18. 
181 “FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA),” accessed November 17, 2015, http://www.fda. 
gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/.  
182 Paul Priyesh Vijayakumar, Melissa Newman, and Gregg Rentfrow, FDA’s Food Safety 
Modernization Act: An Overview (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky College of Agriculture, 2015), 
https://www.uky.edu/fsic/Food_Modernization_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 
183 Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL), Discovery Document: Data Exchange among 
Food and Feed-Testing Laboratories and FDA’s eLEXNET, 3. 
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provide for the desired center-focused, umbrella connecting all food safety regulations 
and programs. Further, in December 2014, the GAO reported that 10 of 12 food safety 
experts they interviewed, “agreed a centralized collaborative mechanism on food safety is 
important to foster effective interagency collaboration and could enhance food safety 
oversight.”184 
2. 50-State Workshops  
A variety of initiatives have been set into motion to address systemic food safety 
problems and foster comprehensive input to improve interagency collaboration. Since 
1998, the FDA has sponsored 50-state workshops to bring together regulators and public 
health professionals from federal, state, local, and territorial agencies with extensive 
subject matter expertise in food, feed, epidemiology, laboratory science, veterinary 
science, environmental science, and public health.185 The first 50-state workshop 
convened in 1998 but activities were suspended in 2001 due to political change and a 
redirection of national priorities.186 Following a number of high-profile national 
outbreaks, and because President Obama declared food safety and protection a priority, 
these meetings were resurrected in 2008.  
3. Partnership for Food Protection 
A valuable outcome of the resuscitated 2008 50-state meeting was the creation of 
the Partnership for Food Protection (PFP), a working body of governmental collaboration 
established to implement recommendations from the workshops. Since its establishment, 
the PFP has utilized a workgroup structure to develop and implement procedures, best 
practices, and additional resources to assist in integration advancement. The PFP has 
been entrusted with fostering the creation and execution of an IFSS. Topics addressed by 
this group include managing conflict, integrating response efforts, conducting joint 
                                                 
184 Government Accountability Office, High Risk: Revamping Federal Oversight of Food Safety. 
185 Partnership for Food Protection, 2012 50-State Workshop Summary Report (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration, 2012), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForFederalStateandLocalOfficials/ 
FoodSafetySystem/UCM361293.pdf. 
186 Partnership for Food Protection, Partnership for Food Protection Newsletter (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForFederalStateandLocal 
Officials/FoodSafetySystem/PartnershipforFoodProtectionPFP/UCM406323.pdf. 
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investigations, and improving communication.187 The FDA considers the 50-state 
workshops as a key milestone in structuring an integrated national food safety system.  
While the PFP has produced some best practices to enhance communication 
across governmental levels, this work is primarily targeted at Class 1 recall 
communication, such as ensuring that product information, distribution lists, and audit 
check assignments are shared expeditiously between the FDA and state agencies.188 In 
2012, the PFP response workgroup developed a Quick Start Response Guide, a visual 
tool to enhance rapid response communication and capabilities by food, epidemiology, 
and laboratory programs.  
The 2012 PFP report provides information on some federal level work towards 
improvement. In September 2011, Commissioner Margaret Hamburg charged Mike 
Taylor, then Deputy Commissioner for Foods, and Deborah Autor, the Deputy 
Commissioner for Global Regulatory Operations and Policy, with establishing an 
administrative IFSS Task Force (ITF) to develop and implement new strategies and 
action plans to envelope state and local agencies into a full partnership.189 This report 
includes recommendations, including the need for the FDA to build the operational 
infrastructure needed for a true IFSS:  
The ITF needs to make information sharing between agencies more 
permanent by assessing existing information sharing mechanisms and 
addressing gaps. This requires reaching out to state leaders to engage in 
more information sharing and streamlining the process for efficiency.190 
Despite these advances, the communication needs of local agencies are often 
unaddressed or deferred, as illustrated by comments during a brainstorming session at the 
2014 meeting: 
                                                 
187 Partnership for Food Protection, A United Approach to Public Health National Workshop 
Summary Report, August 17–19, 2010 (Washington, DC: U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2010), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForFederalStateandLocalOfficials/FoodSafetySystem/UCM361301.pdf. 
188 Partnership for Food Protection, Best Practices for Improving FDA and State Communication 
during Recalls, Summer 2015 (Washington, DC: U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2015), http://www. 
fda.gov/downloads/ForFederalStateandLocalOfficials/FoodSafetySystem/PartnershipforFoodProtectionPFP
/UCM460013.pdf. 
189 Partnership for Food Protection, 2012 50-State Workshop Summary Report, 9. 
190 Ibid., 10. 
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• Locals [need to be] viewed as a partner instead of being kicked to the curb 
• Locals unaware of tools available 
• Locals are underrepresented at PFP meetings  
• No two-way model outbreak/recall communication protocols between 
federal, state, local and territorial health agencies191 
Despite these issues, the PFP remains active, and improving outbreak 
investigation communication between federal, state, and local public health continues to 
be a work in progress.  
P. OTHER FOOD PROTECTION COLLABORATION INITIATIVES  
In 2011, the FDA entered into a five-year cooperative agreement with the 
National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) to facilitate efforts to support 
critical federal-state collaboration. With an eye on the development of an IFSS, it was 
one of several projects funded by the FDA to create and launch collaborative online 
information-sharing tools aimed at a variety of stakeholder users.192  
The FDA, FSIS, and CDC continue to oversee a variety of initiatives to enhance 
interagency food safety coordination, such as the Interagency Food Safety Analytics 
Collaboration (IFSAC), which is designed to estimate foodborne illness source attribution 
better. However, as pointed out by the GAO, none of these initiatives currently touch on 
all desired aspects of centralized collaboration among federal agencies.193  
The Integrated Foodborne Outbreak Response and Management (InFORM) 
conference is a series of meetings held every two years since 2013, with the intent of 
integrating separate educational events for the different disciplines and agencies 
intimately involved in foodborne outbreak detection and response. Previously, the CDC 
and the APHL sponsored PulseNet meetings for laboratory staff who were part of their 
                                                 
191 Author’s notes from 50-State Workshop, Mutual Reliance for a Safer Food Supply, St. Louis, 
2014.  
192 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, and U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, 2011 Sector Critical Infrastructure Protection Annual Report for the Food and Agriculture 
Sector, 10. 
193 U.S. Government Accountability Office, High Risk: Revamping Federal Oversight of Food Safety. 
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national networks. Similarly, OutbreakNet meetings for epidemiology staff were 
sponsored by the CDC or APHL. InFORM 2013 served to integrate the PulseNet and 
OutbreakNet meetings, and expanded to include EH specialists involved in outbreak 
response. Sponsored by the CDC, APHL, USDA/FSIS, and FDA, this combined meeting 
serves to support the vision of an IFSS by expanding and enhancing partnerships among 
and between disciplines, with the intent of integrating and amplifying multi-agency and 
multi-disciplinary responses.  
As illustrated in this chapter, effective communication is an essential element 
within and between agencies to prevent and respond to widespread illness attributed to 
food. Agencies at the federal, state, and local levels, as well as a number of non-
governmental organizations, are working toward new enhancements, and assuring 
coordinated communication and response efforts. Further efforts need to include the 
development of realistic protocols or specific remedies to reduce communication 
vulnerabilities, as well as establish realistic solutions to enhance governmental 
capabilities for effective communication in all directions, laterally, upward, downward, 
within, and between agencies.  
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III. RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS  
Many states have protocols or guidelines to provide steps for staff to follow in 
foodborne outbreak response. This chapter examines states’ general operating procedures 
to ascertain lines and modes of communication related to foodborne outbreaks, determine 
procedural commonalities, identify potential barriers, and make recommendations to 
enhance multi-directional information exchanges between health agencies.  
A. COMMON THEMES: OPTIMIZING INTER- AND INTRA- AGENCY 
OUTBREAK COMMUNICATIONS 
A strong and flexible public health infrastructure is the best defense 
against any disease outbreak—naturally or intentionally caused. As with 
all public health events, coordination and cooperation among all agencies 
are critical to the success of any response. 
~ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention194  
To assure a streamlined approach to foodborne outbreak response, many states 
have created protocol documents instructing their agencies on acceptable response 
actions (see Table 3). A protocol is “a standardized way of performing a task in a process 
that is repeatable and reproducible.”195 It has the advantage of enabling actions to be 
undertaken in a homogenous pattern. Although generically called protocols, the 
foodborne outbreak response documents reviewed are more like SOGs, or standard 
operating guidelines, checklists, or best practices. As situations and resources may vary, 
each state or agency has customized the guidelines to fit their particular political and 
structural circumstances.  
The state and agency foodborne outbreak response documents used in this study 
were examined to ascertain defined practices for coordinated information management. 
                                                 
194 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health Emergency Response: The CDC 
Role (Atlanta, GA: U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2001), http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Doc 
umentsAPP/Improving_biodefense.pdf. 
195 European Association of Nuclear Medicine, Working with Protocols (Vienna, Austria: European 
Association of Nuclear Medicine, 2003), http://www.eanm.org/committees/technologist/tech_write_pro 
tocols.pdf. 
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In other words, they were reviewed to ascertain timely sharing of pertinent critical 
information during outbreak response. Response is based on public health core principles 
of preventing disease and death. The North Carolina Institute for Public Health outlined a 
series of questions to envisage as an outbreak unfolds, including: 
• What resources, including personnel are available? 
• Who will direct the day-to-day investigation? 
• How will the team communicate with each other? 
• How will data be shared and analyzed? 
• Who will write the final report and present the information?196 
The processes described within a protocol document should be clear and logical to 
ensure understanding and appropriate implementation.197 It is recognized that standard 
operating guidelines may have varying specific features, based on the lens of the parent 
organization. Regardless, to be most efficacious, procedure manuals that are clear, easy to 
follow, and formatted well are those that are the most likely to be consistently utilized. 
When it comes to communication and information sharing during an outbreak, it is 
essential to keep in mind who needs to know what, when, how this information will be 
transferred, and by whom. Namely, who owns and is accountable for communication in 
responses?  
Numerous foodborne outbreak response guidelines have been developed by 
federal, state, and local governmental and nongovernmental agencies, as well as by 
national professional organizations, many of which are referenced throughout this 
document. These guidelines vary in scope, and although the recommendations all have 
similar concepts on communication improvement, they do not always align with one 
another across agencies or jurisdictions, nor have they been universally adopted by state, 
county, or local jurisdictions. Three model documents, recognized as the main guidance 
                                                 
196 North Carolina Center for Public Health Preparedness, Focus on Field Epidemiology (Chapel Hill, 
NC: North Carolina Center for Public Health Preparedness 2003), http://nciph.sph.unc.edu/focus/vol1/issue 
2/1-2Team_issue.pdf. 
197 Kristie Lorette, “The Guidelines on Writing Procedure Manuals, Houston Chronicle, accessed 
November 18, 2015, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/guidelines-writing-procedure-manuals-3121.html. 
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references in the United States, were primarily used to ascertain if the content in states’ 
protocols met with best practices in communication. These three documents are the 
following:  
• Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR): Guidelines 
for Foodborne Disease Outbreak Response (2009)198 
• International Association for Food Protection: Procedures to Investigate 
Foodborne Illness, 6th ed. (2011)199 
• National Food Safety System Project: Multistate Foodborne Outbreak 
Investigations Guidelines for Improving Coordination and Communication 
(2001)200 
With these guidance documents, this study sought to identify documented routes 
of internal and external agency communications and information sharing during 
foodborne outbreak response in the states. No “one-size-fits-all” exists when it comes to 
outbreak communications. However, commonalities and standard frameworks can help 
assure core principles are met and communication barriers are identified and addressed. 
The following information provides a behind-the-scenes look at what might or not occur 
–during outbreak investigations and responses. Further, this chapter looks to provide a 
detailed discussion of strategies used by states for information exchange and identify 
promising systemic improvements.  
Limitation of document:  
• State protocols were open-source, and obtained online. States were 
contacted via email to verify the outbreak protocol posted online was the 
most current version. 
• Some states did not respond to the inquiry email, so it was presumed the 
document posted was currently in use.  
                                                 
198 Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) and Council of State and Territorial 
Epidemiologists, Guidelines for Foodborne Disease Outbreak Response. 
199 International Association for Food Protection (IAFP), Procedures to Investigate Foodborne 
Illness. 
200 National Food Safety System Project, Multistate Foodborne Outbreak Investigations Guidelines 




• All the agency protocols reviewed included various processes for outbreak 
investigations. However, this research concentrates on steps or guidance 
on aspects related to communication; that is, obtaining and sharing 
information within and across stakeholder regulatory agencies.  
• Arizona and Iowa’s protocols include a preceptive note that is likely 
applicable to the other documents reviewed, “This resource manual is not 
intended to replace existing procedure manuals. Instead, it should be used 
as a reference document for comparison with existing procedures, for 
filling in gaps and updating agency-specific procedures, for creating new 
procedures where they do not exist, and training staff.”201  
• It is interesting to note that, although there are procedural and scientific 
commonalities, the states’ procedures also vary widely, especially in the 
areas of outreach and communication sharing.  
• Many states do not reference the CIFOR Guidelines, arguably the standard 
model for outbreak response in the United States.  
• Maricopa County, the only protocol in this study not from a state agency, 
was attached as an appendix to Arizona’s document. Due to its potential 
value in providing a local agency perspective, it was included in this 
study.  
• Throughout this chapter, the term “states” includes both states and 
Maricopa County.  
• Protocols for waterborne gastrointestinal outbreaks were not included in 
this study, as attributed illnesses could also occur from recreational 
exposures, such as swimming.  
• Some outbreak response protocols, such as Florida, Massachusetts, and 
New Jersey, are part of a larger document that covers responses for food 
and non-food related outbreaks. For the purposes of this study, only the 
section related to foodborne diseases was considered.  
                                                 
201 Arizona Department of Health Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Disease Outbreak 
Investigation Resource Manual (Phoenix, AZ: Arizona Department of Health Services, 2010), http:// 
www.azdhs.gov/documents/preparedness/epidemiology-disease-control/disease-investigation-resources/ 
foodborne-waterborne-disease-outbreak-manual.pdf; Iowa Department of Public Health, IDPH Foodborne 
Outbreak Investigation Manual (Des Moines, IA: Iowa Department of Public Health, 2014), http://www. 
idph.state.ia.us/idph_universalhelp/main.aspx?system=IdphFoodborneDiseaseManual. 
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Table 3.   List of States and their Foodborne Outbreaks Protocol Documents 
State Document Name / Web Location Year FDA Food Code  
Version Adopted206 
Pages 




2012 2005 5 pages 




2010 1999 208 pages 




2014 2009 11 pages 





2006 2009 86 pages 
Kansas Foodborne Illness and Outbreak Investigation Manual211 
 
http://www.kdheks.gov/epi/download/kansas_foodborne_illness_manual.pdf 
2008 2009 186 pages 
                                                 
206 Association of Food and Drug Officials (AFDO), Real Progress in Food Code Adoption (Washington, DC: U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, 2001), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceRegulation/RetailFoodProtection/FoodCode/UCM476819.pdf. 
207 Alabama Department of Public Health, Foodborne Outbreaks Protocols (Linden, AL: Alabama Department of Public Health, 2012), 
http://www.adph.org/epi/assets/FBO_Protocols.pdf.  
208 Arizona Department of Health Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Disease Outbreak Investigation Resource Manual.  
209 Florida Department of Health, Food and Waterborne Disease Surveillance and Investigation (Tallahassee, FL: Florida Department of Health, 
2005), http://www.floridahealth.gov/diseases-and-conditions/food-and-waterborne-disease/_documents/2005.pdf. 
210 Iowa Department of Public Health, IDPH Foodborne Outbreak Investigation Manual. 
211 Kansas Department of Health and Environment, Foodborne Illness and Outbreak Investigation Manual (Topeka, KS: Kansas Department of 
Health and Environment, 2008), http://www.kdheks.gov/epi/download/kansas_foodborne_illness_manual.pdf. 
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Table 3.  List of States and their Foodborne Outbreaks Protocol Documents (Continued) 
 
State Document Name / Web Location Year FDA Food Code  
Version Adopted212 
Pages 




2013 2005 205 pages 





2012 1999 16 pages 
Maricopa 
County, AZ 





2007 1999 19 pages 





1997 1999 12 pages 
 
 
                                                 
212 Association of Food and Drug Officials (AFDO), Real Progress in Food Code Adoption (Washington, DC: U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, 2001), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceRegulation/RetailFoodProtection/FoodCode/UCM476819.pdf. 
213 Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Outbreak Investigation Manual, Version 2 (Frankfort, KY: 
Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 2013), http://chfs.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/73FA3399-9DFD-44F1-B667-A98BB97F0A70/0/Foodborne 
andWaterborneOutbreakInvManualFinal314.pdf. 
214 Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Food-borne Outbreak Investigation (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana Department of Health and 
Hospitals, 2012), http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/assets/oph/Center-PHCH/Center-CH/infectious-epi/EpiManual/FoodOutbreakManual.pdf.  
215 Arizona Department of Health Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Disease Outbreak Investigation Resource Manual.  
216 Massachusetts Department of Health and Human Services, Foodborne Illness Complaint/Outbreak Actions (Boston, MA: Massachusetts 
Department of Health and Human Services, 1997), http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/dph/environmental/foodsafety/ref-manual/intro-pages.pdf. 
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Table 3.  List of States and their Foodborne Outbreaks Protocol Documents (Continued) 
 
State Document Name / Web Location Year FDA Food Code  
Version Adopted217 
Pages 
Minnesota Procedures for Responding to Foodborne Disease Outbreaks in Food Service 
Establishments in Minnesota218 
 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/eh/food/pwdu/fboprotocol041609.pdf  
2009 1997 38 pages 




2012 2009 65 pages 




2013 2001 58 pages 





2005 2009 7 pages 
 
                                                 
217 Association of Food and Drug Officials (AFDO), Real Progress in Food Code Adoption (Washington, DC: U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, 2001), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceRegulation/RetailFoodProtection/FoodCode/UCM476819.pdf. 
218 Minnesota Department of Health, Procedures for Responding to Foodborne Disease Outbreaks in Food Service Establishments in Minnesota 
(Saint Cloud, MN: Minnesota Department of Health, 2009), http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/eh/food/pwdu/fboprotocol041609.pdf. 
219 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services, Communicable Disease Investigation Reference Manual (Jefferson City, MO: Missouri 
Department of Health and Senior Services, 2003), http://health.mo.gov/living/healthcondiseases/communicable/communicabledisease/cdmanual/pdf/CD 
sec30.pdf. 
220 New Jersey Association of County and City Health Officials et al., Communicable Disease Outbreak Manual: New Jersey’s Public Health 
Response (New Brunswick, NJ: New Jersey Association of County and City Health Officials, New Jersey Department of Health and Rutgers, The State 
University of New Jersey, NJAES, Office of Continuing Professional Education, 2013, http://njlmn2.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/NJACCHO%20 
Outbreak%20Investigation%20Manual_0.pdf.  
221 North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, North Carolina’s Foodborne Illness Investigation Guidance and Tools (Raleigh, 
NC: North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, 2012), http://ehs.ncpublichealth.com/faf/food/fd/docs/GuidelinesforEnvironmental 
FieldInvestigations-August%202012.pdf. 
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Table 3.  List of States and their Foodborne Outbreaks Protocol Documents (Continued) 
 
State Document Name / Web Location Year FDA Food Code  
Version Adopted222 
Pages 




2012 2009 48 pages 





2011 2009 15 pages 






2007 2005 94 pages 






1999 2001 31 pages 
                                                 
222 Association of Food and Drug Officials (AFDO), Real Progress in Food Code Adoption (Washington, DC: U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, 2001), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceRegulation/RetailFoodProtection/FoodCode/UCM476819.pdf. 
223 North Dakota Department of Health, Foodborne Outbreak Investigation Manual (Bismarck, ND: North Dakota Department of Health, 2012), 
http://www.ndhealth.gov/disease/GI/Docs/FoodBorneManual_FINAL.pdf. 
224 Ohio Department of Health, Foodborne Disease Outbreaks (Columbus, OH: Ohio Department of Health, 2014), http://www.odh.ohio.gov/pdf/ 
idcm/fdbrn.pdf. 
225 State of Rhode Island Department of Health, Guidelines for Investigating Foodborne Illness Outbreaks (Providence, RI: State of Rhode Island 
Department of Health, 2004), http://www.health.ri.gov/publications/guidelines/InvestigatingFoodborneIllnessOutbreaks.pdf. 
226 Texas Department of State Health Services, Foodborne Disease Outbreak Manual (Austin, TX: Texas Department of State Health Services, 
1999), https://www.dshs.state.tx.us/idcu/health/foodborne_illness/investigation/. Note that the Foodborne Disease Outbreak Manual is currently under 
review. 
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Table 3.  List of States and their Foodborne Outbreaks Protocol Documents (Continued) 
 







Foodborne Outbreak Investigation Guidelines228 
 
http://health.utah.gov/envsvc/ESP/FoodSafetyProgram/outbreak.pdf 
1998 2009 3 pages 




1999 2005 7 pages 




2012 1999 10 pages 




2008 2005 11 pages 
Wisconsin Foodborne and Waterborne Disease Outbreak Investigation Manual232 
 
https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/foodborne/fd-wtr-borne-man.pdf  
2008 2009 114 pages 
                                                 
227 Association of Food and Drug Officials (AFDO), Real Progress in Food Code Adoption (Washington, DC: U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, 2001), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceRegulation/RetailFoodProtection/FoodCode/UCM476819.pdf. 
228 Utah Department of Health, Foodborne Outbreak Investigation Guidelines (Salt Lake City, UT: Utah Department of Health, 1998), http:// 
health.utah.gov/envsvc/ESP/FoodSafetyProgram/outbreak.pdf. 
229 Virginia Department of Health, Foodborne Outbreaks (Richmond, VA: Virginia Department of Health, 1999), http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/ 
EnvironmentalHealth/FOOD/FoodSafety/GuidanceDocs/GuidanceFiles/Inspxn%20processes/VDH%20Disease%20Control%20Manual.pdf. 
230 Washington State Department of Health, Foodborne Disease Outbreaks (Tumwater, WA: Washington State Department of Health, 2013), 
http://www.doh.wa.gov/Portals/1/Documents/5100/420-054-Guideline-FoodOutbreak.pdf.  
231 West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, General Outbreak Investigation/Notification Protocol (Charleston, WV: West 
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 2008), http://www.dhhr.wv.gov/oeps/disease/ob/Documents/Outbreak%20Investigation%20 
protocol.pdf.  
232 Wisconsin Department of Health Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Disease Outbreak Investigation Manual (Madison, WI: Wisconsin 
Department of Health Services, 2008), https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/foodborne/fd-wtr-borne-man.pdf.  
 72 
B. STATE PROTOCOL DOCUMENTS 
Not surprisingly, most of the state’s documents had similar titles, as they are all 
intended for a particular focus, the investigation of, and response to, multiple cases of 
illness attributed to food. The titling of the documents were all shades of the same basic 
definition, and incorporated one of the following terms: manual, protocols, guide/
guidance/guidelines, tools, actions, and reference. One outbreak response instrument—
Maricopa County—had an additional user-friendly subtitle, The Food and Waterborne 
Illness Cookbook. Four states, Florida, Missouri, New Jersey, and West Virginia, 
incorporated foodborne outbreak response as a section or chapter in a larger 
communicable disease outbreak manual. Two states specifically indicated their protocols 
were a collaborative document. New Jersey partnered with the New Jersey Association of 
County and City Health Officials (NJACCHO), and Virginia’s document was a 
partnership between the Virginia Department of Health and the Virginia Department of 
Agriculture and Consumer Services. Only one manual had a communication reference in 
the title. West Virginia named its guidelines, General Outbreak Investigation/Notification 
Protocol.233  
The length of the documents reviewed ranged from three pages to 208 pages, with 
the larger dossiers being more detailed, and the shorter documents being older. The date 
range for the creation of or updates to the protocols ranged from as early as 1997 
(Massachusetts), to as recent as 2014 (New Jersey). Some are reviewed or updated 
annually; others have no timeframe for appraisal or revisions. While most protocols were 
procedural for food-related complaints and outbreaks regardless of source attribution, 
Minnesota had the only document with a title specific to foodborne outbreaks in 
foodservice establishments (Procedures for Responding to Foodborne Disease Outbreaks 
in Food Service Establishments in Minnesota).234 
                                                 
233 West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, General Outbreak 
Investigation/Notification Protocol. 
234 Minnesota Department of Health, Procedures for Responding to Foodborne Disease Outbreaks in 
Food Service Establishments in Minnesota. 
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The terms “foodborne disease” and “foodborne illness” were used 
interchangeably in the documents, but some states were broader in their outbreak source 
inclusion. The majority of the protocols were targeted towards illness from food; 
however, Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, Maricopa County, and Wisconsin incorporated 
waterborne diseases along with food. For the purposes of this research, only the 
foodborne outbreak sections of protocols were reviewed, as waterborne gastrointestinal 
illnesses can be also be contracted from recreational activities and other non-food related 
sources.  
1. Target Audience 
While the documents reviewed were targeted toward regulatory outbreak response 
within an agency, a wide range of professional expertise is represented throughout the 
roles and responsibilities set forth by the sponsoring authorities. Given the variety of 
agencies involved, and their respective centralized or decentralized structure, a particular 
state and its local public health agencies may fall under the same or differing procedural 
documents, depending on the state’s structure. “Staff” is a generic term that can be 
attributed to a wide range of personnel conducting a variety of investigative and clerical 
tasks. These tasks and the responsible professionals can differ based on agency structure, 
state professional licensing requirements, position pre-requisites, and the availability of 
funding and resources. Overall, it can be interpreted that the documents are targeted 
towards the professionals in public health agencies who have a participatory role in 
surveillance for and response to foodborne outbreaks.  
2. Stated Communication Goals and Objectives 
For effective outbreak response, the multi-directional exchange of information 
and coordination of response efforts is a required element for vigilance in foodborne and 
enteric disease tracking and investigation, especially when a number of agencies are 
involved.235 With this in mind, this study sought to identify which protocols, if any, have 
specific, measurable goals to assure the timely and appropriate sharing of essential 
                                                 
235 International Association for Food Protection (IAFP), Procedures to Investigate Foodborne 
Illness, 5. 
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outbreak investigation information to those stakeholders who have a need to be informed. 
Communication goals and objectives foster an agency’s ability to maintain focus and 
perspective, and establish communication priorities when faced with a foodborne 
outbreak.  
To encompass the nuances of communication and how the application of 
communication principles could be interpreted, the following terms, found in the 
protocols, were considered to be synonymous with communication: advise, brief, call, 
collaborate, collaboration, communicate, consult, contact, cooperate, coordinate, discuss, 
forward, exchange information, inform, liaise, negotiate, reach out, report, share, update, 
and work together.  
As one of many components of outbreak investigation and response, most states 
did not specify separate goals and objectives for outbreak communication. Rather, stated 
purposes of the documents tended to address the entire scope of outbreak response. 
Arizona said it thusly, “This manual is intended to provide a structure for coordinating 
the activities of the various public health, laboratory and administrative agencies 
responsible for the investigation, prevention, and control of food and waterborne 
disease.”236 While communication is inherent in the overarching business of outbreak 
response, it is such an essential component that it could be argued the element of assuring 
effective information exchange should be an objective of outbreak response, if not an 
outright goal.  
Of the states that addressed communication principles, Missouri phrased it most 
succinctly, “Communicate often, early, and accurately.”237 Florida similarly stated, 
“During any food disease outbreak or complaint investigation, prompt communications 
are of the utmost importance.”238  
                                                 
236 Arizona Department of Health Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Disease Outbreak 
Investigation Resource Manual, 8. 
237 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services, Communicable Disease Investigation 
Reference Manual. 
238 Florida Department of Health, Food and Waterborne Disease Surveillance and Investigation. 
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Of all the protocols reviewed, New Jersey’s document was the only one that 
explicitly defined performance goals for outbreak tracking and response, inclusive of 
communications. Targeted at local health departments, these communication goals 
include the expectation that local health jurisdictions will immediately report all 
suspected outbreaks to the state department of health, forward all investigation summary 
reports to the state department of health within 30 days of investigation completion, 
update the contact listings red book within 24 hours of a change in personnel or contact 
information, and ensure that contact information is always 24/7 and 3x3 (three contact 
persons with three contact methods.) While a valuable set of goals, it falls short by not 
including performance expectations for other stakeholders or specifying bi-directional 
communication and information exchange.  
Minnesota has a slightly different tone. Its protocol does not stipulate a goal 
verbatim, but rather designates a focus for its foodborne outbreak response plan, “This 
document articulates mechanisms for communicating and sharing responsibilities.”239 It 
goes on to particularize, “It is essential that the individuals identified (e.g., key staff) 
communicate frequently to exchange information throughout the outbreak 
investigation.”240  
While it is accurate to categorize that the documents audited for this study did not 
include communication goals stated as such, they all had aspects that could be viewed as 
information exchange targets. For instance, Louisiana specified, “when a potential 
outbreak situation occurs, the first person involved should ensure that all the stakeholders 
are informed.”241 Similarly, Massachusetts looks to assure that “coordination and 
communication with other members of the foodborne illness complaint response team is 
imperative. Additionally, be sure to keep others not directly involved in an outbreak 
                                                 
239 Minnesota Department of Health, Procedures for Responding to Foodborne Disease Outbreaks in 
Food Service Establishments in Minnesota. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Food-borne Outbreak Investigation. 
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informed.”242 Kansas included communication as the second step in conducting an 
outbreak investigation by stipulating “contact and coordinate with key personnel.”243  
Iowa recognized the breadth of partners that may be involved in an outbreak, and 
the need to assure regular contact and updates, “Due to the number of partners that may 
be involved in a foodborne outbreak investigation, ongoing communication is critical to 
keep everyone informed and organized.”244 In its steps to conduct an investigation, 
Kansas reminds its professionals to “contact and coordinate with key personnel”245 
because “coordination and cooperation among all agencies are critical to the success of 
any response.”246 In review of the documents, “coordinate” and “cooperate” were two 
terms used widely. Perhaps adding the concept of two-way information exchange would 
make this common phrase more accurate and applicable. The goal, simply stated could 
be: coordinate, cooperate, and communicate. 
The need for open communication by all members of the outbreak team is 
emphasized throughout the manuals of Minnesota and Kentucky:  
Successful investigation and resolution of an outbreak depends on the 
communication and collaboration of a multi-disciplinary team. How will 
communications occur and are contact information sheets and clear 
directions available? Answers to these types of questions will be crucial to 
successful investigation. Successful investigation and resolution of an 
outbreak depends on the communication and collaboration of a multi-
disciplinary team.247 
An optimal plan should also include communication goals that address the 
distribution of information to stakeholders outside the core state regime for situational 
                                                 
242 Massachusetts Department of Health and Human Services, Foodborne Illness Complaint/Outbreak 
Actions. 
243 Kansas Department of Health and Environment, Foodborne Illness and Outbreak Investigation 
Manual. 
244 Iowa Department of Public Health, IDPH Foodborne Outbreak Investigation Manual. 
245 Kansas Department of Health and Environment, Foodborne Illness and Outbreak Investigation 
Manual. 
246 Ibid. 
247 Minnesota Department of Health, Procedures for Responding to Foodborne Disease Outbreaks in 
Food Service Establishments in Minnesota; Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Foodborne 
and Waterborne Outbreak Investigation Manual, Version 2. 
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surveillance, response, and recovery. As Texas included in its document, be sure to 
“Inform other agencies of the possible outbreak, so that they are aware of the problem, 
and can report cases of similar illness to your agency rapidly.”248 Lastly, North Dakota 
specified its communication “goal” in terms of aligning messages, “Coordinate as 
necessary with state and local public information officers to coordinate the distribution of 
news releases, health alerts, conference calls and memos.”249  
3. Defining a Foodborne Outbreak 
There are nuances in the specific terms states use to refer to an outbreak related to 
food consumption, such as:  
• “Outbreak” (ND,250 WV251) 
• “Foodborne outbreak” (AZ,252 RI,253) 
• “Foodborne illness” (AL)254 
• “Common source foodborne illness” (FL)255 
• “Outbreak of foodborne illness” (NJ)256 
• “Confirmed foodborne disease” (LA)257 
• “Potential foodborne outbreak” (MO)258 
                                                 
248 Texas Department of State Health Services, Foodborne Disease Outbreak Manual. 
249 North Dakota Department of Health, Foodborne Outbreak Investigation Manual. 
250 Ibid. 
251 West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, General Outbreak 
Investigation/Notification Protocol, 1. 
252 Arizona Department of Health Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Disease Outbreak 
Investigation Resource Manual, 19. 
253 State of Rhode Island Department of Health, Guidelines for Investigating Foodborne Illness 
Outbreaks, 10. 
254 Alabama Department of Public Health, Foodborne Outbreaks Protocols, 1. 
255 Florida Department of Health, Food and Waterborne Disease Surveillance and Investigation. 
256 New Jersey Association of County and City Health Officials et al., Communicable Disease 
Outbreak Manual, 6. 
257 Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Food-borne Outbreak Investigation, 1. 
258 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services, Communicable Disease Investigation 
Reference Manual. 
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• “Foodborne disease outbreak” (MA,259 MN,260 UT261) 
• “Suspected foodborne disease outbreak” (KS,262 WA263) 
Despite the subtleties in the terms, the prevalent meaning is clear, people became 
ill from eating food.  
The CDC defines a foodborne-disease outbreak (FBDO) as “an incident in which 
two or more persons experience a similar illness resulting from the ingestion of a 
common food.”264 The FDA echoes this description. Definitions from other references 
common to health departments extrapolate this concept to include the process of 
professional analysis. The CIFOR defines a foodborne outbreak as “two or more cases of 
a similar illness shown by an investigation to result from a common exposure, such as the 
ingestion of a common food.”265 The CSTE adds an additional element to its definition, 
“An incident in which two or more persons experience a similar illness after ingestion of 
a common food, and epidemiologic analysis implicates the food as the source of the 
illness.”266 
It might be expected that states would adopt one of the definitions originating 
from oversight agencies or from professional organizations, but a number have reworded 
or extrapolated on the federal definition. A few definitions refer to any type of outbreak, 
but most are directly related to food ingestion:  
                                                 
259 Massachusetts Department of Health and Human Services, Foodborne Illness Complaint / 
Outbreak Actions, 8. 
260 Minnesota Department of Health, Procedures for Responding to Foodborne Disease Outbreaks in 
Food Service Establishments in Minnesota, 9. 
261 Utah Department of Health, Foodborne Outbreak Investigation Guidelines, 1. 
262 Kansas Department of Health and Environment, Foodborne Illness and Outbreak Investigation 
Manual, 13. 
263 Washington State Department of Health, Foodborne Disease Outbreaks, 4. 
264 According to the CDC, before 1992, three exceptions existed to this definition; only one case of 
botulism, marine-toxin intoxication, or chemical intoxication was required to constitute a foodborne disease 
outbreak if the etiology was confirmed. The definition was changed in 1992 to require two or more cases to 
constitute an outbreak. 
265 Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) and Council of State and Territorial 
Epidemiologists, Guidelines for Foodborne Disease Outbreak Response, 249. 
266 “Foodborne Disease Outbreak 2011 Case Definition,” accessed June 3, 2015, http://wwwn.cdc. 
gov/nndss/conditions/foodborne-disease-outbreak/case-definition/2011/.  
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• “Foodborne illnesses refer to diseases acquired through eating or drinking 
contaminated foods or liquids” (AL)267 
• “An outbreak is an unexpected, unexplained increase of disease occurring 
within a specific population at a given time and place” (AL)268 
• “An unexpected, unexplained increase of a similar illness, and food is a 
likely source” (AL)269 
• “If there are two or more foodborne illness complaints from the same 
facility within a 14-day time period OR two or more individuals became 
ill after consuming food from a common source AND they reside in at 
least two households” (AL)270 
• “An outbreak or an epidemic is the occurrence in a community or region 
of an illness(es) similar in nature, clearly in excess of normal expectancy 
and derived from a common or propagated source” (ND)271 
How do the state protocols in this study define a foodborne outbreak? Most agree 
that a foodborne outbreak consists of two or more persons, experiencing a similar illness 
after ingesting a common food. Further refining this definition, Alabama, Virginia, and 
Missouri specify affected persons need to be from different households, while Kansas 
looks for ill persons to be unrelated. Several states broaden the concept of common food. 
Louisiana includes a common meal as acceptable, while New Jersey and Washington 
focus on different foods from a common source. North Dakota incorporates the ingestion 
of food from a common place or common or propagated source, while Massachusetts 
includes exposure to the same food source, and Arizona persons with the same exposure. 
Rounding out the list, Missouri and Minnesota also include the consumption of a 
common beverage in their foodborne outbreak definition.  
 
 
                                                 




271 North Dakota Department of Health, Foodborne Outbreak Investigation Manual, 4. 
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• “Two or more persons” (AL,272 AZ,273 IA,274 KS,275 KY,276 LA,277 
MA,278 Maricopa County,279 MO,280 MN,281 NC,282 NJ,283 OH,284 RI,285 
TX,286 UT,287 VA,288WA,289 WI,290 WV291)  
• “From different households” (AL,292 MO,293 VA294) 
                                                 
272 Alabama Department of Public Health, Foodborne Outbreaks Protocols, 
273 Arizona Department of Health Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Disease Outbreak 
Investigation Resource Manual, 19. 
274 Iowa Department of Public Health, IDPH Foodborne Outbreak Investigation Manual, 19. 
275 Kansas Department of Health and Environment, Foodborne Illness and Outbreak Investigation 
Manual, 13. 
276 Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Outbreak 
Investigation Manual, 8. 
277 Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Food-borne Outbreak Investigation, 1. 
278 Massachusetts Department of Health and Human Services, Foodborne Illness Complaint/Outbreak 
Actions, 8. 
279 Arizona Department of Health Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Disease Outbreak 
Investigation Resource Manual, 19. 
280 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services, Communicable Disease Investigation 
Reference Manual, 13. 
281 Minnesota Department of Health, Procedures for Responding to Foodborne Disease Outbreaks in 
Food Service Establishments in Minnesota, 9. 
282 North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, North Carolina’s Foodborne Illness 
Investigation Guidance and Tools, 1. 
283 New Jersey Association of County and City Health Officials et al., Communicable Disease Outbreak 
Manual, 6. 
284 Ohio Department of Health, Foodborne Disease Outbreaks, 2. 
285 State of Rhode Island Department of Health, Guidelines for Investigating Foodborne Illness 
Outbreaks, 10. 
286 Texas Department of State Health Services, Foodborne Disease Outbreak Manual, 1. 
287 Utah Department of Health, Foodborne Outbreak Investigation Guidelines, 1. 
288 Virginia Department of Health, Foodborne Outbreaks, 1. 
289 Washington State Department of Health, Foodborne Disease Outbreaks, 4. 
290 Wisconsin Department of Health Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Disease Outbreak 
Investigation Manual, 2. 
291 West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, General Outbreak Investigation / 
Notification Protocol, 1. 
292 Alabama Department of Public Health, Foodborne Outbreaks Protocols. 
293 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services, Communicable Disease Investigation 
Reference Manual.  
294 Virginia Department of Health, Foodborne Outbreaks, 1. 
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• “Unrelated” (KS295)  
• “Experiencing a similar illness” (AL,296 KY,297 LA,298 MA,299 Maricopa 
County,300 MO,301 MN,302 NC,303 ND,304 NJ,305 OH,306 RI,307 TX,308 
UT,309VA,310 WA,311 WV312)  
• “Same disease” (AZ313)  
• “Similar objective symptoms” (KS314) 
                                                 
295 Kansas Department of Health and Environment, Foodborne Illness and Outbreak Investigation 
Manual, 13. 
296 Alabama Department of Public Health, Foodborne Outbreaks Protocols. 
297 Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Outbreak 
Investigation Manual, Version 2, 8. 
298 Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Food-borne Outbreak Investigation, 1. 
299 Massachusetts Department of Health and Human Services, Foodborne Illness Complaint / 
Outbreak Actions, 8. 
300 Arizona Department of Health Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Disease Outbreak 
Investigation Resource Manual. 
301 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services, Communicable Disease Investigation 
Reference Manual, 13. 
302 Minnesota Department of Health, Procedures for Responding to Foodborne Disease Outbreaks in 
Food Service Establishments in Minnesota, 9. 
303 North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, North Carolina’s Foodborne Illness 
Investigation Guidance and Tools, 1. 
304 North Dakota Department of Health, Foodborne Outbreak Investigation Manual, 4. 
305 New Jersey Association of County and City Health Officials et al., Communicable Disease 
Outbreak Manual. 
306 Ohio Department of Health, Foodborne Disease Outbreaks, 2. 
307 State of Rhode Island Department of Health, Guidelines for Investigating Foodborne Illness 
Outbreaks, 10. 
308 Texas Department of State Health Services, Foodborne Disease Outbreak Manual, 1. 
309 Utah Department of Health, Foodborne Outbreak Investigation Guidelines, 1. 
310 Virginia Department of Health, Foodborne Outbreaks, 1. 
311 Washington State Department of Health, Foodborne Disease Outbreaks, 4. 
312 West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, General Outbreak 
Investigation/Notification Protocol, 1. 
313 Arizona Department of Health Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Disease Outbreak 
Investigation Resource Manual. 
314 Kansas Department of Health and Environment, Foodborne Illness and Outbreak Investigation 
Manual. 
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• “After ingestion of a common food” (KY,315 LA,316 Maricopa County,317 
MO,318 MN,319 NC,320 NJ,321 OH,322 RI,323 TX,324 UT,325 VA,326 
WA,327 WV328) 
• “Or meal” (LA329)  
• “From a common or propagated source” (ND330) 
• “Common place” (ND331) 
• “Different foods from a common place” (KY,332 NJ,333 WA334) 
 
 
                                                 
315 Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services, “Foodborne and Waterborne Outbreak 
Investigation Manual, Version 2.” 
316 Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Food-borne Outbreak Investigation. 
317 Arizona Department of Health Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Disease Outbreak 
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318 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services, Communicable Disease Investigation 
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319 Minnesota Department of Health, Procedures for Responding to Foodborne Disease Outbreaks in 
Food Service Establishments in Minnesota, 9. 
320 North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, North Carolina’s Foodborne Illness 
Investigation Guidance and Tools, 1 
321 New Jersey Association of County and City Health Officials et al., Communicable Disease 
Outbreak Manual. 
322 Ohio Department of Health, Foodborne Disease Outbreaks, 2. 
323 State of Rhode Island Department of Health, Guidelines for Investigating Foodborne Illness 
Outbreaks, 10. 
324 Texas Department of State Health Services, Foodborne Disease Outbreak Manual, 1. 
325 Utah Department of Health, Foodborne Outbreak Investigation Guidelines, 1. 
326 Virginia Department of Health, Foodborne Outbreaks, 1. 
327 Washington State Department of Health, Foodborne Disease Outbreaks, 4. 
328 West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, General Outbreak 
Investigation/Notification Protocol, 1. 
329 Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Food-borne Outbreak Investigation, 1. 
330 North Dakota Department of Health, Foodborne Outbreak Investigation Manual, 4. 
331 Ibid. 
332 Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Outbreak 
Investigation Manual, Version 2, 8. 
333 New Jersey Association of County and City Health Officials et al., Communicable Disease 
Outbreak Manual. 
334 Washington State Department of Health, Foodborne Disease Outbreaks, 4. 
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• “Exposure to the same food source” (MA335) 
• “With the same exposure” (AZ336) 
• “Or beverage” (MN,337 MO338) 
• “Occurring within one incubation period of each other” (AZ339) 
• “Within a 48 hour period” (KS340) 
• “Or eating at a common restaurant/gathering” (LA,341 Maricopa 
County342) 
• “And epidemiologic evaluation implicates the meal or food as the source 
of illness” (LA,343 MA,344 Maricopa County,345 TX346) 
• “And a specific food or meal is suspected” (LA347)  
• “But person-to-person transmission or other exposures cannot be ruled 
out” (LA348) 
 
                                                 
335 Massachusetts Department of Health and Human Services, Foodborne Illness Complaint/Outbreak 
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336 Arizona Department of Health Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Disease Outbreak 
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337 Minnesota Department of Health, Procedures for Responding to Foodborne Disease Outbreaks in 
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Reference Manual, 8. 
339 Arizona Department of Health Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Disease Outbreak 
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341 Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Food-borne Outbreak Investigation. 
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343 Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Food-borne Outbreak Investigation. 
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• “Which has been implicated as a likely source of the illness by 
epidemiological analysis” (RI349) 
• “Confirmed outbreaks may or may not be laboratory confirmed” (LA)350 
• “An unexplained, unexpected increase of a similar illness, and food is a 
likely source” (Maricopa County,351 VA352) 
• “A situation when the observed number of cases unaccountably exceeds 
the expected number (i.e., an epidemic)” (WA353) 
• “Exception: one case of botulism or chemical poisoning constitutes and 
outbreak” (MO,354 TX,355 WV356) 
• “Suspect or confirmed illness due to intentional exposure” (WV357) 
• “Not defined, but if more than one complaint from non-related individuals 
about illness that may be related to a facility or event is received, confirm 
diagnosis and call EpiTeam meeting to manage the investigation” (WI358) 
C. A TEAM APPROACH 
Foodborne outbreaks can range in size and complexity. While many cases and 
clusters of communicable disease can be handled routinely by one or two staff in a health 
agency, more involved situations may necessitate the efforts of multiple public health 
professionals. The North Carolina Institute for Public Health has observed that foodborne 
outbreak response can “range in size and complexity from a small number of individuals 
                                                 
349 State of Rhode Island Department of Health, Guidelines for Investigating Foodborne Illness 
Outbreaks. 
350 Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Food-borne Outbreak Investigation. 
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engaging in a short telephone communication at a local level to a widespread multi-
discipline, multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional response.”359 Effective outbreak 
response is inclusive of a defined multidisciplinary approach cognizant of effective 
communication and collaboration approaches.  
Depending on the anticipated size of the outbreak, response may be a structured 
gathering of all responding stakeholders to coordinate the control, investigation, and 
management of an outbreak, or a discussion between two or more stakeholders following 
the identification of a case of exposure of concern.360 Regardless of the size of an actual 
or potential outbreak, the burden of response typically is the responsibility of a core team 
of individuals. While a variety of staff and subject matter experts may become involved 
in outbreak response, designated, competent professionals, and trained subject matter 
experts may be needed to take on various aspects of outbreak response, team approach, 
and control.  
The American Public Health Association, in the 19th edition of its Communicable 
Disease Manual, guides professionals to establish an outbreak control team with a 
defined role, in response to an outbreak report, although the CIFOR recommends 
determining the composition of the core team long before an outbreak occurs.361 Further, 
the CIFOR counsels that this team should meet regularly, and formally, with the minutes 
of meetings recorded.  
Ideally, a jurisdiction will establish a team of professionals and subject matter 
experts, including “environmental health specialists/sanitarians, epidemiologists, 
microbiologists, nurses, physicians, public information specialists, and others (e.g., 
toxicologists) as needed.”362 As New Jersey states, “The size and expertise of the team 
                                                 
359 North Carolina Center for Public Health Preparedness, Focus on Field Epidemiology. 
360 World Health Organization, Terrorist Threats to Food: Guidance for Establishing and 
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will vary according to the scope of the outbreak and nature of the disease.”363 Arizona 
recognizes this concept as well, “Depending on the scope and size of an outbreak, the 
investigative team may include more or fewer investigators, and the different roles and 
responsibilities may overlap. Nonetheless, the outbreak investigators should work 
together to ensure that all necessary tasks are completed.”364 Due to the wide variation of 
resources in the states, the size and composition of the team also is a factor of personnel 
and resources available. Some positions do not exist in some states or jurisdictions. In 
smaller health agencies, the team may consist of one or two multi-tasking individuals. 
Regardless of the size of the outbreak, the protocols reviewed nearly universally 
mentioned these three core professions when investigative responsibilities are defined: 
epidemiologists (disease detectives), microbiologists/laboratory professionals, and EH 
specialists/sanitarians.  
In addition, as Kentucky points out, suggested team members should “include 
persons who can provide clinical and diagnostic advice, epidemiological support, nursing 
services, public information, environmental health consultation and inspections and 
information technology support.”365 In other words, leverage all the specialized tasks that 
come into play during a well-organized investigation. It is important to remember, as 
Iowa puts forth, that many area experts, not included in the core list (e.g., state 
toxicologist, or an infectious disease physician), may be able to provide technical 
expertise and could be called to assist the team. Virginia recognizes at times that outside 
agencies need to be included as part of the investigation team. It can typically occur when 
a facility regulated by the state department of agriculture is involved, or when the 
circulation of an affected food is implicated. Although team synergy in widespread 
outbreaks can be a challenge, West Virginia has found that “in multi-jurisdiction 
                                                 
363 New Jersey Association of County and City Health Officials et al., Communicable Disease 
Outbreak Manual.  
364 Arizona Department of Health Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Disease Outbreak 
Investigation Resource Manual, 20. 
365 Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Outbreak 
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outbreaks, roles and responsibilities are usually negotiated respectfully between 
jurisdictions.”366  
In outbreak response, each team member’s work becomes the building blocks for 
the whole picture being worked on by the team; thus, close teamwork, rather than isolated 
labors, is essential.367 During larger and multi-jurisdictional outbreaks, the response team 
may also include professionals from other agencies and levels of government (state 
department health, the CDC, USDA, Department of Natural Resources, state department 
of agriculture or the private sector), such as recognized by Missouri.  
Not only do the states investigate with a team approach, many also designate a 
team leader. Some have this role pre-assigned; others identify the team lead at the start of 
the outbreak investigation. New Jersey designates the team leader as the main point of 
contact and communication lead. West Virginia outlines the need to pinpoint likely team 
members and resources to be part of the investigation, to be equipped for fieldwork and 
to also identify a lead investigator.368 In Washington, state epidemiologists are 
responsible for coordinating the investigation of multi-county and multi-state foodborne 
disease outbreaks involving individuals. Similarly, in Rhode Island, where food 
protection is overseen by the state, the state department of health, the office of food 
protection, the office of communicable diseases, and the division of laboratories come 
together as a comprehensive and coordinated illness outbreak response team; each entity 
with its own team lead.  
Missouri references preparing for an outbreak before it occurs by establishing a 
multidisciplinary investigative team, and Kansas stipulates that teamwork and close 
collaboration are essential components to successful investigations. As addressed earlier 
in Chapter II, some states have foodborne outbreak RRTs. Funded through cooperative 
agreements with the FDA, the teams are charged with building extensive partnerships and 
                                                 
366 West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, General Outbreak 
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collaboration among the many partners who may need to work together to respond and 
resolve foodborne outbreaks. Half of the states reviewed in this research have received 
RRT funding from the FDA: Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, North 
Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. Their RRTs go 
by varying names, such as Alabama’s DETECT (Decrease Epidemiological Threats with 
Environmental Controls and Testing) and North Carolina’s Epi-Team. Massachusetts has 
a state working group on foodborne illness control and a foodborne illness complaint 
response team. Kentucky’s protocols refer to their epidemiology rapid response team.  
On the other hand, the protocol document for North Dakota, and similarly Ohio, 
lists roles and responsibilities of the responders, but does not identify a team (or use the 
term). Washington only describes that state epidemiologists are responsible for 
coordinating the investigation of multi-county and multi-state foodborne disease 
outbreaks involving individuals. Utah details coordination where local health departments 
are urged to discuss the situation with the state Bureaus of Epidemiology, Microbiology 
and Food Safety and Environmental Health during their investigations. Wisconsin does 
not accredit a team, but does discuss coordinating environmental investigations with 
epidemiologic investigations being conducted by local health departments. Minnesota 
does not use the work “team,” but embodies the concept as it lays out the investigation 
steps: “the state disease investigation section will notify the environmental health 
services outbreak coordinator, local epidemiology and the appropriate local 
environmental health department as necessary to arrange a conference call to identify the 
primary contacts, plan the response activities, make decisions about the investigation and 
identify agencies needing notification.”369 Maricopa County, the only county in the 
group, has no mention of “team;” rather, it contains lists of agencies to keep informed.  
A breakdown of the members of outbreak investigation teams can be found in 
Table 4. 
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Table 4.   State Outbreak Investigation Teams 
 
West Virginia discusses identifying potential investigation team members, 
without stipulating particular professional titles. The agencies that do not mention 
outbreak teams discuss coordinating response, without specifying particular team 
parameters. Maricopa County’s document contains a list of other agencies. To keep 
informed, North Dakota lists roles and responsibilities of the responders, while Utah lists 
agencies to consult with during response.  
Ohio, while not listing team formation, does reference the CIFOR and IAFP 
guidelines, both of which recommend a team approach as excellent resources for 
investigations.  
When it comes to leading an outbreak team, a number of states designate team 
leaders from within their staff. For instance, Washington lists the state epidemiologist, 
the associate director of health or the state food defense coordinator as the team leader. 
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However, most defer the designation of a lead person to the time an outbreak is 
suspected.  
The North Carolina Center for Public Health Preparedness recommends that 
regular updates are provided to designated team leaders to assure coordination, measure 
progress in the investigation, and allow for feedback and direction to fellow outbreak 
team members. The team structure is important to coordinate communication and tasks 
among those involved in the response, including those inside and outside the lead 
agency.370  
D. WHO IS THE KEY STAFF IN CHARGE OF COMMUNICATION? 
Coordinating communication is essential to assure an accurate and timely 
exchange of messages and information between key stakeholders. Plans were reviewed to 
ascertain which staff members are responsible for assuring communication within and 
between agencies. This research was not inclusive of the roles of public information 
officers, or messages crafted specifically for the public. Designating key staff for inter- 
and intra-agency communication helps to assure the right information is disseminated to 
the right people at the right time. A well-designed communication map with a focal 
spokesperson helps to prevent unnecessary duplication, mixed messages, and avoidable 
delays. The IAFP describes this essential component, “delegate responsibility to a 
professionally trained person who is familiar with epidemiologic methods and food safety 
to direct the surveillance program, report to appropriate agencies and public health 
partners as needed, take charge when foodborne and enteric disease outbreaks are 
suspected and handle publicity during outbreaks.”371 
Pre-planning for communication is an asset in response, and several states address 
this topic. New Jersey recommends developing a communication plan that defines a 
designated individual in the organization responsible to lead communication to assure all 
involved are “provided with consistent information, rumors are minimized, and good 
                                                 
370 North Carolina Center for Public Health Preparedness, Focus on Field Epidemiology. 
371 International Association for Food Protection (IAFP), Procedures to Investigate Foodborne 
Illness, 4.  
 91 
working relationships are maintained beyond the outbreak.”372 Other states are more 
specific and recommend outbreak coordination that identifies agency and department 
leaders before an outbreak, and establishes a culture of consistent communication among 
local, state, and federal agencies. 
Several states, such as Massachusetts, reference the need for a communication 
plan, but do not specifically establish a formalized section for this plan as part of their 
protocols. As described in their outbreak lexicon, “Coordination and communication with 
other members of the foodborne illness complaint response team (e.g., sanitarian, food 
inspector, public health nurse, the state department of health) is imperative. Additionally, 
be sure to keep others not directly involved in an outbreak informed (e.g., other board of 
health members or health department staff).”373 
In lieu of a separate communication map, protocols from Arizona and Kentucky 
include extensively detailed roles/responsibilities that enumerate communication points 
for all team members. Within these roles and responsibilities, it is specified that the 
primary investigator and the state outbreak epidemiologist should retain consistent 
dialogue with each other throughout the investigation. 
Many states do not have a regular designated individual, and prefer to identify a 
communication point person or arrangements for information exchange during the food 
illness event. Some imprecision does occur in the protocols as to how the key 
communicators are selected, or who acts in that capacity. The defined centerpiece for 
communications is most commonly attributed to a department, branch, or agency, (e.g., 
“local health department,” “branch staff,” or “state division of disease control”) and not a 
title or person. Florida explains this rationale, by describing that key staff, and key staff 
responsible for communication, is outbreak specific. Its protocols detail this function 
thusly, “Establish who will take the lead in an outbreak investigation. Determine how, 
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when and who will contact the regional Environmental Epidemiologist when it is decided 
that an outbreak is suspected.”374 Minnesota expounds on this concept:  
The state disease investigation section will notify the environmental health 
services outbreak coordinator, local epidemiology and the appropriate 
local environmental health department as necessary to arrange a 
conference call to identify the primary contacts, plan the response 
activities, make decisions about the investigation and identify agencies 
needing notification such as the USDA, FDA, CDC and the state 
department of agriculture.375 
Louisiana, takes a different approach. This state has a food protection RRT to 
unify and coordinate outbreak response. If a decision is made to activate the state’s RRT, 
it is the regional RRT coordinator’s responsibility to coordinate outbreak response duties 
with all team members and be bound to advising the regional administrator and medical 
director of all pertinent outbreak information and updates at least daily.  
Just as an outbreak investigation has (or should have) a plan designating roles and 
responsibilities, a scheme for the exchange of information should be defined, both for 
routine matters, and especially for emergent and outbreak situations. As Kansas points 
out, most outbreak communication will occur between the local health department 
infection control nurse, the food inspector assigned to the outbreak, the regional medical 
investigator, and an epidemiologist. However, sometimes an outbreak affects a broader 
range of stakeholders. The greater the number of entities and public health personnel 
involved in the outbreak response, the more challenging the communication structure can 
become. North Dakota’s protocol illustrates some of the communication tiers:  
If sufficient information indicates a foodborne outbreak, the state Division 
of Disease Control has the responsibility to notify the local health unit 
with jurisdiction; the Division of Food and Lodging and/or Environmental 
Health Agency with licensing or regulatory authority; the Division of 
Laboratory Services, and the Department Operations Center if additional 
resources are needed. In addition, the division of disease control 
epidemiology section will coordinate as necessary with state and local 
public information officers to coordinate the distribution of news releases, 
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health alerts, conference calls and memos, the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention. (CDC) and other federal agencies, and out of state health 
departments.376 
Michigan details communication as an ongoing assignment. The state’s protocols 
establish that public health professionals should identify agency and department leaders 
before an outbreak, and create modes of consistent dialogue among local, state, and 
federal agencies. When planning an investigation, a team leader should be selected to 
manage the outbreak and assign particular job duties related to the incident. If an 
outbreak spans multiple jurisdictions (areas/agencies), the regional communicable disease 
coordinator should be consulted to assist in determining the appropriate lead agency. 
Regardless of the individual state’s structure, it is essential during an outbreak 
that all stakeholders are providing updates to the entire outbreak team, and maintaining 
regular bi-directional communication in this accord throughout the investigation. 
1. Inclusion of Contact Information 
The aim in the prompt reporting of suspect foodborne illnesses is to detect an 
outbreak as soon as feasible so as to intercede and control the spread of disease among 
persons at risk. Suspect foodborne outbreaks, and diseases or incidents, such as 
foodborne intoxications, acute hepatitis A, and intentional foodborne contamination 
require immediate reporting to the regulatory health authority. Such incidents do not 
always align with normal business hours.  
Contact lists are an essential tool when looking to streamline prompt 
communication to another person or agency. Quick references help assure no time is lost 
looking up phone numbers or email addresses, and support effective information 
exchanges by directing delivery to the intended audience. The CIFOR strongly 
encourages agencies to update all contact lists at least twice a year, and make them 
available in electronic and hard copy formats to all public health partners. In addition, the 
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CIFOR also recommends establishing standard operating guidelines for all personnel 
participating in multiagency, multijurisdictional conference calls.377  
With this in mind, the state protocols were reviewed to ascertain if they were 
inclusive of ways to communicate not only during business hours, but also for nights, 
weekends, and holidays.  
Despite the need and value of phone lists, not all states include them directly in 
the protocols, or as part of appendices. Most only include telephone numbers that direct 
back to the state or parent agency, and have no contact listing for other known 
stakeholders. One notable exception, Alabama’s foodborne outbreak protocols document, 
is absent of any contact information, including emails, phone numbers and the like. 
Conversely, Massachusetts looks to forestall possible communication gaps by instructing 
users to “maintain a list of people on your board of health and in the local community to 
contact in an outbreak, including hospitals and emergency rooms. Notifying area health 
care providers may aid in the identification of related cases.”378 
Minnesota and Kentucky each include a phone list, as does Iowa, which also 
incorporates a toll-free 24/7 voicemail/fax. Maricopa County, Massachusetts, and 
Virginia include phone numbers throughout the document, but fall short of including 
them in one easily referenced list. Kansas, New Jersey, and North Dakota have links or 
references to other web-based locations for current phone lists. The Ohio protocol 
contains a phone list for the state EH and food safety program, the state laboratory, the 
state department of agriculture, as well as the hotlines for the FDA and USDA. Kansas’ 
protocol contains some telephone numbers to state agencies throughout the document, on 
decision trees, and on a checklist, as well as a reference to a public health directory 
website. However, under this state’s list of agency contacts, instruction is given to “see 
directory.” Texas uses a different approach by listing several state agency phone numbers 
under “special instructions” in a foodborne illness reference chart. Utilizing a 
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geographical approach, Missouri’s phone list includes a map and contacts for outbreak 
designees in each region. Rhode Island had the most comprehensive phone list, which 
included the health director, epidemiologists, laboratories, regulators, food protection 
office, supervisors, inspectors, and administrators on call. The contact directory in its 
protocols included spots for phone, cell phone, pager, fax numbers and after hours 
numbers for agency professionals by name, division, program, and title.  
States with protocols that specifically listed after-hours contact information were 
Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. Wisconsin and Maricopa County listed 
both an after-hours phone number and fax. Louisiana had one 24-hour number. Kansas 
included phone, email, and fax; however, the email and fax did not stipulate if they were 
monitored round-the-clock.  
New Jersey recognized that health professionals and the public must have a way 
to notify the local health department immediately of a possible communicable disease 
incident. Its guidance conveys that health officers should set up an after-hours emergency 
contact number for the public, provide local police department with 24/7 contact info, 
and ensure the state emergency contact red book directory is updated. Florida provided a 
back-up contingency for when regional environmental epidemiologists are unavailable, 
and instructs responders to call the food and waterborne disease coordinator using the 
listed phone number. 
Email was not universally included in the documents, but North Dakota did 
include email contact. Missouri requests that regulators “maintain a current phone 
directory, including email and Internet addresses, home addresses and phone numbers of 
team participants, and key contact personnel outside the local public health agency.”379 
Minnesota had the most detailed listing. In addition to phone and fax for business hours, 
an after-hours phone and emergency pager, a local and toll-free foodborne illness 
reporting hotline, and the cell number of several managers were listed. Lastly, Wisconsin 
did not include a physical or postal address.  
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Interestingly, no protocol included the concept of 3x3 redundancies in call down 
lists, where a health agency designates three staff members with three means of contact to 
assure notification and response for all emergencies.  
2. Receiving Outbreak Information 
The states reviewed recognize the benefit of being aware of the baseline disease 
burden in their communities. Missouri references the need to “maintain adequate local 
surveillance systems.”380 Wisconsin discusses “diligent public health surveillance 
provides an accurate assessment of the status of the health of the community.”381 Kansas 
refers to how “foodborne illnesses are monitored through the statewide surveillance 
system to assess disease impact, to detect trends, and to guide interventions.”382  
The IAFP explains that: 
public health is typically advised of a potential foodborne outbreak by 
receiving an alert or complaint about foodborne illness, food spoilage, 
adulteration of a product, or even mislabeling. This type of notification 
can be originated from physicians’ reports, by notices of foodborne 
pathogens isolated by clinical laboratories, or by referrals from poison 
control centers. Hospitals, medical centers or emergency squads may 
forward reports of treatment for enteric disease. These alerts can also take 
the form of advisements or an increase in a particular PFGE pattern from 
clinical isolates.383  
Passive surveillance, or the routine receipt of disease case reports from healthcare 
providers, medical laboratories, and other public health agencies, is a common form of 
morbidity data collection for health departments. Schools may report increased rates of 
absenteeism, or pharmacies increased consumer purchases of over-the-counter remedies 
for gastrointestinal symptoms. Common across the states, a number of reporting sources 
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are statutorily required to advise the health authority of certain pathogens and diseases, 
otherwise known as notifiable conditions reporting. As New Jersey explains, by state law, 
health care providers, public health labs, and administrators of institutions are obligated 
to advise the health authority of any individual diagnosed with any reportable disease 
within a specified timeframe.384  
In addition, it is not unusual to receive passive reporting of foodborne illness 
symptoms from members of the public, as oversight of retail food establishments is likely 
one of the more well-known functions of a health authority. Passive surveillance is of 
value to public health because of its continuous advantageous nature, and its need for few 
resources to implement and maintain.385 The health agency receiving illness information 
can review the data provided, and from this review, may identify increased levels of 
diseases or common symptoms. Although this quiescent receipt of data may not capture 
all potential outbreaks, it is an efficacious scan for outbreak indicators.  
Connectivity between passive reporting sources and the health agency is primarily 
through well-established business communication methodologies: telephone, fax, email, 
and in-person correspondence. With the availability and ease of accessibility provided by 
computer tracking systems, some states utilize electronic reporting portals as part of their 
passive surveillance scheme; however, most of the protocols reviewed were not 
descriptive nor inclusive of specific electronic reporting systems in use. Those that 
specifically mention electronic reporting include New Jersey and Kansas, both of which 
conduct monitoring through a statewide surveillance system that identifies morbidity and 
provides data on disease trends, which helps assess local and regional disease impact, and 
provides necessary information to guide interventions. Ohio uses the NORS database, 
while Minnesota specifically references PulseNet.  
Consumer complaints are often the mode by which a health department is made 
aware of a potential food-related illness. Virginia recognizes that a telephone call may 
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provide the first indication that an outbreak has occurred, and can provide valuable 
details for initial response actions. Minnesota encourages these types of calls by 
sponsoring a statewide foodborne illness reporting hotline, as does Kentucky. Maricopa 
County, not wishing to miss a call after business hours, uses poison control centers to 
cover calls on weekends.  
Some states did not detail from where their first notice of foodborne illnesses tend 
to originate, although it may be comfortably presumed that sources are similar across the 
United States. Prevailing passive surveillance sources for the states and county include 
the following: 
• “Foodborne illness complaints from private citizens”386 
• “Medical evaluations of ill individuals from healthcare professionals at 
hospitals, clinics or physicians’ offices”387 
• “Routine laboratory testing and techniques”388 
• “Information received through the media and public information 
officers”389 
• “Reports from local, state and federal food safety regulators”390  
• Reports from the community: food establishments, schools, residential 
facilities, child care establishments, and others 
• “Routine surveillance and case investigation of reportable diarrheal 
illnesses by state and local public health agencies”391 
In addition to these common informants, less traditional partners were also 
mentioned. Missouri included notifications from law enforcement, and Texas stipulated 
the value of reports from poison control centers. Aware of potential cross-over with 
zoonoses, New Jersey protocols include veterinarians, certified animal control officers, 
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and managers of animal facilities as possible sources of outbreak information. All these 
items are beneficial to monitor, as they may suggest outbreaks, contributory situations, 
disease impact, or detect trends.392  
Protocols were also gauged to review what surveillance or reporting systems are 
being used to record, track or share information on potential outbreaks. Complaints of 
foodborne illness, even singular, are usually placed into a log or database for tracking and 
analyzing to detect clusters. If a cluster of cases is identified, health officials should look 
to review actively any information forwarded from physicians or laboratories, as receipts 
of food complaints may suggest outbreaks of disease or related information. Rhode 
Island’s document expounded its process. Upon receiving disease reports, the state counts 
and analyzes information in hand, and reviews it weekly to ascertain potential disease 
clusters by person, place, or time, to determine any escalation in enteric diseases.  
Many states reference what they receive, not the medium or mode in which they 
are received or if their method of recording is logging on paper, electronic, or both.  
While passive surveillance is beneficial in identifying the first stages of an 
outbreak, a time may come in an investigation when additional outbreak data is needed. 
As Kentucky contemplates:  
With the case definition in place, the next half of the equation is to decide 
how to find additional cases, (i.e., routine methods versus more intensive 
methods). 
Is it reasonable to rely on telephone reporting from physicians? Should 
case reports be actively solicited from area physicians, laboratories, or 
hospitals? 
Should the help of the local media be enlisted? These are all “judgment 
calls” which must be made while taking into account the severity of the 
disease, how widespread it is, the urgency of intervention, and the 
manpower available to find and interview case patients.393 
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These questions illustrate the thought process involved in transitioning 
surveillance activities from passive to active. Active surveillance occurs when a health 
agency reaches out to labs or healthcare entities to gather information on the existence of 
illnesses. As undertaking this surveillance takes considerable resources, it is typically not 
conducted as a routine surveillance measure, but rather to provide a more specific picture 
of disease frequency, or to identify additional cases during an outbreak.394  
Virginia’s protocols describe some mechanisms of active surveillance:  
Conduct surveillance, i.e., actively search for cases and for all persons 
exposed to the suspected source of illness. Ill persons or group organizers 
may be able to identify others who had the same exposure (that is, 
attended the same event) and who need to be interviewed, regardless of 
their illness status. If the outbreak occurred among a group attending a 
meeting in a hotel or other place where multiple groups can meet 
simultaneously, a contact person from the other groups who held meetings 
at the same location should be contacted to see if any illness has occurred. 
If the illness is not confined to an identifiable group, such that illness may 
be occurring in the community, cases may also be found by contacting 
emergency departments, physician offices, ambulatory care centers, etc.395 
As previously mentioned, laboratories are important partners in the surveillance 
process. Although tasked to forward lab reports that identify gastrointestinal disease 
within a designated time frame, workplace realities sometimes preclude this passive 
surveillance from occurring as prescribed. As such, West Virginia protocols mention the 
use of “enhanced passive surveillance,” where a letter or memo is faxed or sent to clinical 
labs or healthcare providers with a request to report back with details on any individual 
who meets an outbreak’s case definition. Additionally, West Virginia refers to active 
surveillance, where providers are personally contacted and requested to report cases that 
meet a case definition. In a search for additional cases in an outbreak, North Carolina 
advocates contacting clinical laboratories to see if they conducted laboratory testing on 
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cases and obtained specimens. Arizona explains the advantages in that “active 
surveillance provides more timely data with less variability than passive surveillance.”396 
Obviously, the sooner a public health agency becomes aware of a suspected 
foodborne outbreak, the earlier investigations and interventions can be established. The 
requirement for medical labs and healthcare providers to report certain diseases to the 
health agency has already been discussed. Several protocols described further how 
notification for non-reportable diseases or reports of enteric symptoms from members of 
the public are received. If a web-portal, or a reporting hotline is available, such resources 
should be made well known to the public to assure use.  
Although electronic reporting may be a modern and direct way of outbreak 
disclosure, no matter how a health agency receives the information, preferably in a timely 
manner, the notification is accomplished. Notwithstanding, several states specify the 
preferred method of transferring outbreak information. Virginia’s Boards of Health 
require that local health departments are advised of potential enteric epidemics by the 
most rapid means available, which their protocols identify as “i.e., by telephone.”397 
Missouri defines “as soon as possible” to mean “by phone or email,” and in the same 
document declares, “outbreaks are a Category I disease and shall be reported to the local 
health authority or to the state department of health within 24 hours of the first 
knowledge or suspicion by telephone, facsimile or other rapid communication.”398 
Kansas, too, enumerates a reporting time frame, but not a mechanism for information 
transfer; outbreaks of disease, no matter the cause, must be reported to the state health 
department within four hours.399 Ohio requests reports of suspected outbreaks be 
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telephoned to the outbreak response and bioterrorism investigation team for subsequent 
entry by the local health department in the CDC’s NORS database.400  
E. INTRA-AGENCY COMMUNICATION 
Having clearly defined methods for intra-agency information exchange and 
maintaining close communication among those included in outbreak interventions is 
fundamental in assuring a coordinated response. While established guidelines may be 
generalized to allow for situational flexibility, enough specificity needs to be available to 
assure appropriate and timely notifications to all who should be included in the outbreak 
response conversation. Essential communication considerations should include: Who do 
you contact? When? How? With what information? Who do these recipients share 
information with in turn? Methods used should include modes of providing information 
exchange with members of the outbreak team, as well as others in the agency obliged to 
be notified and updated.  
The protocols included in this study were reviewed for the inclusion of intra-
agency guidelines for communication, including these points recommended by the 
CIFOR:  
• “Decide who will be notified when an outbreak is suspected on the basis 
of roles, including any changes in notification according to the nature of 
the outbreak (e.g., pathogen type, involvement of commercial product) 
and timing (weekends and holidays versus week days).”401 
• “During an outbreak response, maintain close communication and 
coordination among outbreak response team members.”402 
• “Prepare contact information (including after-hours information) for 
people in the agency who should be contacted in the event of an outbreak, 
including backups.”403 
                                                 
400 Ohio Department of Health, Foodborne Disease Outbreaks. 
401 Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) and Council of State and Territorial 
Epidemiologists, Guidelines for Foodborne Disease Outbreak Response, 4. 
402 Ibid. 
403 Ibid., 3. 
 103 
• “During an outbreak response, arrange for the outbreak response team to 
meet daily to update the entire team in a timely manner.”404 
• “During an outbreak response, communicate actions taken and new 
outbreak information to all members in the outbreak response team.”405 
• “Determine whether and how confidential information (e.g., from forms 
and questionnaires) can be shared within the outbreak response team 
before an outbreak occurs.”406  
Protocols were searched for any instructions or references along the lines of these 
CIFOR recommendations, and also to ascertain how a state recommends fostering 
communication with the outbreak team, within the office, and within the lead agency. For 
this parameter, “intra-agency” was broadly interpreted, as agencies may have a variety of 
departments, divisions, and regional offices as part of a parent state structure. In this 
intra-agency category, all the states include processes to address communication within 
the state agency, although the particulars vary from agency to agency. Communication 
methods were ascertained by looking at the listed roles and responsibilities of each 
agency for terms that related to information exchange, such as meet, consult, contact, 
communicate, and recommend. The progression of communication differs in the 
protocols, based on the hierarchy and interconnectivity of the agency. State-level 
agencies handling health, agriculture and/or infectious disease have, by their nature, 
aspects of integration with regional, county, and local offices within their state borders. 
This integration applies to offices directly under the authority of the state agency, or with 
a working/reporting systems type of relationship. 
Some states’ protocols, such as New Jersey, only address upwards 
communication, where a local health agency is mandated to report to the state department 
of health. Maricopa County’s Outbreak Investigation Guide contains a checklist that 
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specifically identifies communication steps, starting with “contact supervisor by phone or 
pager to alert her/him of possible outbreak.”407 
Others require contact with state and regional agencies, but several also include a 
top-down requirement for outbreak notification, where the state will apprise a regional/
local agency if a suspected or actual outbreak is affecting someone in its jurisdiction, as 
exemplified by Florida. This contact is typically dependent upon which agency is the 
primary lead for an outbreak.  
When an investigation is launched, advising all departmental or agency staff, not 
just the coordinating team, that an outbreak is being handled, can be beneficial, so as to 
prevent misinformation, and help direct misplaced inquiries to the correct personnel. 
Notwithstanding, the list of people or agencies to be notified could be very short, or 
extremely long, based on an agency’s size, structure, or standard operating procedures.  
Notably absent from documents reviewed was the inclusion or reference to a 
phone tree, or modern communication notification list with sufficient redundancy to 
address any difficulties in tracking down specific people and to ensure if some staff 
cannot be contacted, the message still gets through. Some addressed this area in an 
alternative, but less convenient fashion, by setting it down in roles and responsibilities of 
specific state agencies, job positions, or the outbreak team.  
F. ELECTRONIC DATA EXCHANGE 
Some reporting requirements are via electronic database to transfer essential 
information to another agency staff person. New Jersey requires the use of its electronic 
system if a suspected outbreak is caused by a reportable or communicable disease. 
Agencies within the same computer network can monitor documents and the progress of 
the disease and investigation. For large or high-profile outbreaks, Alabama stipulated that 
staff notify epidemiology, environmental, and nursing directors by email with a message 
to monitor the shared computer drive during an active outbreak investigation. In this case, 
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what works for one state may not for another, based on the variability of computer 
systems and software.  
New Jersey and Utah require local health departments to report (defined as within 
24 hours) all suspected outbreaks immediately to the state department of health. Florida 
has a similar timeframe for a county health department to forward complaint information 
to the agency of jurisdiction, via fax, email, or phone. Whereas Minnesota and West 
Virginia also require immediate reporting, they do so without a definition of what is 
considered immediate. Utah discusses the timeframe for the state agency to report to a 
local entity, and adds contingency instructions for notifications received during holidays, 
weekends, and after working hours, when the information is forwarded to the local health 
officer on the next business day unless the situation is deemed an emergency.  
Is outbreak communication directed toward an agency, position, or specific 
person? As the person holding a specific title may change, all the protocols cautiously 
refrained from inserting specific names into their contact hierarchy, and used the broader 
category of position titles. Some states’ listings are generic, and require that suspect 
foodborne outbreaks be reported to the state, the responsible epidemiologist, or the local 
health department from where the incident is originating. Others have an organizational 
web to navigate in assuring the appropriate information transfer. Some, such as 
Louisiana, distinguish between specific job titles and divisions, in their instance, 
“Regional Medical Director/Administrator, other regional staff (Epidemiologist, Disease 
Surveillance Specialist, Sanitarian), and the Infectious Disease Epidemiology 
Section.”408 Communication between the local outbreak team leader and the New Jersey 
Department of Health epidemiologist is encouraged via the local outbreak team leader, 
who is expected to continue regular dialogue and updates on the outbreak situation, both 
daily and weekly.409 As a rule, most of the communication listings were dispersed from 
the director level to the staff level. Some of the communication responsibilities appear 
quite confusing to someone not familiar with the hierarchy and public health structure of 
                                                 
408 Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Food-borne Outbreak Investigation, 3. 
409 New Jersey Association of County and City Health Officials et al., Communicable Disease 
Outbreak Manual, 13. 
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a specific state. Communication flow charts or public health call trees would be 
beneficial in these incidents for the expediency of information exchange.  
All outbreak response plans reviewed reflect reciprocity in initial notifications, 
depending on who first has knowledge of the existence of a possible foodborne outbreak. 
It was fairly universal to see requirements that the state contact a local agency in case of a 
suspected outbreak, and local agencies are expected to notify the state if they are the first 
with potential outbreak information. In other words, whoever has breaking information 
on an outbreak must notify the other agencies. However, notifications can become 
labyrinthine, depending on the outbreak circumstances.  
North Dakota provides an example of the agency notification responsibilities, 
depending on who initially has knowledge of the occurrence of a possible foodborne 
outbreak. For instance: 
• “In case of outbreak, the state division of Disease Control will notify the 
local health unit with jurisdiction; the Division of Food and Lodging and/
or Environmental Health Agency with licensing or regulatory authority; 
the Division of Laboratory Services, and the Department Operations 
Center if additional resources are needed.  
• If the city or local environmental health agency is first to receive 
notification of the occurrence of a possible foodborne outbreak, they must 
notify the Division of Disease Control with specifics. 
• Upon notification of the occurrence of a possible foodborne outbreak, the 
Division of Food and Lodging will notify the State Division of Disease 
Control; the city of local environmental health agency who has 
jurisdiction; and any necessary federal agencies.  
• Upon notification of the occurrence of a possible foodborne outbreak, the 
Division of Health Facilities will notify the state Division of Disease 
Control and the city of local environmental health agency that has 
jurisdiction.  
• Upon completion of the occurrence of a possible foodborne outbreak, the 
State Meat/Poultry/Dairy Inspection Program will notify the state Division 
of Food and Lodging; the Division of Disease Control; the city or local 
environmental health agency that has jurisdiction; and any necessary 
federal agencies.”410 
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All the states included or alluded to offers of outbreak response assistance from 
the state agency. For additional capabilities, North Carolina advises local agencies to 
consider calling their state health department and food protection branch regional EH 
specialist even if the health agency does not require assistance.  
When intermediate agencies are part of the equation, communication can become 
more complicated, necessitating an information-distribution chain. County health 
departments in Florida, for example, are asked to keep the regional environmental 
epidemiologist notified of a foodborne outbreak, even if they do not require assistance. 
The regional environmental epidemiologist is then required to ensure the food and 
waterborne disease coordinator in the state bureau of epidemiology is kept informed, and 
also is required to notify directors of developments as they occur.  
How are notifications accomplished? Texas’ document included a state foodborne 
illness chart, with contacts for specific diseases and situations listed under “special 
instructions.” In Florida, these communications may occur via email, face-to-face 
meetings or conference calls. Virginia specifies the use of the most rapid means 
available, specifically mentioning the telephone, as do the states of Ohio and Texas.  
The states use a variety of terms to capture the essence of communication; many 
of these terms are general enough to provide both specificity and ambiguity, in the 
absence of agreed upon particulars. These terms include:  
• “notify” (MN,411 ND,412 UT413) 
• “kept aware of all developments” (FL414) 
• “share pertinent info” (VA415) 
• “report to” (UT416) 
                                                 
411 Minnesota Department of Health, Procedures for Responding to Foodborne Disease Outbreaks, 3. 
412 North Dakota Department of Health, Foodborne Outbreak Investigation Manual, 6. 
413 Utah Department of Health, Foodborne Outbreak Investigation Guidelines, 2. 
414 Florida Department of Health, Food and Waterborne Disease Surveillance and Investigation, 5. 
415 Virginia Department of Health, Foodborne Outbreaks, 4. 
416 Utah Department of Health, Foodborne Outbreak Investigation Guidelines, 1. 
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• “contact” (KS417) 
• “coordinate with key personnel”(KS418)  
The range of agency communication stratums illustrates the problem of 
constructing optimal network trees that satisfy given communication requirements 
particular to the providing and receiving agencies.  
G. INTER-AGENCY COMMUNICATION 
An established framework for two-way communication with other agencies, 
stakeholders, and partners helps center outbreak response and assures the right people 
receive the necessary information in a timely fashion. In addition to the notifiable disease 
requirements, as previously discussed, prompt data exchange between public health 
partners is essential to address an outbreak situation appropriately.  
Even a small outbreak confined to a single jurisdiction may require the transfer of 
data and updates to others. If an outbreak is more expansive, the CIFOR observes, “a 
multijurisdictional foodborne disease event requires the resources of more than one local, 
state, territorial, tribal, or federal public health or food-regulatory agency to detect, 
investigate, or control.”419 
1. Communication Plan 
As a communication plan is pivotal to a coordinated outbreak response, the states’ 
documents were reviewed for references to such a policy. While it is very likely that 
many of the agencies reviewed share reciprocal communication during an outbreak, such 
exchanges are discussed only briefly in the protocol documents. Communication with 
other public health stakeholders is an aspect of the state protocols that varies in the level 
of detail based on agencies’ requisites. In this regard, Arizona explains, “a strong and 
flexible public health infrastructure is the best defense against any disease outbreak—
                                                 
417 Kansas Department of Health and Environment, Foodborne Illness and Outbreak Investigation 
Manual, 35. 
418 Ibid., 34. 
419 Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) and Council of State and Territorial 
Epidemiologists, Guidelines for Foodborne Disease Outbreak Response, 191. 
 109 
naturally or intentionally caused. As with all public health events, coordination and 
cooperation among all agencies are critical to the success of any response.”420 In 
accordance with this strategy, Arizona’s document lists roles and responsibilities that 
include a number of steps on coordinating and “maintaining communication channels 
between programs, agencies, counties and states, as needed.”421 Massachusetts 
proactively prepares for outbreak communication by keeping a list of board of health 
members and local community contacts needed in the event of an outbreak, including 
hospitals and emergency rooms. This structure echoes New Jersey’s provision that a 
phone list of stakeholders is essential, as the state encourages local and county health 
departments to stay in contact with their partners during an outbreak to minimize rumors 
and keep information consistent. The CIFOR advises that agencies should maintain a 
contact list for those within and outside the health agency who may be players in 
outbreak response. The CIFOR also recommend these lists be updated often, as well as 
when agencies restructure or if staffing and/or title change.422 
2. Communication with Other State and Local Health Agencies 
New Jersey recognizes the potential issues that can arise if an outbreak crosses 
jurisdictions. Their protocols counsel, “As soon as possible, share information with other 
local health officials who may become involved in the investigation. This may include 
Health Officers who have jurisdiction where (a) the outbreak may have originated; (b) the 
local school or institution attended by the cases is located or (c) the workplace of the 
cases is located.”423 They promote using the state’s health alert network to send necessary 
messages to other public health professionals connected via the network.  
Kansas has a similar appreciation, and counsels that health professionals from 
contract agencies or the state health agency may need to be advised, but it could vary 
                                                 
420 Arizona Department of Health Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Disease Outbreak 
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421 Ibid.  
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423 New Jersey Association of County and City Health Officials et al., Communicable Disease 
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upon the county affected or the type and source of foodstuffs implicated. Utah is 
comparable in this regard, as it details its Bureau of Epidemiology will communicate with 
local health agencies regarding epidemics that may have implications for additional 
agencies in the state, or have the potential to create media interest. West Virginia sets a 
timeframe for the notification of the health departments at the state and local level, as 
well as the epidemiologist for the region, its Office of Laboratory Services and, if needed, 
the CDC. It specifies a timeframe of 90 minutes for this correspondence to occur ideally, 
as it is a condition of its bioterrorism grant funding. The requirement to communicate and 
work with affected businesses is part of Massachusetts’ plan, and also stipulates a 
requirement to work with local, state, and federal counterparts when tracebacks are 
essential, as this situation typically spans beyond one jurisdiction. Typically, as Utah 
indicates, laboratories involved with outbreak testing will report test results to the agency 
leading the investigation, as well as its Bureau of Epidemiology.  
State and local communication among a variety of agencies can be perplexing 
unless specifically spelled out for staff. Virginia outlines the intricate interplay between 
the Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and the Offices of Dairy 
and Food and Meat and Poultry Services:  
• “Within the Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 
reports of foodborne illness are most often reported to the Office of Dairy 
and Foods. The Office of Meat and Poultry Services will notify the Office 
of Dairy and Foods when they are notified of a possible outbreak. The 
Office of Dairy and Foods will notify the Office of Epidemiology by 
telephone. If a food traceback and/or recall may be required, Virginia 
Department of Health employees should call and discuss this with 
someone in the Office of Epidemiology, and Virginia Department of 
Agriculture and Consumer Services employees should call the Office of 
Dairy and Foods.  
• The Central Offices of the two agencies will consult with each other and 
determine the need for and logistics of a recall, including whether the 
FDA needs to be involved. The Virginia Department of Agriculture and 
Consumer Services’ office of Dairy and Foods will notify Meat and 
Poultry Services for actions in accordance with the FSIS directive.”424 
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The interplay of the people and agencies involved in local and state outbreak 
response necessitates a clear, written communication plan that details who is receiving 
the information, when this information needs to be exchanged, how this exchange will 
occur, who is the person or agency responsible for the delivery of the message, and how 
to confirm the message has been received and understood.  
3. Communication with Federal Agencies  
Generally, outbreak communications with federal agencies are the responsibility 
of state agencies, as the overseers of disease response operations in their respective states. 
Small or conventional outbreaks handled by local health departments are not elevated to 
the point of needing federal guidance. However, depending on the type and severity of an 
outbreak, states may choose to send federal partners a response report at the conclusion 
of the outbreak (for smaller or “routine” outbreaks), or contact them for awareness and/or 
assistance (for larger, unusual, or ongoing situations). In the protocols reviewed, most 
references to communication with federal agencies are in the form of completing and 
submitting the voluntary outbreak summary reports to the CDC. For example, Ohio, New 
Jersey, and North Dakota submit information to the NORS, and West Virginia’s Epi 
Program reports foodborne outbreaks to the EFORS within 60 days of the first disease 
onset.  
In the state of North Dakota, if information in hand points to a foodborne 
epidemic, its Division of Disease Control is instructed to notify the CDC, as well as other 
federal agencies and out-of-state health departments. Iowa provides an additional 
example of this process, by pronouncing that its state agencies will notify the federal, as 
well as other appropriate state health agencies if an outbreak is widespread or severe. 
Texas has a similar perspective if a meat or poultry product under federal inspection is 
suspected to be the causative agent; the regional USDA compliance staff must be notified 
and kept informed. 
When it comes to requesting additional assistance from federal agencies, Florida 
mandates the following, “requests for EpiAid from the CDC must come from the county 
health department through the state’s food and waterborne disease coordinator, as CDC 
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cannot send anyone into the state to investigate unless they are specifically invited to do 
so by the state Epidemiologist.”425  
Some states reference other agencies within the protocol document, but do not 
prescribe a particular pattern for information dissemination. Wisconsin, for example, 
includes 16 state or federal agencies in its acronym list that may have a role in its 
outbreak response.  
As listed by the states, external partners can most commonly include other local 
health departments, state departments (health, agriculture), laboratories, federal agencies, 
homeland security, law enforcement, and healthcare providers. Although bi-directional 
communication would provide the best coaction for outbreak coordination with these 
entities, expectations of responses from stakeholder communication is not clearly defined 
in the guidance documents.  
While not the primary focus of this research, it should be noted that some states—
Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, and New Jersey—address information dissemination to 
the media or the public, and include the involvement of health educators, health 
promotion specialists, and public information officers. Utah’s health officers at the 
grassroots level are required to advise the state bureau of epidemiology regarding any 
communication being considered for public release. New Jersey notes prophylactically 
providing regional agencies with all-hazards risk communication plans for use in the 
event of a large-scale public health emergency, with the intent that pre-developed 
messages for outbreaks, will assure that all public health agencies are communicating 
with the public in a clear and consistent manner.  
H. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
The ICS can benefit disease outbreak investigations undertaken by public health 
agencies, as it provides a standardized approach to an event that may involve numerous 
staff, multiple agencies, and a number of jurisdictions. FEMA describes the ICS as “a 
standardized on-scene emergency management construct specifically designed to provide 
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for the adoption of an integrated organizational structure that reflects the complexity and 
demands of single or multiple incidents, without being hindered by jurisdictional 
boundaries.”426 The ICS is scalable as the investigation or number of victims grows, and 
can incorporate bringing additional public health staff into the investigation.427 As such, 
the ICS is valuable tool to use to coordinate a foodborne outbreak response of any size.  
Despite the value of the ICS in situational management, and the DHS requirement 
of ICS 100/700 for response personnel, only three of the 22 states and county referenced 
this requirement in their outbreak response plans: Kentucky, New Jersey, and Rhode 
Island. These states note that the ICS may be activated during a complex outbreak, and 
include a chart or ICS template for reference. In addition, Kentucky recommends that its 
outbreak responders, in accordance with its ICS cooperate with and provide 
communications to other agencies and organizations including federal, state, and local 
health departments, veterinarians, producers, and animal owners within the state.  
I. PROCESSES AND TECHNOLOGIES USED TO SUPPORT OUTBREAK 
COMMUNICATIONS 
This study looked to identify existing processes and technologies currently 
employed by health agencies to support foodborne outbreak communications. As 
suggested in the CIFOR guidelines, “define a formal communication process for agencies 
of the outbreak response team for use during outbreaks. Options include daily phone calls 
and routine email alerts.”428 Unsurprisingly, the telephone, a ubiquitous business 
essential, is the most common device in use by health departments, as all protocols 
reviewed reference a phone or list phone numbers. Chapter II discussed at length the 
wide range of nets, cores and electronic portals that are assets to intra- and inter-agency 
exchanges. As mentioned earlier, states and counties, as modern businesses, are 
presumed to have access to telephones and fax machines, as well as Internet access and 
email servers, and the protocols reviewed support this presumption. Of greater interest, 
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are other systems or mechanisms that agencies employ, such as the use of after-hour 
phone numbers, cell phones; electronic mail, computer-based tracking systems or any 
effective or innovative forms of communication. 
Beyond the more traditional phone, email, and fax communications, additional 
methods of official information transfer noted in protocols include: 
• Conference calls 
• Health Alert Network (or state version of the HAN)  
• Red Book database (for agency and stakeholder contact information)  
• Face-to-face communication  
• Electronic data systems  
• National Outbreak Reporting System (NORS)/eFORS database429 
• U.S. mail  
• 24-hour hotlines (phone number established solely for the purpose of 
reporting outbreaks)  
• Pager  
• Voicemail 
Technology can fail, which is why it is prudent and essential to establish a 
redundant communication system, or establish ways to verify that the intended agency or 
person received a data transmission. Redundancy also has the added value of verifying a 
message’s integrity and the sender’s authenticity. For instance, Massachusetts requires a 
call to confirm the receipt for any reports sent via fax, and Kansas lists the state courier as 
an option to send or receive information. Kansas also has a 24-hour technical assistance 
contact, whereas Wisconsin has an established email address only for questions and 
updates for the outbreak manual.  
When information is transmitted via email, the electronic correspondence should 
be manifested with a sent, received, or read notification. Confirmation of receipt is also 
                                                 
429 The data transmission tool that preceded NORS was called the electronic Foodborne Outbreak 
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important when using databases; some systems allow users to audit the names of 
individuals who input or viewed information. Of equal importance is awareness when or 
if a specific notification method is or is not acceptable; in other words, whether or not 
notifications are required to be given directly to a live person, to assure the 
communication has been duly transferred.  
Several states are utilizing the Internet for federal or state versions of the Health 
Alert Network, and/or for submitting notifications and reports to the CDC (eFORS; 
NORS, EpiNet). Moreover, within each regulatory agency or state, additional databases, 
intranet portals, file sharing or similar methods may be available that are not specifically 
referenced in their communication protocols. Low tech communication methods, such as 
bulletin boards, white boards, and memos, may be considered business-as-usual 
communication methods, and are not listed specifically as methods of emergent 
information exchange within an agency. With a variety of options for communications 
available, Kansas included several decision trees to assist stakeholders in the best mode 
for information exchange in a variety of outbreak situations.  
1. Declaring an Outbreak 
The CIFOR guidelines lay out the lead-in aspects of a foodborne outbreak, such 
as through surveillance and disease notification or other means. A jurisdiction may find it 
may have a situation that meets its definition for an outbreak.430 Based on the previously 
discussed definitions of foodborne outbreaks, if calls are received from multiple 
individuals who ate the same product or at the same place, it is feasible that a food 
product is involved. Therefore, when such a situation occurs, and points to a potential 
outbreak, investigative procedures call for a preliminary assessment.431  
Core elements of this assessment include verifying the diagnosis to establish the 
existence of an outbreak, typically through an analysis of victims’ symptoms, medical 
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431 Ibid. 
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tests, and case histories. This review lays the foundation for categorizing individuals as 
cases through the formation of a case definition.  
Arizona’s protocols explain that noting that an outbreak is occurring can be 
concluded in a number of ways, such as reviewing the current number of cases and 
comparing a previous comparable period. It is important to see if the information 
available is not due to something other than an outbreak, such as reporting procedure 
changes, differences in case definition, how diagnostics were performed, or just increased 
awareness of the disease or reporting mechanisms. Checking on historical data trends and 
communicating with other jurisdictions to see if they are experiencing similar rates of 
disease can help to establish if the outbreak is real.432  
Nearly every state itemizes the need to establish the existence of an outbreak as a 
primary step in its public health response, but falls short of stipulating how an 
investigating agency should declare an outbreak; if any difference or change in 
communication occurs, depending on the status of the outbreak.  
Outbreaks are typically categorized in one of three ways, depending on the 
strength of available data: 
• Suspect—An agency has opened an investigation into a suspect foodborne 
outbreak related to an event, or related to the consumption of a particular 
food.  
• Probable—Investigation and patient interviews point to the increasing 
possibility of an outbreak. 
• Confirmed—Lab results have verified a particular foodborne agent. 
If the preliminary investigation points to the likelihood of a suspect, probable or 
confirmed outbreak, other local and state health professionals should be advised, based 
on a jurisdiction’s protocols. Given the limited resources that often plague public health 
departments, it can be argued that heightened efforts or an enhanced search for additional 
cases may result if an outbreak is deemed to be real or valid, as opposed to suspect.  
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The hesitation occasionally detected in declaring an outbreak is principally a 
product of distinguishing and authenticating the delineation between a disease cluster and 
an outbreak. Kentucky identifies that the CDC set down definitions for knowing if a 
disease is suspect, as well as probable and confirmed case identification parameters, and 
suggests that amending these definitions to fit current needs in the investigation may be 
helpful. Epidemiological evidence is the usual parameter that takes a situation from a 
suspect or probable outbreak scenario to an actual outbreak event. Once the 
epidemiological evidence points to an outbreak, the documents are in agreement that an 
outbreak should be declared. The mode of declaration of an outbreak is not as clearly 
specified by the states. What does declare mean? Checking a box on a form? Notifying 
staff? Assembling the outbreak team? Amplifying response? Advising other agencies? 
Based on the protocols reviewed, the interpretation of “declare an outbreak” is mostly 
ambiguous, and may depend on staffing and resources available, or be event specific.  
With this in mind, the protocols were reviewed to ascertain the existence of any 
escalation protocols, and if the documents referenced an established chain of 
communication. In other words, after recognizing an outbreak, when does the identifying 
agency notify other public health professionals inside and outside of its organization that 
a food-related epidemic is occurring? The information at hand may point to an outbreak, 
but who is responsible for actually saying that a foodborne outbreak exists? If an 
individual, a team, or an agency declares an outbreak, who do they tell in turn? Is there a 
communication tree? Protocols were also reviewed to identify any points of escalation for 
notification; preliminary assessment vs. suspect vs. verified (from clinical specimens). 
None of the protocols reviewed included tiers of notification based on the intensity of the 
situation. Certainly, greater impact and urgency is given concerning the numbers of ill 
persons, and the severity of the illness.  
Does response change based on the outbreak classification (suspect/probable/
confirmed), or specific triggers like death or media interest? Who is responsible for 
declaring, and telling others? Most “declare” an outbreak only by definition; when the 
person/team/agency officially labels the situation an outbreak, does the communication 
flow change? A distinction does occur between declaring an outbreak vs. developing a 
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working hypothesis. Declaring a suspected outbreak is likely to trigger the involvement 
of the outbreak team.  
When it comes to declaring an outbreak, New Jersey defines a benchmark for 
declaration, “when it is determined the increase in cases is real, and the diagnosis is 
verified, declare an outbreak.”433 However, most states’ protocols do not delve into 
announcing or “declaring” a confirmed outbreak in terms of how to communicate this 
information to others. Instead, they refer to identifying or establishing the existence of an 
outbreak; in other words, examining the data. Examples include North Dakota, which 
specifies, “If sufficient information indicates (an outbreak),”434 and Rhode Island “in the 
event a foodborne outbreak is suspected”435 Kentucky recommends that its outbreak 
team work together to determine if reported foodborne related illnesses should be 
investigated as an outbreak.436 Wisconsin denotes that an outbreak is likely by looking at 
the incidence of the disease in a particular group of people and matching it with a 
comparable previous time period or when point source outbreaks occur.437 
Although the data and circumstances identify an outbreak, a person or persons are 
those who determine, or declare, that a foodborne outbreak exists. Protocols were 
examined to ascertain the inclusion of a communication chain describing how, who, and 
in what timeframe, are contacted when the existence of an outbreak is identified, and 
which other stakeholder agencies are notified.  
2. Triggers for Communicating Outbreaks with External Partners 
The progression of a foodborne outbreak, from initial notification through to the 
completion of final report writing, can be a constantly and rapidly changing scenario. All 
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agencies will come to essential points in an investigation that call for the forwarding and 
sharing of information. Protocols reviewed for this research were checked to identify any 
standardized processes, including notification triggers and timelines, for sharing 
information with the next level of public health, as well as other local, state, and federal 
agencies, as recommended by the CIFOR:438  
Establishing prompts for sharing critical information during an outbreak 
investigation can help prevent delays in response. CIFOR suggests 
standardizing processes for information sharing, including timelines and 
notification triggers. Further, CIFOR stresses the value of knowing which 
team member is responsible for communicating with other levels of public 
health, including federal, state, and fellow health agencies.439  
Triggers can include elements that point to an outbreak of significance; an 
immediate health hazard to individuals or the community, widespread cases, a widely 
distributed food, an unusual agent, the exposed population subsequently dispersed, usual 
or suspicious circumstances, illnesses affecting children, death has occurred, or media 
attention. It is important to recognize that flexibility is needed; no two outbreaks are 
identical. However, an “as needed” approach may be too general a notion for passing on 
essential information.  
The trigger of the suspicion of an outbreak has already been discussed. All states 
have some provision for the initial outbreak notification for a suspect, probable, or 
confirmed foodborne outbreak.  
Few references in state protocols indicate as to what point an outbreak 
investigation would prompt notification of stakeholders outside the state agency 
umbrella.  
Some states, like Kentucky and Wisconsin, included notification triggers in their 
lists of roles and responsibilities. Although some states include situational points that 
should prompt the forwarding or exchange of information, it was not observed to be a 
typically listed trigger or action step in state documents.  
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Virginia lists triggers for when a food traceback and/or recall may be required. It 
ramps up communication to the state Bureau of Child Care if the event affects children. If 
a food traceback or recall are necessitated, communication may be escalated. Third, if 
enteric disease cases are associated with a hospital or hospital-based long-term care 
facility, this situation should trigger outreach to the state’s Section for Long-Term Care 
regulation.440 
Kansas has a list of triggers for suspicious incidents, where law enforcement is 
contacted:  
• Environmental clues, such as reports of unusual color, odor, or appearance 
of food 
• Evidence or tampering in food packaging  
• Unusual agent or vehicle chemicals that do not belong at the site  
• Sick or dead animals in the vicinity of the food preparation facility441 
Minnesota has the following communications triggers:  
• Response to media inquiries 
• Response to legal inquiries  
• Public announcement or proactive notification of media regarding an 
outbreak 
• Coordinating tracebacks with the state department of agriculture, FDA, 
USDA, and CDC, as appropriate442 
In Texas, if a foodborne outbreak is suspected to stem from a meat or poultry 
product, it should trigger the investigator to phone the USDA regional compliance staff, 
and keep them apprised of the investigation status.443  
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3. Sharing Information with External Partners 
Although a health agency may report directly to the CDC, a report to a federal 
agency does not necessarily assure neighboring or affected communities are notified 
about the situation promptly. Agencies should proactively reach out to contact affected 
and neighboring health agencies in a timely fashion.  
Outside of notifying other governmental public health agencies of the existence of 
actual foodborne outbreaks, as previously described, providing and receiving outbreak-
related data is not always as simple as making a request. Privacy issues abound, which is 
why the CIFOR recommends an agency consider its strategies for sharing confidential 
information with other regulatory agencies.444 In addition to the information that can be 
shared, it is important for all the partners working on an outbreak response to know what 
information cannot be shared. 
Privacy issues are a serious concern, and agencies are bound by federal HIPPA 
laws. Beyond this restriction, the protocols did not include much guidance on sharing 
ongoing outbreak information with external partners while an outbreak is active. It is 
another area in which it is difficult to distill out some of the guidance and procedures, as 
it may vary based on a states’ structure; is a local health department considered an 
internal or an external partner? 
Secure systems do exist for some sensitive private data, New Jersey’s 
Communicable Disease Reporting and Surveillance System (CDRSS), for example. 
States that participate in the voluntary NORS database use this system to share 
information with the CDC. Texas uses a state database/electronic bulletin board that 
allows its Department of Health to inform other agencies of a possible outbreak, so that it 
is aware of the problem, and can report cases of similar illness. This bulletin board should 
post the existence of outbreak, ongoing findings, and final results. Also, as discussed at 
length in Chapter II, states and federal agencies can use a wide range of cores, nets, and 
electronic portals to share information securely.  
                                                 
444 Texas Department of State Health Services, Foodborne Disease Outbreak Manual. 
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Sometimes stakeholders and other agencies may become aware of an incident 
through the press or media coverage, and for this purpose, several protocols also have 
some guidance on what information should be included in such communications. 
Kentucky, for instance, includes a section on incident specific information dissemination.  
The following incident-related information shall be disseminated using 
established information-sharing processes via communication systems or incident 
management software systems: type of incident, where the incident occurred, impacted 
area, the number people displaced or injured, identification of the triggering incident as 
suspect or confirmed, health and medical response capacity, impact, laboratory 
confirmation and case definition, as available, a request for public health and medical 
assistance, if required, resources for tracking the situation (links to applicable websites, 
etc.), and anticipation of public information or health guidance release to include 
recommendations for the public and copies of news releases.  
As Louisiana’s protocols indicate:  
the media often obtain information from the public and expect to gain 
more information from the epidemiologists. Information already in the 
media is not confidential and can be discussed as long as the above 
guidelines (patient protection; HIPPA) are followed. When an outbreak 
has gained large media attention, it is useful to prepare an outbreak 
investigation summary limited to statistical results, sanitarians’ inspection 
and common knowledge already in the media’s hands.445 
Minnesota errs on the conservative side. In general, Minnesota’s outbreak 
notifications are shared only when necessary to alert potentially exposed individuals to 
seek medical attention or take other protective measures In addition, information may be 
released if necessary to inform individuals who may be at risk of exposure, or who could 
expose others.446 
                                                 
445 Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Food-borne Outbreak Investigation. 
446 Minnesota Department of Health, Procedures for Responding to Foodborne Disease Outbreaks in 
Food Service Establishments in Minnesota. 
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4. Barriers to Communication 
Barriers to communication can detract from organizational effectiveness. No 
matter how streamlined a communication arrangement, transmission and receipt issues, 
administrative issues, message interpretation, and follow-through, are some factors that 
can inhibit an effective outbreak investigation and response.  
For a situation as serious as a potential or actual outbreak, assuring the 
notification or required acquiescence of agency administration prior to action can be an 
obstacle to response. In addition, the failure to receive an acknowledgement of an 
information transmission can inhibit rapid response.  
Territorial management and information hoarding are potential detractors, 
depending on the mindset of those holding knowledge that could or should be shared. In 
addition, written or unwritten internal policies or directives may limit the circumstances 
and content of forwarded data. Response can lag or move forward based on the ability to 
connect or confer promptly with designated supervisors or management levels. Slow or 
procrastinated approvals could also prevent essential information from reaching the 
appropriate parties in a timely fashion. 
Despite all these potential barriers, very few protocols addressed these issues. 
Both Florida and Maricopa County had alternate steps to follow to connect with an 
appropriate person in case a regional epidemiologist or supervisor could not be reached. 
Minnesota provided instruction to contact the EH section manager or designated 
replacement in the absence of the EH outbreak coordinator.447 
New Jersey acknowledges possible delays in reporting as a concern when 
discerning whether to declare an outbreak over. Further, the state suggests a retrospective 
outbreak response evaluation for stakeholders to consider how successfully the 
communication flow was maintained, in an attempt to improve the process continually. 
                                                 
447 Minnesota Department of Health, Procedures for Responding to Foodborne Disease Outbreaks in 
Food Service Establishments in Minnesota. 
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5. Declaring the Outbreak Over 
In the mission to assure individuals are no longer becoming sick, it is expected 
that regulatory agencies continue with a foodborne disease investigation until an outbreak 
is concluded. An outbreak is considered over, as defined by the WHO, when the number 
of new cases has returned to background levels.448 Even after considering the outbreak 
over, public health officials need to keep an eye on disease incidence for up to several 
weeks to identify if cases begin to increase again. If that happens, the investigation is 
typically continued or restarted. Attribution in such cases could be due to incomplete 
control of the source, or that a secondary situation is linked to the first outbreak.449 If all 
the data show no new cases, the outbreak should be declared over and the public is then 
no longer considered to be at risk. 
It is essential for all agencies that are part of the outbreak response to be aware of 
the end of an outbreak to wind down the investigation, coordinate final details, and 
combine descriptive and analytical epidemiology results for a final report. This essential 
step allows all involved to end the investigation and focus on recovery and the final 
report. However, only five of the 22 protocols reviewed commented on declaring an 
outbreak over or closed.  
Maricopa County urges sending a follow-up closure letter to an implicated 
facility, but does not mention providing similar closure notification to other stakeholders. 
In addition, the County provides guidance for small outbreaks. Its manual conveys, “If 
number of reported ill is less than 5 persons, all ill persons have been interviewed by the 
health department, and there are no hospitalizations or deaths (confirmed by the contact 
person), then consult with supervisor about possibly closing the investigation.”450 
New Jersey, while cautioning to allow for reporting delays, provides for declaring 
an outbreak over when no case that meets the investigation’s criteria is reported within 
                                                 
448 World Health Organization, Terrorist Threats to Food: Guidance for Establishing and 
Strengthening Prevention and Response Systems, 3. 
449 “Investigating Outbreaks,” accessed September 9, 2015, http://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/ 
outbreaks/investigating-outbreaks/investigations/decision.html.  
450 Arizona Department of Health Services, Foodborne and Waterborne Disease Outbreak 
Investigation Resource Manual. 
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two incubation periods. North Dakota combines descriptive and analytical epidemiology 
results in its determination of outbreak conclusions, while the state of West Virginia 
continues to monitor the situation until the outbreak investigation is closed. Wisconsin 
follows an “all clear procedure,” but only for boil water and unsafe water situations; no 
mention of when or how to declare a foodborne outbreak over is included in the 
document.  
With the exceptions just listed, the protocols reviewed did not include any forms, 
sample wording, or distribution guidelines for declaring the finalization of an outbreak.  
6. Reporting and Communicating Findings 
Providing data to other agencies is especially important and notably difficult 
while an outbreak is being investigated. Sharing or releasing the results of an in-progress 
outbreak investigation is best accomplished with an agency lead, to centralize the process 
and allow a health agency to speak with one voice and one message. States were 
reviewed to ascertain any procedures in place to release information among public health 
partners, or to the public in general, in ways that minimize the risk of miscommunication 
or prevent the dissemination of protected information. The CIFOR suggests identifying 
an agency lead responsible for interactions with other agencies and advocates, “the 
establishment of procedures for coordinating communication with partner stakeholders to 
provide consistent messaging and accurate information flow.”451  
Florida chooses to centralize the provision of information by assigning an 
outbreak liaison to handle communication with other agencies. Maricopa’s Outbreak 
Investigation Guide contains a checklist, which specifically identifies communication 
steps. New Jersey ensures procedures for maintaining communication and information 
exchange, as well as decision making, media messages, outbreak updates, and more. 
Kentucky prescribes its incident-related information shall be disseminated using 
established information-sharing processes via communication systems or incident 
management software systems. Texas refers to its electronic bulletin board and database.  
                                                 
451 Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) and Council of State and Territorial 
Epidemiologists, Guidelines for Foodborne Disease Outbreak Response, 104. 
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Developing a communication plan that identifies an organizational 
communication lead will streamline efforts to assure the transfer of consistent 
information to stakeholders, as well as reduce the potential for rumors. These actions can 
contribute to the sustainability of good working relationships after the conclusion of the 
outbreak response.  
Combining and evaluating all aspects of the outbreak investigation to summarize 
essential components of the case effectively is not easy. Written outbreak investigation 
summary reports are mandated by 13 of the states. Completion of the CDC summary 
outbreak form is desired by Maricopa County, North Carolina, and West Virginia.  
Several states have guidelines to assure their reporting goes through a series of 
reviews prior to release. The completed report is then required to be provided to the 
respective state lead and/or the CDC. The CIFOR parallels this guideline in its 
recommendation for public health agencies to assure standardized forms are used for 
every outbreak to assure pertinent information is recorded and shared in the appropriate 
state and national outbreak databases.452  
It is presumed that reports are written to share findings; so ideally, states should 
use a format that can be shared with other stakeholders, even if it is just an executive 
summary with key data points. Several states have a format for the final report or 
stipulate using scientific format in the writing. Arizona has an extensive listing on how to 
prepare a summary report, and Kentucky has an entire chapter on after action reports and 
components. Alabama seeks input from other state outbreak stakeholders for validation of 
the information contained in the report, and Minnesota includes its team members for 
comment on the written report. Before distribution of the final report, Alabama sends the 
draft report to the outbreak team for validation of the information relating to the outbreak 
investigation and findings, after which it is reviewed by the director before final 
submission to the state epidemiologist. Florida looks to assure the appropriate personnel 
will review and forward reports to state and federal agencies.  
                                                 
452 Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) and Council of State and Territorial 
Epidemiologists, Guidelines for Foodborne Disease Outbreak Response, 104. 
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Final outbreak reporting may be subject to additional administrative scrutiny 
approvals or varying tiers of clearance due to HIPPA and similar privacy protection 
requirements:  
• Investigation team 
• Official use (state, fed agencies) 
• Public  
The IAFP suggests that multijurisdictional outbreak reporting should be 
coordinated with other responding stakeholders. It continues to suggest a hot wash or 
debrief of all relevant stakeholders to assure all lessons learned are captured, 
memorialized, and shared. The final report should be as complete as possible. In the 
interest of fairness and continuing cooperation, due credit should be given to all 
investigation participants. Lastly, copies of the final report should be accessible to all, 
and shared with the respective state agencies.453 
Where included in the protocols, access to the final report and distribution lists are 
sent to state and federal agencies of concern. The approved final report should be 
distributed to all agencies that contributed to the investigation effort, and all local staff 
involved. Missouri and North Dakota both agree with this level of distribution, and 
suggest the approved final report be distributed to all agencies that contributed to the 
investigation effort. Alabama shares its reports by posting them on its resources webpage 
for involved state staff and also makes them available to the public upon request. 
Alabama guidelines also propose holding a meeting with those involved to review the 
report, and if a facility is involved, to schedule a meeting with them or call them to 
review the report. Kansas recommends that findings from the investigation be shared 
with the investigation team by the lead food inspector. This point person is also obliged 
to provide a copy of the final report to the corresponding local health department and the 
state epidemiological services.  
                                                 
453 International Association for Food Protection (IAFP), Procedures to Investigate Foodborne 
Illness, 75–76. 
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Oral briefings, appropriate for audiences who cannot or will not read an entire 
report, are required by New Jersey and West Virginia. The oral briefing is assembled 
primarily for the outbreak team and others involved in the investigation, and may include 
the public or the media. Louisiana suggests an appropriate summary be shared with the 
public when a foodborne epidemic is being followed by the media, and expects the 
summary report will be prepared by a member of the outbreak team. In addition to a 
written summary for each individual outbreak, West Virginia also annually summarizes 
all state outbreaks and lessons learned.  
Health agencies are expected to report the findings of an outbreak investigation, 
upon completion, to state health authorities and to the CDC for informative reasons. It 
also allows the federal agencies to update best practices and to add to the current public 
health body of knowledge on outbreaks. The final outbreak summary report should be 
widely shared to meet this goal, and can be accomplished through any combination of the 
following: email distribution, posting in a database, public meetings, press release/press 
conference, submission to professional journals, or presentations at conferences.  
States that specify the content of a final report have similar requirements, which 
are aggregated as follows. Content of the written report should include:  
• Name 
• Municipality and location 
• Name of disease-suspect disease-cause of problem 
• Background 
• Initiation of the investigation  
• Key investigators 
• Epidemiological, environmental and laboratory data 
• Number ill 
• Date of onset 
• Description of symptoms 
• Pertinent medical history and available diagnostic confirmation 
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• Investigation method  
• Investigation results  
• Summary of any site visits conducted 
• Outbreak investigation activities  
• Analysis and interpretation of data 
• Summary of recommendations  
• Discussion 
• Copies of any resources created or distributed (e.g., press releases, letter to 
parents, surveys)  
• Contact information for key contacts at facilities involved in the outbreak 
• Include only statistics, information from the environmental assessment, 
and knowledge already covered by the media 
• Report authors 
In addition, several states require the completion of CDC form 52.13,454 a 
standardized form used to report enteric foodborne outbreak investigations, for input into 
the NORS database. West Virginia indicates the state will report selected outbreaks to the 
CDC. Four require the completion and submission of standardized state forms. Kansas 
also requires the completion of a Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) 
inspection report. West Virginia requests the findings of outbreak response activities as 
soon as possible, if the state had lead responsibility.  
Several states continue the team approach through the final report before it is 
declared “final.” Kansas requires a written report of the lead agency if resources allow. 
Minimally, they should provide the outbreak team lead with pertinent relevant 
information so an end-of-outbreak report can be completed at that level. Minnesota 
requests written reports for probable, as well as confirmed outbreaks. Louisiana suggests 
a “hot-wash,” a post-exit conference with staff and RRT members, held for purposes of 
review, and to evaluate efficacy and appropriateness of the outbreak response activities.  
                                                 
454 “Forms and Guidance,” accessed November 10, 2015, http://www.cdc.gov/nors/forms.html.  
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The timeframe for completion and submission of final reports, where indicated by 
seven states, ranged from 28 days (Alabama) to 90 days (Missouri), with a mode of 30 
days. West Virginia’s timeframe was not as specific, but does request submission as soon 
as possible.  
Written format is the most common mode of documenting and sharing the 
overview of an outbreak to describe what an agency found, what actions were taken by 
the agency, and recommendations for further action. As the IAFP explains, the lead 
agency overseeing the outbreak response should create a narrative report, including a 
summary of all outbreak data, and points that lead to response decisions.455 This 
communiqué ideally contains an accounting of specific outbreak activities, 
recommendations provided, and how effective these interventions were in ending the 
string of disease, actions taken or recommended, and the effectiveness of these actions.  
Ideally, agencies have a format that can be shared with other states, health 
departments and stakeholders, even if it is an executive summary with key data points. 
The written report serves as a performance assessment, a reference for future outbreaks, 
and a document for potential legal issues. Agencies should also consider publishing 
findings in peer reviewed journal, to share lessons learned.  
7. Communication Training 
As with any professional proficiency, training is essential to assure situations 
encountered are handled competently, and to recognize and address barriers, including 
communication.  
The existence of agency protocols for handling a foodborne outbreak is 
purposeful, but a guidance document in and of itself does not necessarily increase the 
skills of the professionals using it. If outbreaks occur infrequently in an agency, the 
application of essential response steps may be a perishable skill. Training functions as a 
tool to improve the efficiency, knowledge, and skills of a workforce, helps to reduce 
                                                 
455 International Association for Food Protection (IAFP), Procedures to Investigate Foodborne 
Illness, 75–76. 
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mistakes, strengthens response, and in the case of outbreaks, can reduce the incidence of 
disease and death.  
In this regard, the CIFOR recommends:  
Team members should be trained in the agency’s outbreak response 
protocols and their role on the team. Training can be provided through 
established classroom and self-study courses but is likely to be more 
effective when interesting and provided through team and interagency 
exercises, on-the-job training during a real-life investigation, and 
debriefings after each outbreak investigation.456  
The IAFP extrapolates this concept further:  
Develop the skills of the staff assigned to outbreak response so that they 
can carry out their role effectively during an investigation and teach them 
procedures to interpret data collected during investigations. Conduct 
seminars routinely, and during or after investigations, to update staff and 
keep agency personnel informed. Train office workers who receive calls 
concerning foodborne illnesses to give appropriate instructions. Those 
who participate in the investigation will learn from the experience and 
often are in a position to implement improvements after the investigation 
is completed.457  
While these recommendations are not specific to communication, they all include 
interdisciplinary communication and coordination as a foundational tenet. However, 
despite the authoritative recommendations for foodborne outbreak response training, less 
than half (nine out of 22) of the documents audited for this study included any reference 
to the training of staff.  
Several alluded to the value of previous outbreak response experience. Iowa, for 
example, conveys that by conducting “routine” foodborne illness investigations, agencies 
are better prepared to investigate and control outbreaks, and considers foodborne 
outbreak response experience as training for more serious, more widespread outbreaks. 
Although experience is a great teacher, more formal training may provide essential 
infrastructure. West Virginia brings this topic to light by stipulating, “this investigation 
                                                 
456 Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) and Council of State and Territorial 
Epidemiologists, Guidelines for Foodborne Disease Outbreak Response, 26. 
457 International Association for Food Protection (IAFP), Procedures to Investigate Foodborne 
Illness, 5. 
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protocol is not a substitute for training and experience in outbreak investigation. Consult 
an experienced trained epidemiologist for complex outbreak investigations.”458 
Other states make note of staff instruction, but provide vague direction on where 
or how to obtain training. Wisconsin instructs the state agency to provide foodborne 
outbreak training materials, and advises that local health departments can prepare by 
training personnel in data collection procedures, such as line lists, questionnaires, and the 
use of databases. Massachusetts provides links to CDC materials. Similarly, Arizona 
asserts that pre-outbreak education is valuable to assure knowledge and application on 
essential procedures, including a questionnaire provision and how to handle clinical 
specimens. The National Food Safety System Project opines that additional training of 
public health professionals is necessary for expanded surveillance and necessitates 
resources at local, state, and federal agencies.459 Missouri agrees, and further explains 
that public health professionals should prepare for an outbreak before it occurs by 
training staff, and lists epidemiologic resources for such training. Florida mentions its 
departmental training, and advises staff to follow all the procedures for learning during 
this education when investigating complaints of illness. Florida also offers training to its 
public health partners, “at the county health department’s request, your Regional 
Environmental Epidemiologist is available to present training to both large and small 
county health department groups on any of these subjects.”460 
For maximum benefit, training for each individual with duties in outbreak 
response should be continuous and needs to emphasize cooperation, coordination, and 
essential teamwork both within an agency and with external partners. New Jersey was the 
only state to specify timeframes for training and training updates to “ensure that all 
outbreak response team personnel are properly trained. Provide, review and update 
                                                 
458 West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, General Outbreak 
Investigation/Notification Protocol. 
459 National Food Safety System Project, Multistate Foodborne Outbreak Investigations Guidelines 
for Improving Coordination and Communication. 
460 Florida Department of Health, Food and Waterborne Disease Surveillance and Investigation. 
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training at least once a year for all staff and within 30 days of hire date for new 
employees.”461 
Notably absent from all the protocols, except New Jersey, was the provision of 
trainings with stakeholders (health care providers, schools, media, etc.). New Jersey 
suggests that to help manage outbreaks, local health departments should routinely educate 
health care professionals and administrators in their respective jurisdictions about their 
obligation to report incidents of communicable diseases.  
Other beneficial aspects of training, such as foodborne outbreak exercises, needs 
assessments, and program evaluations to capture learning effectiveness, relevancy and 
gaps for continuous quality improvement, were not included in the text of any of the 
states’ documents.  
  
                                                 
461 New Jersey Association of County and City Health Officials et al., Communicable Disease 
Outbreak Manual.  
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IV. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In responding to foodborne outbreaks, effective communication guidelines and 
strategies are essential for public health agencies to assure situational awareness and 
interoperability. Based on the content of the states’ foodborne outbreak protocols 
reviewed for this research, this chapter provides conclusions, a summary of 
recommendations, and several suggestions for additional study. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Continuously improving interagency coordination and communication is a goal 
that is fundamental to increasing the effectiveness of this nation’s food safety systems.462  
This study sought to identify routes of internal and external state agency 
communications and categorize how information is exchanged between public health 
agencies during foodborne outbreak response. Commonalities exist within response 
frameworks and protocols adopted by states to assure core investigate principles are met. 
However, no “one size fits all” exists when it comes to coordinating and investigating 
epidemics related to food consumption. Professionals within each state follow their 
respective outbreak guidelines as personnel and resources allow. However, even within 
established protocol architectures, regular review and updates are essential to assure 
communication barriers are identified and addressed. The information laid out in this 
document provides a behind the scenes look at areas in which breakdowns in 
correspondence might occur during outbreak investigations and response.  
Attention to information transfer was apparent in the collective patterns of the 
states, as identified in their response activities, although observable variations occurred 
from agency to agency. Exacting procedures for communication exchange, specifying 
who is responsible for transmitting what information to which public health colleagues 
via what mechanism(s) within a defined time interval, is not universally documented in 
                                                 
462 Stuart A. Capper and Arthur P. Liang, Interagency Coordination and Communication during 
Multi-state Foodborne Disease Outbreaks (unpublished, 2011). 
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outbreak functions. While steps in communicable disease investigation activities need to 
be broad enough to remain nimble and innovative for purposeful response, the lack of 
specificity in information transfer activities can lead to unintentional delays in protecting 
public health.  
Direction for foodborne outbreak response exists in collaborative proceedings, 
such as the CIFOR guidelines; however, exact assignments for managing outbreaks are 
state-specific. This study documented the range of response procedures in existing 
protocols among many of the states. The variability in states’ approaches was 
conspicuous, especially in the areas of outreach and communication. Coordinated 
response, most notably in multi-jurisdictional foodborne outbreaks, can best be attained if 
all players are working with the same playbook. Just as the FDA Food Code is a model 
document that states are strongly encouraged to adopt for synergy in protecting the food 
supply, the CIFOR guidelines should similarly be widely endorsed and adopted by all 
states for functional coaction in outbreak response.  
The comparative analysis of the states’ foodborne outbreak protocols identified 
that strategies used by states for information exchange have similarities. All recognize the 
value of prompt response in identification, investigation, and control. To some extent, all 
reviewed states mention prompt communication, and identify aspects of information 
exchange during investigation activities. Epidemiologists, environmental health 
specialists, and public health nurses are considered core personnel when handling an 
outbreak. A team approach is mentioned by many, but not all states. However, the 
inclusion of other public health professionals, such as laboratory professionals, and health 
educators, are not universally documented as valued assets to the outbreak response team, 
for routine or larger-scale epidemics.  
Analysis of the states’ response protocols also pinpointed areas for improvement 
in communications. Reference to the ICS is lacking in all but a few states’ documents. 
Communication directives are often broad, to allow for flexibility in response. 
Statements, such as “communicate often, early and accurately,” while credible, could 
benefit from specificity, and the inclusion of more measurable response objectives. 
Establishing a communications lead to assure absolute clarity about the outbreak situation 
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at all times can address this responsibility. A well-designed communication plan with a 
focal spokesperson helps to prevent unnecessary duplication, mixed messages, and 
avoidable delays. This area should be formalized in written response plans. Having 
clearly defined methods for intra-agency information exchange and maintaining close 
communication among those included in outbreak interventions is fundamental in 
assuring a coordinated response. While established guidelines may be generalized to 
allow for situational flexibility, enough specificity is necessary to assure appropriate and 
timely notifications to all who should be included in the outbreak response conversation.  
As foodborne outbreaks are often a rapidly evolving, and sometimes confusing 
situation, all agencies should maintain a written, defined, specific, clear, and understood 
communication plan as part of their foodborne outbreak protocols to reduce the 
likelihood of two-way information transmission delays with public health. Up-to-date 
contact information sheets, and clear directions on when and how to distribute 
information to the core team, and to internal and external partners, should be core 
components of planning documents. The interplay of people and agencies involved in a 
local or state response necessitates all public health response staff be trained on how 
information needs to be exchanged, how this exchange will occur, the person or agency 
responsible for the message delivery, and how to confirm the message has been received 
and understood. Designating key staff for inter- and intra-agency communication helps to 
ensure work is not being done in isolation. As outbreak response teams may vary in 
different jurisdictions, roles and responsibilities may overlap. Communication guidelines 
should specify how to incorporate partners that could be involved, and outline when and 
how to share specific information.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
In responding to foodborne outbreaks, effective communication guidelines and 
strategies are essential for public health agencies to assure situational awareness and 
interoperability. Based on the content of the states’ foodborne outbreak protocols 
reviewed for this research, a summary of recommendations is provided.  
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1. Review and Update of Outbreak Communication Protocols  
Outbreak response protocols are the guidance documents for systematically 
investigating disease clusters in a public health agency. As such, they should be timely, 
accurate, and relevant to current practice. While some of the protocols obtained for this 
research were created or updated within the past three years, some date back as far as 
1998. Any organizational guidance documents require review and maintenance to be 
effective. In any given year, organizational needs may change, laws may be created or 
revised, and staff and/or resources may be reallocated, which supports the obligation for 
regular audits and updates.  
It is strongly recommended that all jurisdictions conduct this review and update 
their procedures on an annual basis. It is especially imperative for those agencies with 
older documents to urgently scrutinize and update their procedures to assure the best 
possible response to an outbreak.  
Lessons learned from the experience of responding to cases of disease, the rapid 
pace of new technologies, and lessons learned from localized or multi-regional outbreaks 
can change how and when information is exchanged, and states should regularly look 
towards adapting to new situations. Protocol revisions may be spurred by problems 
encountered during actual response; review and assessment of communications post-
event can provide essential components for continuous quality improvement.  
As a result of potential organizational or staff changes, each protocol document 
should list an author or contact who can be reached for questions or updates. When 
identifying other documents or resources, protocols should include a specific location 
where the reference may be found. For instance, “See directory” should be listed as “see 
directory, located in the XYZ database.” 
In addition, regular review and update of guidelines can help assure staff 
familiarity with localized processes, and individual and departmental expectations and 
responsibilities in foodborne outbreak response. These documents should include a date 
of last revision, to help assure the staff is working from the most current protocols.  
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2. Communication Enhancements 
Coordinated response, especially in multi-jurisdictional foodborne outbreaks, can 
best be attained if all personnel are working with the same playbook. Just as the FDA 
Food Code is a model document that states are strongly encouraged to adopt for synergy 
in protecting the food supply, the CIFOR guidelines should similarly be widely endorsed 
and adopted by all states for functional coaction in outbreak response.  
Communication is an essential element in outbreak investigations. In addition to 
including planning components from the CIFOR guidelines, states’ plans should also 
incorporate prescriptive, but flexible elements to optimize the use of operational 
resources and assure enhanced information transfer.  
Formal communication checklists can provide a quick reference for the 
information distribution chain within and between public health personnel and agencies. 
In other words, which public health professional is responsible for transferring what 
information to which recipient, using what communication methods, under what 
circumstances? Thus, each public health agency should assure its response plans establish 
a communication liaison and backup to guarantee the coordination of information flow. 
To accompany the checklist, communications logs should be used to assure the 
documentation of information transfer. It is important to review and update these 
checklists as necessary after each outbreak event. 
Outbreak response plans need to include a phone tree, or a modern 
communication flow chart. This communications network should incorporate sufficient 
redundancy to address any difficulties in tracking down specific people and to ensure 
messages still get through if one person cannot be reached.  
As electronic communication systems and Internet-based tools are updated, so 
should all agencies adapt their plans to incorporate the most modern, rapid, and 
acceptable means of information transfer. Procedures also should be cognizant of the 
need to handle confidential information, and specify what information can be shared and 
ways to assure data protection.  
 140 
Although the federal government cannot mandate the adoption of certain 
protocols, it could require the existence of a robust foodborne outbreak response 
document—complete with a communication plan—as a prerequisite for the receipt of any 
federal grant monies.  
3. Incident Command System  
Public health agencies throughout the United States, to maintain compliance with 
NIMS, are required to utilize ICS principles to coordinate public health emergency 
responses. As the ICS is a national standard for communication during emergencies, and 
provides the structure for management, reporting, and response, use of this system should 
be stipulated in the text of every outbreak action protocol. The ICS can provide for an 
organized response, especially when entities, such as public health agencies, have limited 
resources. Familiarity with ICS principles and widespread application during foodborne 
outbreaks can help prevent or solve a variety of communication concerns in multi-
disciplinary and multi-agency response.  
4. Regionalized Expertise  
Local health agencies are the first line of defense in foodborne outbreaks. Despite 
this level of defense, resources and multi-disciplinary personnel are often strapped at this 
level. A regionalized approach for food safety expertise is a prudent way of addressing 
this gap, and the federal government has appropriated funding for cooperative agreements 
in this area. The USDA currently funds six integrated food safety centers of excellence 
(COE) and the FDA has provided support for the food protection RRTs in 14 of their 
districts.463 Given the geographical expanse of the United States, these regional entities 
have substantive areas to cover. Ideally, every state should have its own RRT for more 
rapid response and coordination of outbreaks. Funding for additional COEs and RRTs to 
create a more robust regional approach would provide additional resources to assist with 
the burden of foodborne diseases, and allow for the greater integration with the thousands 
of local health agencies serving the nation.  
                                                 
463 “Rapid Response Teams,” accessed November 5, 2015, http://www.fda.gov/ForFederalStateand 
LocalOfficials/CooperativeAgreementsCRADAsGrants/ucm297407.htm.  
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5. Training  
As illustrated in this research, many professional disciplines and professional 
competencies are involved in the investigation and control of communicable diseases 
stemming from the food supply. Assuring the skills of the public health workforce in 
outbreak response is core to a rapid and integrated response to foodborne outbreaks.  
To keep pace with current standards, recurring training must be readily available 
to all persons working in a public health agency. Health agencies should be encouraged 
to provide instruction and practice on interdisciplinary outbreak response, and reduce 
barriers to collaboration and communication. Such training should be offered not only to 
the primary outbreak response professionals (environmental health specialists, 
epidemiologists and laboratory personnel), but also to specialized professionals (health 
education, public health nurses) and administrative and support staff, so they can be 
prepared to act and assist when a large-scale outbreak occurs. Communication tools and a 
variety of outbreak training resources need to be widely available in resource databases, 
such as provided by COEs and the CIFOR. Non-governmental organizations serving 
public health professionals should be encouraged to create and provide regular outbreak 
communication trainings for both introductory purposes and for skills maintenance. 
Local, state, and national communication drills are needed to identify gaps, and assure all 
players are familiar with communication tools and processes. Each health agency, within 
its own policy manuals, should assure every new employee receives foodborne outbreak 
communication training, and when employees are promoted or reassigned.  
Funding opportunities for training and enhancements are often targeted at state-
level agencies or health departments of larger cities and states. Such opportunities should 
be more widely available to smaller health agencies, to identify and create best practices 




C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research reviewed outbreak response protocols from a number of states to 
ascertain communication processes used during foodborne outbreak response. Although a 
picture of communications from state health agencies has been framed, additional areas 
could benefit from further research. 
Although many states have formalized procedures for outbreak response, these 
documents are not aggregated into one location. Further, no data exists to identify which 
local health departments have official frameworks to follow during foodborne outbreaks 
or intentional contamination of food supplies. Gathering and reviewing this information 
can provide a detailed picture of the status of preparedness for food emergencies. 
Public health is not singular in its information-sharing challenges. Law 
enforcement shares similar sensitivity with its communications. Comparing and 
contrasting information-sharing systems and protocols from law enforcement and public 
health may identify best practices that can address existing barriers.  
Many electronic portals exist for information transfer between public health 
agencies. Identifying all the computerized systems, their commonalities, differences, and 
security features may lay some groundwork for functional consolidation and 
synchronization.  
Lastly, no known studies assess the strength of the communication chain from 
federal agencies to states to local health agencies. Ascertaining how rapidly and 
effectively information flows in all directions, from top down, bottom up, and laterally, 
can identify gaps and areas for improvement in communication.  
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